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This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my dear father (1951-2012). 
The knight of immortal youth 
at the age of fifty found his mind in his heart 
and on July morning went out to capture 
the right, the beautiful, the just. 
Facing him a world of silly and arrogant giants, 
he on his sad but brave Rocinante. 
I know what it means to be longing for something, 
but if your heart weighs only a pound and sixteen ounces, 
there's no sense, my Don, in fighting these senseless windmills. 
(Nazim Hikmet, Don Quixote, 1-9)
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Preface
This thesis deals with the interplay between society and technology. In particular, I 
examine the socialization of offshore wind technology in Norway. Offshore wind 
can be depicted as an emerging technology in this context. So far, only one windmill 
is installed at sea. Thus, ongoing debates and negotiations are mainly taking place 
around different visions of feasible futures. This panorama certainly reminds of Don 
Quixote’s effort of tilting at windmills. During his adventurous journey, 
accompanied only by his faithful squire Sancho Panza and his horse Rocinante, Don 
Quixote misinterprets dozens of windmills for fierce giants and decides to attack 
them. In the same vein, some opponents of offshore wind in Norway regard the 
windmills at sea as giant monsters that need to be fought. Similarly, many scientists 
involved in the development of offshore wind technology fear not the windmills 
themselves but a strong imagined public opposition that the windmills may generate. 
However, let us not anticipate too much of the content of the thesis here.  
The three years (and a few extra months) of working with this thesis could as 
well be described as an adventurous journey with its inevitable ups and downs. 
Particularly during the last months, the text became somehow a gigantic monster 
and while writing it I sometimes felt like Don Quixote “tilting at windmills.” Yet, 
while Don Quixote only had Sancho Panza and Rocinante I had many people 
helping and supporting me along the way, making the thesis look less monstrous and 
the writing more enjoyable.    
First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor Knut H. Sørensen for 
his outstanding and valuable guidance during the completion of the thesis. I am also 
grateful to Vivian A. Lagesen for her support and supervision. Special thanks go to 
my colleague Robert Næss for his help while conducting some of the interviews 
together as well as for the inspiring discussions about the data collected.  
I am also very grateful to the rest of my colleagues at the Department of 
Interdisciplinary Studies of Culture for creating such a great working environment. I 
am also thankful to those who have read and commented on earlier drafts of the 
papers and the introductory chapter. Thanks also to Kari Bergheim and Lotte 
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Johanne Sæther for a warm welcome to the department and for taking care of all the 
administrative work.  
I am particularly grateful to my informants for sharing their time and stories 
with me. Furthermore, I would like to thank the Research Council of Norway for 
funding this PhD through the RENERGI program.  
As for my family and friends, I thank for your support, for being there, and 
for continuously reminding me that there are matters more important than this PhD. 
I promise that I will spend more time with you in the future. The biggest thanks of 
all goes to Mickey. I do not know whether it was more difficult for me to write this 
thesis or for you to put up with me during the process. Thank you for your love, 
encouragement and patience.   
Latour (2005, p. 148) remarks: “A good thesis is a thesis that is done.” 
Writing these final words of this work, I can finally and with the greatest joy say 
that it is. 
Dragvoll, April 2014 
Sara Heidenreich 
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Chapter 1: Overview and synthesis 
Introduction 
This thesis deals with the interplay of technology and society. More specifically, it 
addresses the role of news media and scientists for the socialization of the emerging 
offshore wind technology in Norway. Developing offshore wind energy, a 
renewable form of energy generated by wind turbines at sea or on other water 
bodies, is one currently quite popular strategy considered by many countries, 
especially in Europe, but also globally, to increase the percentage of renewable 
energy in their energy mix. A main driver for this development is the respective 
countries’ policies for climate change mitigation that aim at a transition of their 
energy systems from being based on fossil fuels as energy sources to increasingly 
rely on renewable energy in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Other 
motivations for developing offshore wind energy include concerns for energy 
security and the availability of large wind resources and of free space offshore. 
Moreover, moving the production of renewable energy at sea carries the expectation 
of less impact on the environment and on humans and consequently less public 
resistance than land-intensive renewable energy developments such as onshore wind 
energy (Kaldellis & Kapsali, 2013; Veum, Cameron, Hernando, & Korpås, 2011).  
In Norway, offshore wind energy has been described enthusiastically as 
having the potential to become “Norway’s new oil”1 and “Norway’s new industrial 
adventure.”2 Furthermore, the country has been imagined to have the prospect to be 
world leading within offshore wind technology. Offshore wind energy has also been 
mentioned related to depictions of Norway as Europe’s future source of renewable 
energy. It has been described as a potential contribution to Norway’s status as 
“Europe’s green battery”. Despite these optimistic projections, the country has not 
developed commercial offshore wind farms yet. So far, only one pilot turbine, 
Hywind, the world’s first floating wind turbine, is placed in Norwegian waters. 
Although offshore wind technology is new and the development of offshore wind 
parks is just beginning to take off, having only one turbine installed, Norway is 

1PetroleumͲandenergyministerÅslaugHagainNTBtekst05.02.2008.
2PetroleumͲandenergyministerTerjeRiisͲJohanseninKommunalRapport26.06.2009.
6

lagging behind other countries, such as Denmark, Germany or the UK. This is 
related to inter alia the country’s special energy situation and a lack of political 
support, which I will discuss further below. Norway does, however, focus on 
research and development of offshore wind technology. Thus, at this juncture, it is 
unclear what role offshore wind energy will play in Norway.   
Although the term is mostly used for biotechnologies or nanotechnologies, I 
argue that offshore wind in Norway can be characterized as an emerging technology. 
Einsiedel (2009b, p. 3) describes emerging technologies as “technologies in the 
developmental stage of production […] or in early stages of commercialization.” 
She argues that technologies become emergent when they leave the inner circle of 
actors, who are directly involved in technology design and development, and enter 
the public arena. Further, she claims that technologies become emergent earlier 
today than in the past because of a stronger linkage between scientific institutions 
and popular channels. Moreover, public interest in and attention to new technologies 
is increasingly due to today’s easier access to information but also due to active 
government support of certain technologies and the enhanced visibility of social 
groups, either in support of or in opposition to new technologies, in the public arena 
(Einsiedel, 2009b). Einsiedel adds that new technologies are made emergent, i.e. 
made visible and accessible in the public sphere, through the media and various 
other actors, of whom she particularly emphasizes scientists and scientific 
institutions.    
How are new technologies made emergent and how do they become 
embedded in society? In order to account for the processes and practices through 
which emerging technologies are linked to society I draw upon the concept of 
socialization. Grusec and Hastings (2007, p. 1) define socialization broadly as “the 
way in which individuals are assisted in becoming members of one or more social 
groups.” The concept is most commonly used in the context of child upbringing and 
early childhood education to refer to the processes of teaching children the necessary 
skills, norms, values and behaviors in order to function in the culture and society in 
which they grow up (Maccoby, 2007). Similarly, Bijker and d’Andrea (2009) 
emphasize the importance of socializing new technologies in order to be 
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successfully implemented and thus function in society. Hence, with the concept of 
“socialization of technology” the authors refer to processes of embedding the 
technology into society. Bijker and d’Andrea explain obstacles new technologies 
meet in society during implementation with a lack of socialization. Actors, who are 
involved in any processes of embedding technologies into society, are referred to as 
“agents of socialization”. This thesis addresses news media and offshore wind 
scientists as potential socialization agents of offshore wind technology.  
The urgency of addressing the challenge of climate change through 
developing renewable energy, such as offshore wind, and the related policy pressure 
make a study of the socialization of offshore wind technology seem particularly 
relevant. Also, the current trend to move renewable energy production at sea with its 
corresponding expectation of less impact on the environment and humans raises 
interesting and new issues related to the socialization of offshore renewable 
technologies. However, for a better understanding of the socialization of offshore 
wind technology in Norway, it is important to consider the Norwegian context. 
Hence, I will now discuss some major features of renewable energy in general and 
offshore wind energy in particular in Norway.  
Norway, a country with a population of approximately 5 million people, 
distinguishes itself from most other countries by a special energy situation, which 
can be characterized by two main factors. First, the country has a large and 
influential oil and gas industry. In 2012, Norway ranked the seventh largest oil 
exporting and third largest gas exporting country in the world.3  The oil and gas 
industry contributed 23% of Norway’s GDP. In 2011, the industry employed nearly 
55 000 people.4 Notably, the surplus generated by the petroleum sector is saved in 
the Government Pension Fund for future post-oil times. This contributes to the high 
standing of the oil and gas industry in Norwegian society. Second, nearly all of the 
country’s electricity production is from hydropower and thus already renewable. 
Hydropower, which is rather cheap in production, represents a kind of gold standard 
against which all other energy production is measured (Sørensen, 2007).   

3http://npd.no/Publikasjoner/Faktahefter/FaktaͲ2013/KapͲ3/
4http://www.ssb.no/energiͲogͲindustri/statistikker/oljev
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Although electricity production already is almost 100% renewable, total 
energy consumption is not. Thus, Norway focuses on developing new renewable 
energy such as wind, solar and bioenergy. Due to the cooperation through the 
European Economic Area (EEA), the EU directive on the “promotion of the use of 
energy from renewable sources” does also apply for Norway. The country has 
committed itself to increase the share of renewable energy consumed from nearly 
60% in 2005 to 67, 5% before 2020.5
Norwegian policy documents reveal different visions for renewable energy. 
Consequently, renewable energy is linked to several policy areas. The government 
white paper on renewable energy envisions Norway as an “environmentally friendly 
energy nation” (St.meld.nr.11, 2006-2007, my translation). It draws upon 
environmental and climate concerns as motivation for a focus on renewable energy. 
Likewise, the recent white paper on climate policy (St.meld.nr.21, 2011-2012) 
describes new technological solutions, for instance new renewable energy 
technologies, as crucial for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and reaching 
Norway’s aim of being a low carbon society by mid-21st-century. Hence, renewable 
energy is framed as measure for climate change mitigation. In addition, renewable 
energy is framed as measure for economic development. Both the white paper on 
climate policy (St.meld.nr.21, 2011-2012) and the white paper on innovation 
(St.meld.nr.7, 2008-2009) argue that a focus on new renewables would entail 
potential for innovation and industrial development as well as the creation of new 
jobs. Lastly, renewable energy is framed as measure for energy security. It is 
increasingly expected to contribute to the security of energy supplies (St.meld.nr.7, 
2008-2009). However, as Sørensen (2007) points out, this aspect has not been of 
great importance in the past due to Norway’s special energy situation referred to 
above. 
As we have seen, these different government white papers include visions of 
an important role of new renewable energy for Norway as a low-carbon society and 
an environmentally friendly energy nation as well as for industrial development. At 

5http://www.energinorge.no/getfile.php/FILER/NYHETER/ENERGI%20OG%20KLIMA/2011Ͳ12Ͳ
08%20SSB%20Ͳ%20Rapport%20fornybardirektivet.pdf

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the same time, though, the practical implementation of new renewable energy is 
referred to with caution. The white paper on climate policy (St.meld.nr.21, 2011-
2012), for example, discusses the future development of renewables in a rather non-
committal way by pointing to many potential constraining factors such as nature 
conservation concerns and high costs. 
Swensen (2010) also observes this cautiousness about renewable energy 
development in Norwegian energy policy. He argues that although rhetoric and 
visions indicate an ambitious focus on renewable energy technologies, the actual 
focus in government white papers and parliamentary debates is on gas with CCS 
(Carbon Capture and Storage) or as he puts it, “the vision may be to focus on 
renewables, while practically and institutionally gas is facilitated” (Swensen, 2010, 
p. 54, my translation). Swensen shows that this is done by constructing gas with 
CCS as environmentally friendly and framing it in a technology optimistic way. 
Renewable energy technologies, in contrast, are framed more vaguely and without 
political commitment, implying uncertainties about political aims and economic 
feasibility. Hence, Swensen concludes that these different framings allow for a 
continued focus on oil and gas (with CCS) in Norwegian energy policy.  
Renewable energy technologies are rather constructed as objects for further 
research. Concurrently, the white paper on innovation (St.meld.nr.7, 2008-2009) 
states that the government focuses on environmentally friendly technologies by 
financing research and development (R&D). Also the establishment of the national 
Centres for Environment-friendly Energy Research (FME) in 2009 reflects this 
focus on R&D. These centers aim to contribute to climate change mitigation by 
producing leading research on environmentally friendly energy in close cooperation 
with the industry. Two of the now eleven centers, NOWITECH6 and NORCOWE7,
deal exclusively with offshore wind energy. 
The formation of these two research centers happened at a time with very 
optimistic rhetoric about the potential of offshore wind energy, which can be 
summarized by the statements of the two former Ministers characterizing offshore 

6NorwegianResearchCentreforOffshoreWindTechnology
7NorwegianCentreforOffshoreWindEnergy
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wind energy as “Norway’s new industrial adventure” and “Norway’s new oil”, 
which I already referred to above. Norway’s long coastline with abundant wind 
resources seemed to offer ideal conditions for producing offshore wind energy. In 
addition, the development of offshore wind technology was believed to benefit from 
the country’s leading expertise and experience in areas such as marine operations, 
oil and gas, and materials science.  
In 2010, the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate identified 
fifteen potential areas for offshore wind farms (NVE, 2010). Subsequently, the 
directorate carried out an impact assessment and recommended the opening of five 
of the fifteen areas based on good technical and economic conditions and acceptable 
impacts (NVE, 2012). This impact assessment report also touches on the possibility 
of using offshore wind energy to electrify the offshore petroleum industry. This 
solution would increase relevance and opportunities for offshore wind development 
and bring out offshore wind as alternative to new offshore gas power plants (NVE, 
2012).
However, as indicated above, apart from the focus on R&D with respect to 
offshore wind technology, mirrored by the formation of the two research centers and 
by the fact that the only turbine in Norwegian waters is the world’s first full-scale 
floating pilot turbine, not much has happened related to the development of offshore 
wind energy in Norway. This inaction was accompanied by a change in political 
rhetoric, which can be demonstrated by the way the Minister of Petroleum and 
Energy, Ola Borten Moe, who came to office in March 2011, commented on 
offshore wind. According to him, it was too expensive to develop for the time being: 
“It makes no sense to use a lot of tax billions to build wind farms at sea only so that 
they can be at sea.”8
The change in official rhetoric about offshore wind energy is also reflected in 
the development of Havsul, which was the first offshore wind farm granted license 
in Norway. Havsul was planned as the world’s largest offshore wind farm and a lot 
of hope was connected to its development as a breakthrough for Norwegian offshore 

8StavangerAftenblad17.03.2011
11

wind energy. It was planned as bottom-fixed and near-shore wind farm located 
between five and ten kilometers off the coast of Mid Norway. However, in 
December 2012, the developers decided to put the development on hold due to a 
lack of political support.  
Thus, like for renewable energy in general, optimistic visions for offshore 
wind energy meet inaction and cautiousness in practice. The government white 
paper on innovation (St.meld.nr.7, 2008-2009), for example, projects offshore wind 
energy as having great potential, but adds that this lies sometime in the future. 
Another explanation for the fact that Norway is lagging behind other countries in 
offshore wind development is that in many cases deep-sea offshore wind technology 
is needed for installations in Norwegian waters. A development would thus be more 
challenging and costly than in countries with more shallow waters.  
However, the lack of political support for offshore wind energy has been 
criticized. As we have seen above, while the focus on renewable energy is framed as 
measure to mitigate climate change, it is also linked to industrial development. In 
line with the latter framing, offshore wind industry representatives argue that 
offshore wind primarily is about industrial development and that the Norwegian 
offshore wind strategy should address the facilitation of industry and technology 
development for export (Hansen & Steen, 2011). And indeed, while no offshore 
wind farms are installed in Norway, big Norwegian companies, such as Statoil and 
Statkraft, are involved in offshore wind developments in other countries, such as the 
UK, with a more favorable support regime. At the same time, industry 
representatives, particularly from small and medium-sized companies mention the 
lack of a home market as main barrier for offshore wind development in Norway 
and call for more political support in this respect (Steen & Hansen, 2013). 
I also mentioned above that offshore wind energy has been envisioned to 
contribute to Norway as a source of renewable energy for Europe or as “Europe’s 
green battery”. However, as Gullberg (2013) suggests, what the concept of “green 
battery” entails is contested. She finds that while Norwegian decision-makers 
interpret the concept as Norwegian contribution of balancing power from existing 
hydropower capacity, European decision-makers “emphasize the great potential of 
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pumped-storage hydropower9 in Norway” (Gullberg, 2013, p. 622). Gullberg (2013) 
argues that in the short term it is not politically feasible for Norway to become 
Europe’s green battery in the sense of European decision-makers’ interpretation, i.e. 
with pumped-storage hydropower, due to inter alia issues of nature conservation and 
higher electricity prices. She characterizes this development as a long term prospect, 
while for the time being Norway is going to further contribute with balancing power 
from existing hydropower without pumped storage. 
As we have seen, prospects for developing offshore wind in Norway are 
characterized by uncertainty and ambiguity. On the one hand, a home market would 
promise industrial development opening for participation in a rapidly growing global 
market. Further, it could contribute to Norway’s position as source of renewable 
energy for Europe and thus to climate change mitigation. On the other hand, energy 
policy focuses on oil and gas instead of renewables. Both the case of the Havsul 
wind farm, which was put on hold due to a lack of political support, and the missing 
home market highlighted by industry representatives suggest that the inaction in 
offshore wind development “is due to an inconclusive and insufficient support 
regime” (IEA wind, 2010, p. 133). Also the green certificates introduced in 2012 to 
support renewable energy development will probably not further an offshore wind 
development since “the certificate price will be too low to be attractive for OWE 
[offshore wind energy] developers” (Veum, et al., 2011, p. 13). Hence, Benningstad 
(2009, p. 77) claims that offshore wind energy in Norway is characterized by “a high 
degree of technology push, combined with a lack of demand pull.”  
To summarize, studying the socialization of offshore wind technology in 
Norway is particularly interesting for several reasons. Norway has great potential for 
developing offshore wind energy in terms of wind resources and space due to its 
long coastline. Also, the country has an outstanding competence in offshore/marine 
operations developed mainly by the offshore oil and gas industry, which could be 
transferred to offshore wind energy. Furthermore, as Norway already produces 

9ThepumpedͲstoragehydropowerisaboutbalancingEuropeanwindpowerwithelectricityfrom
Norwegianhydropower.WhenthewindisnotblowinginEurope,NorwaywouldexporthydroͲ
electricity.Later,surpluspower,e.g.fromwind,wouldthenbeusedtopumpthewaterbackupinto
thereservoirsandbestoredthereuntilitisneededagain.
13

almost all electricity through renewable hydropower, we could expect the country to 
continue and extend this route by focusing on other renewables as well and take on 
the role as “Europe’s green battery.” 
*
This thesis studies the interplay between technology and society, in 
particular, practices, strategies and visions in regard to the socialization of an 
emerging technology. As mentioned above, Bijker and d’Andrea (2009) argue that 
an embedding of technology into society is necessary for a successful development 
and implementation of emerging technologies. Considering the lack of political 
support for developing offshore wind energy in Norway and the sole focus on R&D 
in this regard, Sørensen (2013, p. 18) suggests that “the involved R&D institutions, 
together with their industrial partners, have been left with the task of innovating and 
commercialising offshore wind technology.” Hence, as Bijker and d’Andrea (2009) 
suggest, scientific institutions have a particular responsibility to act as agents of 
socialization. In this thesis, I focus on two potential agents of socialization, news 
media and scientists, and how they enact their roles in the embedding of technology 
into society.  
Socializing emerging technology involves imagining prospects of possible 
futures for the technology. Through processes of socialization, agents of 
socialization engage in ascribing meaning to the technology. At the same time, 
socialization facilitates public sense-making and hence prepares for a domestication 
of the technology. Different imaginaries and visions of the technology may be 
contested in processes of sense-making or as Einsiedel (2009a, p. 327) puts it: “As 
new sets of technologies emerge, the same passionate battles are fought over 
competing visions of what each might mean, each time pitting the magic of the 
silver bullet against the perils of the poison arrow.”   
Einsiedel argues that for many emerging technologies “the projections of 
potential applications remain just that - projected aspirations and hopes” (Einsiedel, 
2009b, p. 3). Referring to emerging technologies as strategic technologies, she adds 
that these technologies exist not only as projections and imaginaries of scientists and 
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certain stakeholders but involve also national aspirations. Emerging technologies 
could thus be characterized as socio-technical imaginaries, which Jasanoff and Kim 
(2009, p. 120) define as “collectively imagined forms of social life and social order 
reflected in the design and fulfillment of nation-specific scientific and/or 
technological projects.” Accordingly, offshore wind technology could be described 
as socio-technical imaginary and socialization as processes of embedding the 
technology into society, which involve sense-making and constructing visions of 
future prospects for the technology.   
This first chapter aims to provide an overview and a synthesis of the thesis. 
The three papers forming the body of the thesis follow in Chapter 2, 3, and 4. This 
overview and synthesis chapter is structured as follows: In the next section, I 
provide a short summary of the three papers. This summary is followed by a review 
of earlier studies dealing with offshore wind energy and its publics. Then, I discuss 
different theoretical approaches relevant for thesis, which are the basis for the 
following cross-cutting analysis of the three papers as a whole. I conclude this 
chapter with some methodological considerations.   
A summary of the three papers 
The three papers forming the body of this thesis focus on news media and offshore 
wind scientists as socialization agents of offshore wind technology. While paper 1 
analyzes the news media discourse on offshore wind energy, papers 2 and 3 deal 
with different aspects of offshore wind scientists’ imagined publics and socialization 
strategies. 
Paper 1: Dingpolitik at sea: Offshore wind energy in the news media discourse 
The first paper in this thesis sets out from the common expectation that renewable 
energy production at sea will be less controversial than on land, where land-
intensive renewable energy developments have led to many conflicts about negative 
impacts on the environment and humans. Moving renewable energy production 
offshore, and thus “out of sight, out of mind,” carries the promise of preventing 
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public resistance. Hence, the paper aims to investigate whether moving wind 
turbines at sea lives up to this promise. 
The paper analyzes the news media discourse on offshore wind energy. 
Acknowledging the important role of the media for ascribing meanings to emerging 
technologies, the paper investigates how offshore wind technology is made sense of 
in Norwegian newspapers. What possible futures for the technology are constructed? 
News media can be characterized as interface between science/technology and the 
public. They have an important role as source of information for the public, but also 
for agenda-setting and for sense-making of the issues in question. In this paper, I 
regard news media as an arena for Dingpolitik and Naturpolitik. Drawing upon 
Latour’s (2005a) concept of Dingpolitik, which implies a focus on the objects of 
politics, the paper identifies the relevant actors, arguments and perspectives gathered 
around the “Ding” offshore wind technology in order to understand how the 
technology is framed and situated. Based on earlier studies on wind energy, the 
paper also recognizes the relevance of different conceptualizations of nature in 
debates. Hence, it introduces the concept of Naturpolitik as aspect of Dingpolitik to 
analyze the different meanings of nature gathered around offshore wind energy and 
how they are played out in the debate. The analysis of the news media discourse is 
based on newspaper articles from 2000-2010.   
Earlier studies suggest that debates about offshore wind energy can be seen 
as a continuation of onshore debates, particularly related to the continuous 
dominance of aesthetic issues. Thus, they challenge the common belief that moving 
renewable energy production offshore will end the controversy. This paper argues 
that the news media discourse on offshore wind energy cannot fully be considered as 
a continuation of onshore debates. Although not completely living up to the 
expectation of being non-controversial, news media discourse was largely 
supportive of offshore wind energy. Significantly more articles were clearly 
supportive of offshore wind energy (e.g. in 2010: 50% of total number of articles) 
than clearly negative (e.g. in 2010: 10% of total number of articles).  
The findings from a qualitative analysis of the newspaper articles suggest 
that offshore wind energy was made sense of and contested within three different 
16

frameworks: economic, naturpolitical and moral. Notably, both supporters’ and 
opponents’ engagement was triggered by issues within these three frameworks. In 
the economic framework, which appeared as privileged frame of interpretation, 
supporters highlighted national and local economic benefits while opponents argued 
that the development of offshore wind is too expensive. The naturpolitical 
framework was characterized by supporters who constructed offshore wind energy 
as environmentally friendly and as a contribution to climate change mitigation. 
Opponents, by contrast, argued that it has severe environmental consequences on 
both seascapes and biodiversity. Within the moral framework, supporters argued that 
Norway has a moral responsibility to produce more renewable energy to export to 
other countries. Opponents, however, did not agree on this moral responsibility and 
did not want Norwegian taxpayers to pay for an export of renewable energy. Thus, 
since aesthetic concerns lost their dominance and accordingly, Naturpolitik shifted 
to embrace other issues, the paper argues that the offshore debate involved a 
different Dingpolitik than onshore.  
Interestingly though, the Ding itself, the offshore wind technology, was not 
contested in the controversy. Little was written about the design of the technology 
itself. Values rather than facts were contested, or matters of concern rather than 
matters of fact, and the technology remained blackboxed. Following these 
observations, the paper concludes that news media discourse illustrates a twisted 
Dingpolitik. 
Paper 2: Sublime technology and object of fear: Offshore wind scientists 
assessing publics 
As we have seen in paper 1, the news media discourse on offshore wind energy was 
largely supportive, though not completely uncontroversial. News media are central 
in public discourse (Weingart, 2011) and although they do not mirror public debate, 
they provide a partial representation of it. Paper 2, then, shifts the attention from 
news media representations of public debate to scientists’ constructions of publics. 
The paper draws on the concept of “imagined lay person” (ILP) introduced 
by Maranta et al. (2003). ILPs are functional constructions of lay people inscribed in 
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the design of the technology. Hence, scientists’ imaginings of publics are 
performative, in the sense that they may influence scientists’ technology design as 
well as their socialization activities. Based on interviews with scientists associated 
with two national research centers of offshore wind energy, this paper investigates 
offshore wind scientists’ imagined publics.  
Earlier studies of experts’ imagined publics find constructions of the publics 
as resistant to the science or technology in question, often attributing this to 
irrational and emotional thinking among publics in contrast to rational, factual 
science. However, as paper 1, also this paper expects offshore wind energy to be a 
particular case. Offshore wind turbines will be developed at sea and thus may be 
“out of sight, out of mind.” Hence, offshore wind is claimed to be a solution for 
problems with public resistance experienced onshore. Thus, we may expect that 
scientists would not be concerned about public resistance and either imagine publics 
to be positive or indifferent to offshore wind developments, or not to consider or 
care about the public at all. How did the scientists’ imagined publics reflect this? 
Did resistance play into their imagined publics?  
The paper identifies three main narratives of scientists’ imagined publics. 
The first narrative, out of sight, out of mind: the narrative of the positive public, 
confirmed expectation of offshore wind energy as special case. Scientists did not 
worry about public resistance and claimed that since turbines would be placed far at 
sea they would be away from public concern. Thus, they constructed the issue of 
visibility as essential for public attitudes. Interviewees expected fewer conflicts 
offshore than onshore and the public was portrayed as positive towards the 
technology. In the second narrative, new jobs and high electricity prices: the 
narrative of economic concerns, scientists drew upon an economic framework to 
construct both supportive and resistant publics. In the third narrative, making the 
public NIMBY: the narrative of the negative public, scientists expressed a fear of 
public resistance, which was mainly linked to environmental impacts and a 
construction of the public as having a NIMBY (not in my backyard) attitude.  
Notably, the interviewed scientists did not adhere to one narrative. Instead, 
they were moving back and forth between them. Hence, offshore wind scientists’ 
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constructions of publics were ambivalent and messy. On the one hand, they 
constructed the public as positive or indifferent towards a sublime offshore wind 
technology, which they thus could develop and implement independent of the social 
context. Surprisingly, the public was at the same time imagined as resistant and 
consequently, offshore wind energy constructed as object of fear.  
The paper argues that the offshore wind scientists’ imagined publics depict a 
disembedding of offshore wind technology. It attributes particular significance to the 
persistence of the NIMBY concept in the scientists’ imagined publics, as the concept 
seems to be outdated as explanation for public resistance in mainstream social 
science. The portrayal of the public as irrational resistant “others”, as in the NIMBY 
concept, allowed the scientists to discredit opposition. Hence, as in the “out of sight, 
out of mind” narrative, development of technology can happen without considering 
the public. Taken into consideration the surprising persistence of imaginings of 
public resistance, the paper concludes by suggesting a pessimistic engineering 
mindset, i.e. that scientists fear to fail with their technology because of public 
resistance.   
Paper 3: Outreaching, outsourcing and disembedding: How offshore wind 
scientists consider their engagement with the public 
Paper 3, then, changes the focus from offshore wind scientists’ imagined publics to 
their socialization strategies. By depicting offshore wind scientists’ narratives of 
science-public relations in the context of offshore wind energy, the paper analyzes 
how they view their own role in public engagement. 
The background for this paper is an expectation and increasing pressure 
towards scientists to act as agents of socialization of emerging technologies. This 
role is attributed to scientists both by science policy and by normative social science 
theory, such as the socialization of technology approach (Bijker & d'Andrea, 2009). 
In addition, there is the expectation that scientists pursue dialogic and participative 
socialization strategies instead of merely a public education strategy.  
The particular Norwegian context, however, may raise ambivalent 
expectations. On the one hand, again, offshore wind technology promises 
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implementation without public protest. On the other hand, an offshore wind 
development is dependent on public support for covering the high initial investment 
costs. In addition, offshore wind is competing with the oil and gas sector for 
resources. This should motivate scientists to act as socialization agents.  
The paper finds a diversity of socialization strategies among the interviewed 
offshore wind scientists. Despite the normative move towards dialogic and 
participative approaches to science communication, only a few of the interviewed 
scientists mentioned these strategies. In contrast, as observed in earlier studies of 
scientists’ communication strategies, a public education strategy paralleling the 
deficit model was dominant. However, while only a small group of scientists viewed 
their own role as public educators, many referred to the difficulties of being 
outreaching scientists and/or argued that public education should be outsourced and 
carried out by “others”. In that way, they avoided the role as socialization agents. 
Likewise, in the common strategy of non-engagement, active socialization was 
avoided by the interviewed scientists. Here, the scientists declared socialization 
irrelevant and technology development as disembedded. Notably, even those 
strategies involving some degree of activity on part of the scientists were referred to 
as strategies they “ought to pursue” rather than something they were already doing.  
The paper argues, then, that the imagined publics laid out in the second 
paper, were indeed performative. They influenced the scientists’ socialization 
strategies. Constructions of the public as resistant were likely to be followed by a 
public education strategy, while constructions of the public as supportive often were 
related to the narrative of disembedded technology development.  
Considering the increasing pressure on scientists to socialize emerging 
technologies, the dominance of strategies that did not involve scientists as active 
agents of socialization is surprising. Thus, the paper concludes with the observation 
that the interviewed scientists preferred to stay in their ivory towers and develop 
technology without considering the social context.   
*
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Together, these three papers tell a somewhat surprising story of the 
socialization of offshore wind technology. Put very simplified: Although news 
media discourse was largely positive towards offshore wind energy, the scientists 
imagined the public as potentially resistant. However, neither the scientists’ 
imaginings of the public as resistant nor the expectations put forward to them to act 
as socialization agents seemed to spur enough motivation; the majority of the 
scientists did not engage in the socialization of offshore wind technology.  
This thesis deals with news media and scientists as agents of socialization of 
offshore wind technology. The important role of the media for the socialization of 
technology has frequently been emphasized. The media can be considered a 
mediator between science/technology and society; they provide information to the 
public, have a role for agenda-setting, and are regarded as one of several sources for 
public sense-making (Bucchi, 2008; Cox, 2010; A. Hansen, 2010; Olausson, 2011). 
Likewise, scientists have been given the role as potential socialization agents in 
social science studies of science/technology and society. Further, public engagement 
with science and science communication have been increasingly on the agenda in 
science policy. 
Before taking a closer look at the concept of socialization and the two agents 
of socialization, let us take a step back and consider the question why a socialization 
of offshore wind technology is relevant at all. So far, I have argued that in particular 
emerging technologies require socialization. However, as the summaries of the three 
papers indicate, offshore wind technology is commonly believed to be a technology 
for which an embedding into society is irrelevant because wind farms will be “out of 
sight, out of mind” of society. Is that the case? I hope to shed some light on these 
questions with the following overview of earlier research on offshore wind energy 
and its publics.  
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Offshore wind energy and its publics 
Extensive literature has addressed public engagement10  with wind energy. Most 
studies focus on onshore wind energy. Offshore wind, by contrast, has been studied 
much less (Devine-Wright & Howes, 2010). This can partly be explained by the 
simple fact that most wind farms to date are onshore and that offshore wind 
developments are rather new. However, as Whitmarsh et al. (2011) point out for the 
UK context: 
Given that offshore wind is likely to be a major growth sector over the 
next 25 years, and that offshore projects may be quite different to 
onshore in terms of public engagement and acceptance, for example due 
to the very different spatial implication of an offshore project, future 
studies of offshore are needed (and should not be seen as duplicating 
onshore wind studies). (Whitmarsh, et al., 2011, p. 145)  
As we have seen, offshore wind energy is often claimed to be different than 
onshore. It is believed to generate less public resistance and thus be a “solution” to 
onshore problems. Several studies, though, suggest that offshore projects are similar 
to onshore projects with respect to the extent and character of public concern (Ellis, 
Barry, & Robinson, 2007; Haggett, 2008; Wolsink, 2010). Hence, public concerns 
about offshore wind energy are described as a continuation of discussions and 
debates related to wind on land. Thus, in order to provide a background for a 
discussion of the growing number of studies about offshore wind, I will first 
introduce some main features of the literature about onshore wind energy.  
Explaining public resistance to wind energy 
The focus of social science research on wind energy has mainly been on public 
attitudes and acceptance, on explanations of the underlying reasons for public 
attitudes as well as on issues of local participation in planning and decision-making. 
This research has various methodological approaches to studying public 
engagement.  

10Iusepublicengagementasabroadoverarchingtermhere,whichincludespublicattitudes,
acceptance,understandingandpracticesaswellaspublicparticipationprocessesandorganized
engagementactivities.
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One focus has been to measure public attitudes to wind energy by means of 
quantitative survey studies. Many of these studies find a high support of wind 
energy in general among the public, but also related to specific wind energy projects 
(see e.g., Barry & Chapman, 2009; Bidwell, 2013; Ek, 2005; Krohn & Damborg, 
1999; Swofford & Slattery, 2010; Warren & McFadyen, 2010). Despite this high 
level of public support, particular wind farm developments often meet local 
opposition, which is thought to potentially block or at least slow down the 
implementation (Wolsink, 2007). Thus, public acceptance is considered as one of 
several factors limiting the growth of wind energy (Ellis, et al., 2007; Toke, 2005). 
Many studies have therefore focused on the search for explanations and underlying 
reasons for this public opposition. Public support, on the contrary, has been studied 
less (Ellis, et al., 2007). 
A very common explanation of the gap between strong general support and 
local opposition to particular wind farms among policymakers and developers, in the 
media and in public discourse has been to refer to NIMBY (Not-in-my-backyard) 
attitudes among the public (Cotton & Devine-Wright, 2012; Mcclymont & O'hare, 
2008; Wolsink, 2012). The NIMBY concept is based on the assumption that people 
generally are positive towards developments, such as wind energy, but become 
resistant when these developments are planned in their own neighborhood. Thus, 
people are thought to place their individual interests above the common good. 
NIMBY is often attributed to local publics in a pejorative and sometimes even 
insulting way with underlying assumptions of resistant publics as irrational and 
selfish. Partly because of this negative depiction of publics, the use of the NIMBY 
concept to explain local resistance to wind energy projects has been widely 
criticized (Aitken, 2010b; Devine-Wright, 2009; Haggett, 2011; Wolsink, 2012). 
The NIMBY concept has also some underlying issues of racism, class and gender, 
which however, have been addressed more in studies on conflicts about the siting of 
other facilities than wind turbines (Wolsink, 2006).  
Also, an increasing number of studies points out that the assumptions, which 
the NIMBY-concept is based on, i.e. the proximity hypothesis and the decreasing 
property value hypothesis, do not always apply (Wolsink, 2012). By contrast, many 
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studies show that people living close to wind turbines are as supportive or even more 
supportive towards wind energy than people living farther away and that the 
distance to wind turbines has no significant effect on property prices (Ek, 2005; 
Haggett, 2010; Hoen, Wiser, Cappers, Thayer, & Sethi, 2011; Jones & Eiser, 2010; 
Swofford & Slattery, 2010; Warren, Lumsden, O'Dowd, & Birnie, 2005). However, 
although the NIMBY concept has been declared inappropriate as analytical tool by 
mainstream social science (Burningham, 2000; Wolsink, 2006), e.g., Burningham et 
al. (2006) and Wolsink (2012) show that it is still found as unquestioned explanatory 
tool, even in some academic studies (see e.g., Dear, 1992; Lim & Lam, 2014).  
Following the criticism of the NIMBY concept, other explanations for public 
opposition to wind energy have been suggested. In a widely cited paper, Bell et al. 
(2005) characterize the observed gap between high general public support and local 
opposition as “social gap” and propose three explanations for it: (1) the democratic 
deficit explanation, i.e. that a strong opposing minority dominates decision-making 
because the supporting majority is silent and does not have the same incentives to 
participate in decision-making, (2) the qualified support explanation, i.e. that most 
people support wind energy with qualifications and that certain conditions, such as 
the protection of biodiversity and landscapes or community benefits, have to be met 
for people to be supportive, and (3) the self-interest or NIMBY explanation. Hence, 
Bell et al. argue that NIMBYism, or what they call the individual gap, is just part of 
the explanation for the social gap and cannot alone explain local opposition.   
However, an increasing number of publications focusing on explaining 
public opposition with more complex explanations than the NIMBY concept, 
inspired Bell and colleagues to revise their explanation of the “social gap.” Instead 
of explaining the social gap with “any single attitude type” (Bell, Gray, Haggett, & 
Swaffield, 2013, p. 130), they explain it with two factors, which partly are a 
combination of the three single explanations in their original paper. First, they argue 
that “there are large numbers of qualified supporters and (some) place protectors as 
well as a few unqualified opponents and, perhaps, some self-interested NIMBYs, 
who may all work together to oppose particular wind energy developments” (Bell, et 
al., 2013, p. 130). Second, they point to the institutional rules in wind power 
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planning, which make it possible for a strong group of opponents to be successful in 
preventing wind energy projects although they only hold a minority view.  
Another widely cited criticism of the NIMBY concept was provided by 
Devine-Wright (2009, 2011), who proposes to frame the so-called NIMBY-protest 
as “place-protective actions, which are founded upon processes of place attachment 
and place identity” (Devine-Wright, 2009, p. 432). He explains local resistance as 
reactions to changes or disruptions to places to which people are emotionally 
attached. Changes to such places may threaten place identity and thus cause place-
protective behavior, such as opposition to the installations of wind turbines.    
Underlying reasons for public attitudes, both in support and in opposition, 
have been investigated by many studies, both quantitative and qualitative. They 
include a diversity of issues ranging from visual impact of turbines, environmental 
consequences and noise to economic aspects connected to community benefits, job 
creation, stimulation of local economy, effects on electricity prices and tourism and 
issues of participation, procedural justice and trust, amongst others. However, 
conflicts about wind farm siting can often be attributed to contested values rather 
than contested facts (Warren & Birnie, 2009), or as Ellis et al. (2007, p. 521) argue, 
“key issues facing wind farm development are not ‘objective’ policy blockages, but 
clashes of values related to inter alia, governance, technology, landscape aesthetics, 
issues of participation and power inequalities.” 
Bidwell (2013), for example, finds that altruistic values encourage support of 
wind energy while traditionalist and conservative values nourish opposition. Warren 
et al. (2005) describe conflicts of environmental values related to wind energy as 
“green on green.” With this notion the authors point out that conflicts about wind 
energy often divide environmentalists. Supporters would argue for clean, renewable, 
green energy and link it to climate change mitigation while opponents would refer to 
impacts on landscape and biodiversity. Thus both supporters and opponents draw 
upon an environmental framework in their argumentation.     
Another focus of the literature on public engagement with wind energy is on 
the role of public participation in planning processes and decision-making and its 
25

impact on the outcome of planned wind energy projects. Research indicates that 
local participation in decision-making and local/community ownership has a 
positive impact on public attitudes towards wind projects and may thus lead to more 
successful developments (Anderson, 2013; Devine-Wright, 2005; Toke, Breukers, & 
Wolsink, 2008). Trust between publics and developers is frequently mentioned as 
essential for public participation and thus for a more successful implementation of 
wind energy (Hall, Ashworth, & Devine-Wright, 2013; Walker, Devine-Wright, 
Hunter, High, & Evans, 2010).   
While many studies regard public acceptance as an important factor for wind 
energy development, Aitken et al. (2008) and Aitken (2010a) challenge this 
assumption by showing that the role of public opposition is rather limited in 
planning processes. Wind energy developments that the authors studied were not 
prevented by local opposition groups, only delayed. The authors argue that decision-
makers rather than local opposition groups are influential in the process and that the 
planning system itself limits the power of participating publics by constraining the 
kind of participation that would really challenge the wind energy development as 
such (Aitken, et al., 2008). However, later Aitken argues that not only the planning 
system but also local opposition groups themselves limit their participation 
possibilities (Aitken, 2010a).  
In a different paper, Aitken (Aitken, 2010b) further criticizes the existing 
literature on wind energy for having other assumptions that, as she argues, restrict 
research and findings. She describes, for example, that the literature often presents 
support for wind power as “normal” and opposition as deviant. She accuses the 
literature of siding with wind developers and thus aiming to overcome public 
opposition and foster greater acceptance for wind power. She argues that “the 
literature must abandon that it knows who is ‘right’ and instead must engage with 
the possibility that objectors to wind power are not always ‘wrong’” (Aitken, 2010b, 
p. 1840) and that a fair regard for opposing views would create a more open 
dialogue between the relevant stakeholders of wind energy projects. 
To summarize, social science studies on wind energy have focused on public 
opposition and on finding the underlying reasons for it. How has public engagement 
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with wind energy been addressed in Norway? Norway does only have a few onshore 
wind farms. However, survey studies about onshore wind energy in Norway point to 
a positive attitude among the general public (Karlstrøm & Ryghaug, 2014). Bye and 
Solli (2007) suggest that the low degree of wind energy developments in Norway 
can be explained by the fact that wind energy has changed meaning in the public 
debate during the last decades. From being a green environment-friendly alternative 
energy source it has become a negatively connoted technological intervention in 
nature and landscapes. As such, the debate on wind energy could be characterized as 
an example of contested environmental values or a “green on green” conflict 
(Warren, et al., 2005). In a study of two wind energy projects, Solli (2010) points to 
the importance of environmental arguments, mainly related to biodiversity and in 
particular birds, for local opponents’ strategies. He analyzed how opposition groups 
constructed their argumentation, e.g., by using birds to represent threatened nature, 
to fit both local and national environmental concerns in order to be successful and 
convincing. Also Rygg (2012) shows in her analysis of wind energy developments 
in local communities that opponents draw upon environmental arguments. However, 
contrary to expectations, supportive arguments did not refer to environmental issues 
such as sustainability or climate change mitigation. Instead, wind energy 
developments were framed as “modernization hybrids” (Rygg, 2012, p. 175), as 
solutions for economic problems of small municipalities promising employment and 
industrial development.  
Siting offshore as solution for onshore problems? 
As mentioned above, it has often been claimed, also in the Norwegian context, that 
offshore wind energy will be a solution to the problem of public resistance 
experienced onshore. Haggett (2008, p. 292) argues that offshore wind “is seen as a 
good thing not just in its own right, but because it may be the answer to many of the 
problems encountered with onshore developments.”  
In this context, it is important to remember that problems related to the 
development of onshore wind are diverse and complex and that the influence of 
local opposition on these processes is disputed. Thus, studies of public engagement 
27

with offshore wind energy have often focused on the question whether a siting 
offshore really provides a solution to the “social gap” by preventing local opposition 
because turbines are placed at sea and thus removed from people. Parenthetically, 
this assumption alone could easily be said to have an underlying construction of 
publics as NIMBYs.  
The expectation that problems with public resistance are solved when 
moving wind turbines offshore is supported by survey studies that show that people 
generally are even more positive to offshore wind energy than onshore wind energy 
(Karlstrøm & Ryghaug, 2014; Ladenburg, 2008). Nielsen, e.g., states that 
developers based on their experience with the Vindeby offshore wind farm in 
Denmark concluded “that there are no real problems – only advantages – in terms of 
environmental and public acceptance of offshore siting” (Nielsen, 2002, p. 122). 
Similarly, Mander (2008) finds in her study of discourse coalitions in wind energy 
planning in North West England that a siting of wind turbines offshore instead of 
onshore seems to be the only scenario upon which the otherwise disagreeing and 
conflicting groups of wind supporters and landscape protectors could agree.  
However, other studies looking at particular offshore wind developments 
suggest that public concerns about offshore wind are quite similar to the ones about 
onshore wind energy although controversies may partly focus on slightly different 
topics (Ellis, et al., 2007; Haggett, 2008; Huber & Hobarty, 2010; Whitmarsh, et al., 
2011; Wolsink, 2010). As Wolsink (2010) points out, most offshore wind farms are 
near shore and not “out of sight.” Thus, seascapes may play the same role for public 
attitudes to offshore wind as landscapes for onshore wind. Moreover, Haggett 
(2008) adds, offshore wind farms may even be visible for a greater amount of people 
than onshore wind farms, and emphasizes the importance of studying visual impact.  
Consequently, the influence of visibility and visual disamenities on public 
attitudes to offshore wind energy has been investigated thoroughly. Several survey 
studies suggest that publics are more positive to wind turbines when they are placed 
at a larger distance from shore than when they are placed near shore (Bishop & 
Miller, 2007; Krueger, Parsons, & Firestone, 2001; Ladenburg, 2009; Ladenburg & 
Dubgaard, 2007). The effect of visual impact on public attitudes is also related to 
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patterns of usage of beaches and coastal zones indicating that people who are more 
connected to the coast due to frequent usage perceive the visual impact of offshore 
wind farms more as disamenity than people using the beach less frequently 
(Ladenburg, 2010; Ladenburg & Dubgaard, 2007).  
The effect of distance of turbines to the coast has been particularly studied in 
the context of tourism. Lilley et al. (2010) find that some beach-goers would avoid 
the beach due to the visibility of the offshore wind farm and that a siting further 
away from the coast would be preferable. However, the attraction to beaches with 
visible wind farms and the interest to take boat tours to the wind farm is greater than 
the avoidance of these beaches reported in the survey study. Thus, effects on tourism 
may be positive. Furthermore, Landry et al. describe that a majority of their survey 
respondents claim that an offshore wind farm could have a positive influence on the 
seascape and they conclude by characterizing public attitudes as “preference 
heterogeneity – some respondents find the scenario appealing while others find it 
aversive” (Landry, Allen, Cherry, & Whitehead, 2012, p. 110; see also Haven et al., 
2011).
When discussing aesthetics and visual impact it is important to note that 
Kempton et al. (2005) find related to the Cape Cod wind farm off Massachusetts that 
what their respondents referred to as “the view” includes other concerns than only 
visual and aesthetic. The value and specialness of the ocean in general and the idea 
that humans do not have the right to intrude the ocean as well as a perception of the 
uniqueness of Nantucket Sound in particular all played into public perceptions 
linked to aesthetic issues. Similarly, Gee (2010, p. 185) identifies “deeply held 
convictions of the sea as a natural space, [and] deeply held views of the local 
landscape and linked to this local identity” as major public concerns related to 
offshore wind developments in Northern Germany. This could be related to the 
concepts place attachment and place identity mentioned above (Devine-Wright, 
2009).
Several studies focus on the Cape Wind project that I just referred to, which 
is the first offshore wind park to be built in the USA. Cape Wind has been very 
controversial. Comparing public attitudes to a project in Delaware to public attitudes 
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to the Cape Wind project, Firestone et al. (2012a) find 80% support in Delaware vs. 
only 57% support for Cape Wind in 2009.  
By conducting survey studies in different years (2005 and 2009), Firestone 
and colleagues are able to show the dynamic nature of public attitudes. Firestone & 
Kempton (2007) analyze the underlying factors of the public attitudes. Most 
participants of their study expected negative impacts of the offshore wind farm 
mainly with respect to aesthetics, community harmony, fishing and recreational 
boating and a little less on property value, bird life, marine life, and tourism. The 
main positive impacts expected by local publics were on electricity rates, job 
creation and air quality. Interestingly, both supporters and opponents ranked 
environmental effects as main reasons for their attitudes, pointing to a “green on 
green” conflict also here. In the survey study conducted four years later, Firestone et 
al. (2012a) find that the main reasons for opposing the offshore wind park were 
linked to the usage of the sea; that is local fishing and recreational boating, while 
support was related to energy independence and electricity price. Thus, as Firestone 
(2011, p. 236) argues, “findings are snapshots in time.” Public perceptions and 
opinions are highly dynamic and contextual, rather than predetermined and static 
(González & Estévez, 2005). 
As we have seen in the case of onshore wind energy, also debates about the 
development of offshore wind energy are characterized by contested values 
underlying the conflicts rather than contested facts (Kempton, et al., 2005). Conflicts 
can often be characterized as “green on green” or as conflicts of contested 
environmental values. In the early Cape Cod study, Firestone & Kempton (2007) 
find that both supporters ranked environmental effects as main reasons for their 
attitudes. González & Estévez (2005) describe divided environmentalists in the 
context of a proposed offshore development in Southern Spain, where Greenpeace 
and the Green party were supporting the development while local ecologist groups 
were among the opponents.  
The unfolding of planning and decision-making processes affects public 
opinion also related to offshore wind developments. Public participation and local 
ownership is claimed to be important for a successful implementation (Sørensen, 
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Hansen, Hammarlund, & Larsen, 2001; Wolsink, 2010). However, as e.g., González 
& Estévez (2005) show in their study, participation exercises have to be organized in 
a way so that public stakeholders feel that they actually have influence on the 
decision-making. In addition, trust in developers and organizers of participation 
exercises need to be established for a successful process. In this particular case in 
Southern Spain, a forum was organized to activate public participation. However, in 
the end it seemed more effective for local opponents to stay on the outside and 
protest mainly through a media debate than to participate in the formally organized 
processes. Some reasons for this were a lack of trust in the administration and 
developers and that local actors experienced a lack of will on the side of 
administration and developing companies to discuss with local actors. Also 
Firestone et al. (2012b) show that positively perceived transparency, fairness and 
local participation correlated with supportive public opinion, thus supporting the 
assumption that public participation in planning processes influences public 
attitudes. 
Gray et al. (2005) address the issue of participation by studying the 
controversy or “power game” between offshore wind developers and the fishing 
industry in the UK. The fishing industry is indeed one of the most important 
stakeholder groups related to offshore wind energy and also a new actor who did not 
appear to be relevant related to onshore wind energy. The authors describe the 
fisheries’ position as rather weak compared to the powerful offshore wind industry, 
which, at least in the UK, has political as well as public support. Similar to the local 
opposition groups in Spain described above, the fishery community perceived the 
formal participation exercises “as mere cosmetic exercises, with little meaningful 
dialogue at national level between fishing and wind energy representatives” (Gray, 
et al., 2005, p. 134). However, other than in the Spanish case, due to the relative 
weakness of the fishery the authors concluded that the fishery would only “stand a 
chance of resisting the relentless spread of offshore wind turbines” (Gray, et al., 
2005, p. 139) if they presented themselves as more united and succeeded in 
mobilizing potential allies, such as local communities or environmental 
conservationists.  
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To summarize, it has been a common expectation that offshore wind energy 
is different than onshore wind in the sense that it generates more public support and 
easier public acceptance. This may be true for some cases. Against expectation, 
however, many studies about developments of particular offshore wind farms in 
places, such as Northern Ireland (Ellis, et al., 2007), North Wales (Devine-Wright & 
Howes, 2010), Northern Germany (Gee, 2010; Glaeser, 2004), the Dutch Wadden 
Sea (Wolsink, 2010), Southern Sweden (Waldo, 2012) and Southern Spain 
(González & Estévez, 2005) show that offshore wind farms generate opposition just 
as or even more than onshore wind farms, suggesting inter alia strong public concern 
about and place attachment to seascapes. Thus, as Haggett (2011) claims, 
environmental issues, visual impact, spatial considerations, local context such as 
place attachment to seascapes as well as issues of participation and trust are as 
relevant offshore as onshore. However, relevant stakeholders and particular issues 
within these categories that are contested may differ. Hence, siting wind farms 
offshore does not automatically solve “onshore problems.”  
How do public attitudes towards offshore wind play out in Norway? Not 
much research has addressed these issues. Survey studies suggest that a great 
majority (79%) of respondents has positive attitudes (Karlstrøm, 2010). However, 
the planned offshore wind farm Havsul has been controversial. Thele (2008) argues 
that this controversy largely was about contested definitions of nature, which were at 
the basis of discussion about a range of issues, such as economy, environmental 
protection and health, related to the proposed offshore wind development. Thus, it 
could also be described as ‘green on green’ conflict.    
This overview of some social science studies on public engagement with 
wind energy has shown that public attitudes are complex, dynamic and contextual 
and that debates are characterized by contested values. I introduced this section with 
the promise/hope that it would shed some light on the relevance of socialization in 
the context of offshore wind energy. Why is it important to socialize offshore wind 
technology? This overview of earlier research on offshore wind energy and publics 
indicates that technological innovation is not a linear process. Public acceptance of 
and participation in offshore wind energy development are considered important 
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factors of a successful implementation. Hence, contrary to expectation, the moving 
of renewable energy production offshore does not make publics irrelevant for 
technology development. The studies reviewed here suggest that also offshore wind 
technology needs to be embedded in society in order to be deployed. Socialization 
stands out as a central challenge.  
The majority of the studies reviewed here have only shown the public side of 
public engagement with offshore wind energy. Social science studies dealing with 
science/technology – society relations have not focused much on technology design 
and development, but mainly on implementation issues such as public attitudes, 
accept, and responses. This thesis changes the focus to an equally important and 
relevant area - I will argue - for the understanding of public engagement with 
science and technology; the socialization of technology. How shall we understand 
socialization? 
The socialization of technology  
As we have seen, the overview of the literature about public engagement with wind 
energy already indicates that technology is not following a determined trajectory or 
linear path of innovation, but that technology development happens in and is 
influenced by its social context. The concept of the socialization of technology, 
which I draw upon as overarching theoretical resource for this thesis, addresses these 
issues through its focus on the relation between technology and society. Before 
discussing the socialization of technology concept further, I would like to briefly 
and selectively give attention to some of the underlying basic STS (science and 
technology studies) tenets for studying the socialization of technology.   
A central feature in these STS teachings is a critique of technological 
determinism. In short, the main thinking of technological determinism is that the 
development of technology is happening independently from its social context and 
following an inner logic. Furthermore, technology is believed to cause social 
change. Russell and Williams (2002, p. 39) précis the technological determinist 
thinking as follows: “Technological change is depicted as beyond social influence; 
even its adoption is often seen to be determined by a ‘technological imperative.’”  
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However, as Bijker and Law argue, technologies do not develop according to 
an inner technological logic, “all technologies are shaped by and mirror the complex 
trade-offs that make up our societies” (Bijker & Law, 1992, p. 3). Hence, 
technologies are not only technological but also social. They could be described as 
socio-technical entities. Science and technology are described as socially 
constructed (Pinch & Bijker, 1984) or socially shaped (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 
1985; Sørensen & Williams, 2002; Williams & Edge, 1996). Alongside the critique 
of technological determinism is a critique of linear models of innovation.  
Jasanoff (2004) uses the notion of “co-production” to refer to of the mutual 
embeddedness of the social and technical. She argues that natural and social orders, 
the material and the social, are ongoingly produced together. Jasanoff emphasizes 
“the constant interplay of the cognitive, the material, the social and the normative” 
(Jasanoff, 2004, p. 38). Thus, with the notion of co-production Jasanoff not only 
subtends technological determinism but social determinism too. Also actor network 
theory (ANT) emphasizes the embeddedness of technology and society. Humans 
and non-humans alike are treated as actors. Hence, ANT engages in dissolving 
dualisms, such as material and social or technology and society (Law, 1999).  
All these STS notions criticizing the technological determinist thinking 
emphasize the embeddedness of the social and the technical and direct our attention 
to the mutual processes through which technology and society are embedded. 
Hence, let us return to the concept of the socialization of technology, which focuses 
on linking technology to society.   
In the Handbook on the Socialisation of Scientific and Technological 
Research, Bijker and d’Andrea propose the idea of socialization as overarching 
perspective “to overcome the great fragmentation characterising analysis and 
management of science-society relationships” (Bijker & d'Andrea, 2009, p. 21). 
They start their discussion of the concept of socialization of scientific and 
technological research by referring to a paradoxical situation of science and 
technology. On the one hand, science and technology increasingly gain importance 
for social and economic development and consequently get linked more closely to 
society. On the other hand, they observe an increasing mistrust towards science and 
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technology and thus their potential marginalization in society. The authors argue a 
changed relationship between science and society is the basis of this paradox.  
This changed relationship has, e.g., been addressed by the Mode 1/Mode 2 
model (Nowotny, Scott, & Gibbons, 2001). Mode 1 represents the “traditional” way 
of doing science, which is characterized among other things by being placed in the 
academic context within clearly marked-off homogeneous disciplines. Mode 2 is 
described as a heterogeneous practice, which takes place in the context of 
application. Knowledge is produced transdisciplinary and its production involves not 
only scientists but political and social actors as well. The research process is 
described as a dialogue with the users of the knowledge produced and research 
results are not only controlled and validated by fellow researchers but also by a 
wider range of social actors and user groups (Nowotny, Scott, & Gibbons, 2003).  
Hence, Bijker & d’Andrea (2009) refer to more entangled and complex 
relations between science and society and describe science and society as co-
constructed. At the same time, though, they describe research as less embedded in 
society than before. This low level of embeddedness may explain the problems that 
science and technology meet in society. Socialization, then, describes the embedding 
of science and technology into society or as the authors put it: “the processes 
involved in the production, use and circulation of scientific research and its products 
in an inseparable connection with its social context” (Bijker & d'Andrea, 2009, p. 
62).
Nielsen & Heyman (2012), e.g., suggest that an early socialization of 
emerging technologies leads not only to less obstacles in the implementation, but 
also to a better technology design. Comparing engineers’ communication in the field 
of wind technology in Denmark and Germany, the authors argue that both technical 
communication among engineers and socio-technical communication with other 
societal actors were crucial for a successful technology design.    
Keeping in mind the literature on public engagement with wind energy, we 
should note that publics actively make sense of the science and technology that is 
socialized. Sørensen (2013) argues that socialization facilitates a domestication of 
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technologies. Domestication in its original sense refers to the taming of wild 
animals. In technology studies, the concept of domestication has been used to 
describe processes by which users “tame,” that is, make sense of, ascribe meaning to 
and integrate new technologies into their everyday life (Berker, Hartmann, Punie, & 
Ward, 2006). Sørensen (2006, p. 40) refers to domestication as “the complexities of 
human performance or enactment of technologies, related to what is commonly seen 
as ownership and use.” Thus, the processes of embedding a technology into society 
could be described as preparing for a domestication of the technology by the public.  
Socialization can be understood descriptively as “interconnectedness 
between science, technology and society” or prescriptively as “objective for science 
and technology” (Bijker & d'Andrea, 2009, p. 62f). Bijker & d’Andrea identify six 
areas of socialization: scientific practices, scientific mediation, scientific 
communication, evaluation, governance and innovation. Thereby, they emphasize 
the role of scientists and scientific and government institutions as agents of 
socialization. However, any actor making a contribution to link science and society 
can be considered a socialization agent.  
I divided this section on the socialization of science and technology into 
three subsections. The first discusses scientists as socialization agents, the second 
discusses media as socialization agents and the third subsection proposes to regard 
Latour’s (2005a) notion of Dingpolitik as socialization.  
Scientists as agents of socialization 
This thesis focuses in particular on scientists as agents of socialization. With the 
concept of the civic scientist, we may come a little closer to what being a 
socialization agent may entail. Civic scientists are scientists who make knowledge 
accessible in the public sphere. They communicate their research to a general 
audience, and facilitate public debate and decision making (Checkoway, 2001; 
Kyvik, 2005). A civic mission is often described to be driven by external factors, 
such as institutional facilitation in the form of rewards for socialization activities, 
organization of community partnerships or education efforts towards future 
scientists. Greenwood and Riordan (2001, p. 31), however, argue that “being a civic 
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scientist […] requires a deep personal call to action” and that the motivation for 
being agents of socialization comes from the citizen in the scientist.  
Still, the socialization that is mainly referred to as science communication to 
the public here, may unfold in many different ways. To gain better insight into what 
being an agent of socialization may involve for scientists, I now outline several 
approaches to the socialization of technology. The remaining subsection on 
scientists as agents of socialization is structured as follows: First, I look into science 
policy to see what role scientists are attributed here. Then I provide a short overview 
of the theoretical development of the field of Public Engagement with Science and 
Technology (PEST) by referring to different approaches to science-public relations 
and socialization. After discussing the different ways scientists may approach 
socialization I propose the notion of “imagined publics” as helpful tool for studying 
scientists’ views on and strategies of socialization and I provide an overview of 
some earlier research on scientists’ imagined publics. Finally, I address the issue of 
science communication and refer to some earlier studies about scientists’ views and 
practices of this issue.  
What role should scientists play? Socialization in science policy 
An expectation towards scientists to act as agents of socialization has been 
articulated in science policy particularly on the European level. Since more than a 
decade, both the European Commission and member states focus on science and 
publics. Felt et al. (2007, p. 13) claim that public engagement “has become an 
almost obligatory passage point for science policy in some countries.” The “Science 
in Society” (SiS) initiative of the European Commission, which is integrated into the 
Seventh Framework programme (FP7), emphasizes the central place of science in 
society and encourages societal engagement with science. On SiS’s web page, e.g., 
it is written that “[n]ow more than ever, science must engage with us, and we must 
engage with science” (European Commission, n.d.). 
An important motivation for the emergence of initiatives to engage publics 
with science is to rebuild trust in science, as survey data reveal a “lack of interest in 
scientific activities or even fears regarding some of their impacts” (European 
37

Commission, 2002, p. 7). New forms of science-society relations are suggested in 
order to meet this aim. In a European Commission working paper from 2000, which 
forms a basis for the discussion of science and society on the European level, a two-
way engagement between science and publics is emphasized. It calls for “new forms 
of dialogue between researchers, experts, political decision-makers, industrialists 
and members of the public,” (Commission of the European Communities, 2000, p. 
16) such as citizens’ juries, to facilitate democratic debate and decision-making. 
Although this document points to the importance of public knowledge and 
understanding of science in order to be able to engage in a proper dialogue about 
science, it stresses that science also should listen to society and that the aim of a 
science-society dialogue is not to produce favorable public attitudes towards science 
but “to create the conditions for an informed democratic debate” (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2000, p. 16). 
Following up this Commission working paper, the European Commission 
launched the “Science and Society Action Plan” aiming to “develop stronger and 
more harmonious relations between science and society” (European Commission, 
2002, p. 3). Strategies to reach this aim center around three areas: (1) Promote 
scientific and education culture: In order to participate in our democratic knowledge 
society citizens need a certain degree of knowledge and access to information about 
science and technology. In addition, dialogue between science and publics should be 
fostered. (2) Bring science politics closer to citizens through public participation in 
debates on science and technology, more gender equality and directing scientific 
activity more towards addressing current questions and public concerns such as 
sustainability, terrorism or globalization. (3) Put responsible science at the heart of 
policy making by focusing on research ethics, addressing uncertainties and risk 
issues and improving the use of experts in policy making (European Commission, 
2002). The particular role of scientists as socialization agents is described in the 
European Charter for Researchers, which mentions that scientists are responsible for 
the dissemination of their research results to society in an easily understandable way 
to enhance public knowledge of science (European Commission, 2005).  
38

Likewise, in Norway scientists are attributed the role as socialization agents. 
Universities and colleges of higher education are obliged to disseminate their 
research results and to facilitate the participation of students and employees in 
public debate.11 Furthermore, several white papers on science policy address public 
engagement. The white paper headed “Vilje til forskning”12 (St.meld.nr.20, 2004-
2005) gives most attention to the issue. Similar to the European policy documents, it 
emphasizes the importance of society’s access to and influence on research. In order 
to develop new knowledge and technology in a way that is beneficial to society, the 
white paper argues, the debate about science and its future development has to 
involve lay people. However, the public needs to be knowledgeable and interested as 
precondition for entering such a broad debate about science. Thus, research 
institutions as well as individual scientists, among others, should engage in 
disseminating and communicating their research to the public with the aims of 
educating the public, arousing public interest and curiosity, and democratization, i.e. 
to provide knowledge to enhance active public participation.  
The white paper also points out that two-way communication rather than 
one-way information between science and society is increasingly emphasized 
(St.meld.nr.20, 2004-2005). A few years later, another science policy white paper 
(St.meld.nr.30, 2008-2009) adds that dissemination and communication to the public 
is especially important in new fields of research. Research on offshore technology 
could be characterized as such a new field. The latest white paper on science policy 
(St.meld.nr.18, 2012-2013) emphasizes the issue of public trust in science, similar to 
the EC-documents mentioned above. It also addresses the increasing role of science 
communication for marketing purposes, and argues that it is therefore even more 
important that publics are knowledgeable and media critical.  
A particular role for the socialization of technology in Norway has the 
Norwegian Board of Technology. It is responsible for participatory technology 
assessment and organizes activities based on the principle of two-way dialogue, such 
as lay conferences (Teknologirådet, 2008). The Board is an independent public body 

11http://www.lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2005Ͳ04Ͳ01Ͳ15?q=universiter*
12English:thewilltoresearch
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with the task to identify technological challenges and to stimulate a public debate 
about new technologies and the involved benefits and consequences for society and 
individuals. The Board is described as “intermediary between research, politics and 
the public” (EPTA, 2012, p. 61). 
The Board claims idealistic motivations for its activities, such as the 
importance of involving lay people in decision-making to address ethical and value-
related issues related to important technologies with big consequences for society 
and nature. However, the motivation is also pragmatic since an early public 
participation is expected to legitimate decisions and to increase public accept and 
thus provide for an easier implementation of the technologies (Teknologirådet, 
2008). Although the dialogue with lay people is one of the main tasks of the Board, 
it has recently been criticized for using methods that involve lay people in a lesser 
degree than methods involving only experts to assess technologies. Thereby, it loses 
its role as facilitator of democratic debate about technology development (Langfeldt, 
Ramberg, & Tømte, 2011).   
A different kind of socialization, however very relevant in the context of 
wind energy, is provided by the formal planning and licensing processes in Norway, 
which provide opportunities of public participation. According to the Norwegian 
plan and building act, planning authorities have to provide information to the public 
and enable the participation of affected groups. The formal licensing procedure 
includes several public hearings, thus introducing a participatory democratic aspect 
in the planning processes of wind parks (Gjerald, 2012). 
To summarize, scientists should disseminate scientific knowledge and 
educate the public. They should engage in a two-way dialogue, listen to public 
concern, and address these concerns in their scientific activity. Although there is a 
clear move towards dialogic and participative socialization activities, knowledge 
dissemination and public education are still described as central activities in science 
policy. To understand the background of these different approaches to socialization I 
will now turn to the research on public engagement.  
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Socialization as education, dialogue and co-production: Public Engagement with 
Science and Technology 
The scholarly field commonly referred to as Public Engagement with Science and 
Technology (PEST) comprises approaches for social science analysis of science-
public relations. Public engagement as an overarching framework is 
multidirectional. As I will discuss later, it addresses public engagement with science 
and technology as well as scientists’ engagement with publics. Socialization, then, 
focuses mainly on downstream efforts of linking technologies to society. Particular 
public engagement activities, such as consensus conferences or citizen juries, can be 
described as socialization practices. As in science policy referred to above, in the 
field of public engagement scientists are considered potential agents of socialization. 
However, different approaches to public engagement attribute different roles to 
scientists and vary in their views on how socialization should be carried out.  
The theoretical development in the PEST field, which started as, and is still 
known under the heading of Public Understanding of Science (PUS), is usually 
described by referring to three different approaches to public engagement and 
science-society relations. These approaches are commonly referred to as (1) public 
education approach, (2) public dialogue approach and (3) public co-production of 
knowledge approach. Other terms are used as well. A very common one is the term 
deficit model for a version of the public education approach.  
The public education approach could be described as the first approach to 
socialization within this field. When the field emerged, a main activity was to test 
the public understanding of science, that is, people’s knowledge about science and 
technology. The survey studies that were carried out revealed deficits in the public’s 
scientific knowledge. Hence, the aim of the public education approach was to 
improve the public’s scientific literacy through science communication activities or, 
as Rowe and Frewer (2005, p. 263) state, “maximizing the relevant information 
from the sponsor and efficiently transferring it (with minimal information loss) to 
the maximum number of the relevant population.” An improvement of scientific 
literacy among the public was thought to establish more trust and prevent resistance 
towards science and technologies (Callon, 1999; Stilgoe & Wilsdon, 2009).  
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In the public education approach, socialization is conceptualized as one-way 
science communication: a linear process of information transformation from the 
scientists to the public (Bucchi & Neresini, 2008). Scientific knowledge and lay 
knowledge are viewed as two separate spheres of knowledge. Scientific knowledge 
is presented “as the embodiment of truth” (Irwin, 2008, p. 203), as “a body of 
objective, universal, value-free facts that is epistemologically superior to other ways 
of knowing” (Holliman & Jensen, 2009, p. 37). The public is viewed as passive 
recipient of scientific knowledge, as “an undifferentiated mass of scientific 
illiteracy” (Holliman & Jensen, 2009, p. 37), who is potentially hostile towards and 
mistrusts new scientific or technological developments. This partial view on 
socialization as an activity to reduce public deficit provoked the introduction of the 
term “deficit model” for this approach.  
The public education approach and in particular the focus on public deficit 
have provoked strong criticism during the last two decades. The survey studies of 
public understanding of science were criticized for not taking into account the social 
context and the “socially rooted meanings that key terms have for social actors” 
(Wynne, 1995, p. 370). Critics argue that not only publics but also science should be 
problematized. Moreover, they criticize the depiction of lay knowledge as inferior to 
scientific knowledge and of publics as passive. Critics claim that publics are not 
passively receiving scientific knowledge but actively debating, negotiating, 
interpreting, reframing, making sense of and dealing with scientific knowledge. 
Communication should not be one-directional, but dialogic. Thus, the public 
dialogue approach to science-public relations was proposed. Important authors 
initiating this were, e.g., Brian Wynne and Alan Irwin (Irwin & Wynne, 1996). 
The public dialogue approach conceptualizes socialization as two-way 
communication, and thus more symmetrical. Both science and the public are 
considered heterogeneous categories and both scientific and lay knowledges are 
conceptualized as “socially and culturally contingent” (Bucchi & Neresini, 2008, p. 
451). Lay knowledge is thought to enrich scientific knowledge. Hence, by taking lay 
knowledge into consideration the approach aims to break “scientists’ monopoly over 
speech” (Callon, 1999, p. 89). Rowe and Frewer (2005, p. 254f) describe the aim of 
42

this approach, which they term public consultation, as “maximizing the relevant 
information flow from the maximum number of the relevant population and 
transferring it to the sponsor.” Although the publics’ understanding of and interest in 
scientific problems as well as their local knowledge are higher valued here than in 
the public education approach and considered as relevant for scientists (Miller, 
2001), scientific and public knowledge are still considered as two separate spheres.  
In the third approach to public engagement, the public co-production of 
knowledge approach, socialization allows for a more extensive engagement of 
scientists with publics. Here, public participation is not just thought as response to 
science through increased dialogue, but publics are thought to take part in deciding 
on the relevance, benefits and risks of science. With the concept of upstream 
engagement (Stilgoe & Wilsdon, 2009), e.g., socialization can be described as a 
facilitation of public involvement early in processes of technology development and 
decision-making.  
Public participation is viewed as central for the production of knowledge. 
While the other two approaches maintain scientific and public knowledge as 
separate spheres, the co-production approach aims to resolve this separation. By 
calling for a co-production of knowledge by scientists and lay-people, the approach 
redefines the relation between science and publics (Bucchi & Neresini, 2008). 
Callon (1999, p. 91) argues that collective learning is central in the co-production 
approach “since the different knowledge is mutually enriching throughout the 
process of its co-production.” The knowledges are intermingled and can therefore 
not be categorized clearly as either scientific or lay knowledge. This implies that 
strict categorization of this kind is obsolete.  
Both the dialogue and the co-production approaches regard socialization less 
as relating science to the general public, but rather as an engagement with concerned 
groups (Callon, 1999) or publics in particular (Michael, 2009), that is publics who 
have a particular interest in the scientific or technological issues at stake. These 
participative approaches to socialization are often said to have democratic potential 
and are related to the idea of the democratization of science (Stengers, 1999). 
However, they (particularly the concept of upstream engagement) could also be 
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described as a form of cooptation, i.e. to include public concerns early in technology 
development in order to neutralize conflicts and to prevent public debate later (see 
e.g., Selznick, 1966). To account for the different rationales and motivations driving 
socialization, Stirling (2008, based on Fiorino, 1989) distinguishes three imperatives 
for public engagement: normative, instrumental and substantive. While under 
normative imperatives well-conducted participation processes by itself are 
considered as a right and good thing, under instrumental imperatives participation 
processes aim at particular ends, similar to co-optation. Substantive imperatives also 
focus on outcomes of participation processes, however not instrumental outcomes 
(such as more accept and less resistance), but on general ends and qualities or as 
Stirling (2008, p. 271) puts it, on “explicit, socially deliberated, publicly reasoned 
evaluative criteria for the outcomes themselves” (such as general public well-being 
and health).  
The development of the three main approaches to public engagement is often 
portrayed as a chronological development. Indeed, the theoretical development of 
this field can be described chronologically. However, since a range of empirical 
studies show that the public education approach has not completely been replaced by 
to two other approaches (Besley & Nisbet, 2013; Davies, 2008; Michael & Brown, 
2005; Powell, Colin, Kleinman, Delborne, & Anderson, 2011; Tøsse, 2013), it is 
more appropriate to refer to these approaches as different modes or as Irwin (2008) 
suggests as “orders of thinking,” which exist simultaneously and as hybrids (Bucchi, 
2008). Irwin (2006) argues that new theoretical and policy developments, which 
clearly advertise participative approaches, are not simply changing existing relations 
of professional power. It requires changing institutional practices more 
fundamentally to reach the aim of a more democratic science.  
To sum up, both science policy and the scholarly field of public engagement 
with science and technology stress the importance of public engagement in the 
context of emerging technologies. Scientists are expected to act as agents of 
socialization and they are increasingly expected to pursue dialogic and participative 
socialization strategies.  
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Burchell et al. (2009) argue that while the official, institutional development 
of these different approaches to socialization, from public education to more 
dialogic and participative approaches, which I illustrated here, has been given 
attention in social science research, “a sociological study of scientists’ perceptions 
of these development represents a noticeable gap in the research literature” 
(Burchell, et al., 2009, p. 6). Hence, this thesis directs its focus towards scientists’ 
views of and approaches to socialization, which in recent years increasingly have 
gained attention in science and technology studies as we will see below. I study 
offshore wind scientists as potential socialization agents by investigating their 
imagined publics and constructions of science-public relations. I will argue that 
scientists’ imagined publics are significant for their socialization strategies and their 
role in public engagement.   
Scientists’ imagined publics 
As shown above, an emerging literature deals with public engagement with offshore 
wind technology. Scientists’ engagement with publics, however, has been addressed 
much less. Thus, we could say that scholarly interest has been on the domestication 
of renewable energy technologies by the public while socialization aspects have 
largely been neglected. This observation deserves particular attention in the light of 
the policy push behind the development of renewable energy and the focus on 
scientists as agents of socialization in science policy. 
In a similar vein, Wynne (2014) observes that mainstream social science 
dealing with science-public relations has not addressed science in the same frame as 
publics. Hence, he argues that science should be problematized in the same manner 
as publics. Addressing scientists’ imagined publics is an attempt to do that.  In this 
section, I will first discuss the concept of imagined publics, particularly in the 
context of renewable energy technologies before providing a short overview of 
earlier studies on scientists’ imaginings of publics.  
Walker et al. (2011) propose a framework for understanding and 
conceptualizing public engagement in the context of renewable energy technologies 
and the processes, dynamics and interactions involved. The framework aims to go 
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beyond what the authors call “simplistic accounts of public engagement” (Walker, et 
al., 2011, p. 12), such as the NIMBY concept discussed above, and to represent the 
complexities involved in processes of public engagement.   
The framework has four main characteristics: First, it focuses on symmetry 
by addressing both publics and RET actors (renewable energy technology actors, i.e. 
actors developing and promoting the technologies) and their interactions. Or we 
could say, the framework attends to both public engagement with science and 
technology and scientists’ and other relevant actors’ engagement with publics. 
Second, the framework addresses expectations and anticipations both of publics and 
of actors developing and promoting the technologies. The publics’ expectations of 
impacts and benefits of renewable energy developments as well as of the project 
developers and the decision-making processes are thought to shape public 
acceptance of and engagement with renewable energy development. Likewise, RET 
actors’ expectations of publics, technology developments and decision-making 
influence their interactions with publics. Third, the framework focuses on dynamics 
by acknowledging that expectations and engagement shift over time. Fourth, the 
framework gives attention to contextualities and situatedness such as the wider 
policy and economic contexts as well as the distinctiveness of local communities, 
cultures and places (Walker, et al., 2011).  
The concept of imagined publics that I draw upon to investigate scientists as 
agents of socialization of offshore wind technology, relates mainly to the second 
characteristic of Walker et al.’s framework in that it focuses on scientists’ 
anticipations and expectations of publics. While recognizing the dynamics and 
contextualities involved, the concept of imagined publics also corresponds to the 
symmetry characteristic in that it changes the focus from public engagement with 
science and technology, which is widely studied in the context of wind energy, to 
scientists’ engagement with publics, which has been studied less and thus is a main 
focus of this thesis.   
Maranta et al. introduce the concept of “imagined lay person” (ILP), which 
they define as “conceptions of lay persons as they are manifested in the products and 
actions of experts” (Maranta, et al., 2003, p. 151). As background for the 
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introduction of the ILP concept, the authors point to an epistemic divide between 
experts and lay people. However, since experts are to produce solutions, advice or 
assist for lay people, they have to consider the lay persons’ world and thus estimate 
what might be relevant for lay persons. Hence, experts have to deal with a dilemma 
which the authors describe as follows: “the experts have to preserve the epistemic 
asymmetry, which is the basis for the epistemic division of labour, while they still 
have to formulate their advice in a way in which lay persons can apprehend and use 
in their own world” (Maranta, et al., 2003, p. 151). Moreover, experts commonly do 
not have direct contact with relevant lay persons, and consequently, the lay persons 
or users they consider are often imagined lay persons (ILPs). Hence, while doing 
their “normal” expert work, such as designing technologies, experts also construct 
lay persons. Maranta et al. (2003, p. 152) describe experts as “lay persons maker[s].” 
These ILPs, which are integrated to into the experts’ work may be implicit. Also, 
ILPs may differ from “real” lay persons as they mostly are imagined with limited 
competence and possibilities of action. Rather, ILPs are “functional constructs in 
expertise” (Maranta, et al., 2003, p. 151). 
Further, Maranta et al. (2003) argue that experts construe and thus address 
ILPs in different ways: as individualized ILPs, as representative ILPs or as 
generalized ILPs. Generalized ILPs are closest to the expression “imagined public” 
since they are addressed as collectives in contrast to the individual and 
representative ILPs, which are addressed as individuals or individual representatives 
of particular social groups respectively. More than the latter, the generalized ILPs 
result from experts’ imaginaries, models and theories. Walker et al. (2010) describe 
the process of lay person making as follows: “through such actors constructing 
shared narratives and ‘repertoires’, shaped both by direct and by mediated 
interactions, an imagined, anticipated public is produced, given voice, and assigned 
a presumed subjectivity” (Walker, et al., 2010, p. 932).  
Drawing on the work of Lippmann (1993 [1927]), Marres (2005, p. 216) 
argues that “a public is a partly imaginary entity,” an abstraction or a phantom. She 
proposes to understand the phantomlike qualities of the public, its ungraspability and 
slipperiness, as an aspect of its agency. Hence, in that sense, the general public is 
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always abstract and imagined. Walker et al. (2010) propose to include the idea of the 
public as phantom, or as Latour (2005a, p. 38) puts it, “this fragile and provisional 
concept,” in the understanding of imagined publics and to study how the phantom 
public is imagined and made real and influential.    
Imagining publics may involve boundary work. Gieryn defines boundary 
work as scientists’ “attribution of selected characteristics to the institutions of 
science […] for purposes of constructing a social boundary that distinguishes some 
intellectual activity as non-science” (Gieryn, 1983, p. 782). It often involves 
portraying science in a favorable and superior way. Woolgar (1991), for example, 
observes that experts “othered” lay people by creating contrasts between experts and 
users, us and them, insiders and outsiders.  
Experts’ imagined publics may be performative in the sense that they 
influence technology design. Scientists and engineers may include imagined publics 
in the design of their technology. Already Woolgar (1991) argues that future users 
and use are constructed in the process of technology design. Based on participant 
observation in a company producing microcomputers, or what he calls an 
“ethnography of computers,” he claims that the construction of these computers 
involves a configuration of the future users. In order to illustrate his argument 
Woolgar employs the metaphors of “machine as text” and “user as reader.” 
Constructing a machine is thought of in the same terms as writing a text. Hence, 
Woolgar emphasizes the interpretative flexibility of the machine; “the relation 
between readers and writers is understood as mediated by the machine and by 
interpretation of what the machine is, what it’s for, what it can do” (Woolgar, 1991, 
p. 60). Writing the text (or designing the machine) entails a construction of the 
readers’ identity as well as of their possible actions, and thus configures (i.e. defines, 
enables and constrains) the readers (users). The process of configuring the user 
while designing technology may happen implicitly or unconsciously.  
Also Akrich argues that designers inscribe imaginaries of user roles and 
contexts of use in the design of technology. Like a film script, the technical objects 
define actors, their interactions and the spaces in which they act. Thus, she claims 
that “the designer expresses the scenario of the device in question – the script out of 
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which the future history of the object will develop” (Akrich, 1992, p. 216).  
In addition to being performative in technology design as exemplified by 
Akrich and Woolgar, imagined publics may also be performative by influencing the 
implementation of the technologies in question and driving the experts’ interactions 
with publics and their socialization activities (Maranta, et al., 2003). Interactions 
between experts and lay persons depend on how experts construe and imagine lay 
persons in their theories and what competences experts attribute to lay persons. 
Furthermore, experts’ imaginaries of publics may influence the selection of certain 
engagement activities as well as of the suitable participants in these activities. Thus, 
they have a constraining effect on public engagement (Felt, et al., 2007; Whitmarsh, 
et al., 2011).  
Hence, the imagined publics, which are produced by experts particularly in 
the context of application, are given agency. Imagined publics are performative and 
may have political impact. They may even have more significance than the “real” 
publics the experts meet face-to-face (Walker, et al., 2010, p. 943). In this way, the 
integration of imagined publics into the experts’ work can be seen as a virtual form 
of public participation. While imagined publics possibly may be linked to “real” 
publics, they can also be very different. Publics involved with experts or their 
technologies in one way or another (e.g., as participants in engagement activities or 
as users of technologies) can, of course, divert from the inscribed roles and make 
sense of or use technologies in other ways than imagined by experts (Latour, 1988).  
Welsh and Wynne (2013) differentiate between three different modalities of 
imagined publics developed since Post WWII in the UK, which partly can be 
described as parallel to the theoretical development within the field of PEST 
sketched above. The first modality has its beginnings in the 1950s. The authors refer 
to it as “publics as imagined and practiced non-entities” (Welsh & Wynne, 2013). In 
this context, publics were imagined as passive audience for technological 
developments and expected to approve of technologies or even regard them as 
sublime. Moreover, publics were not attributed a role in technology policy. 
Although publics were conceptualized as passive non-entities excluded from 
decision-making, there was still the possibility of public mobilization against 
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science and technology, which needed to be prevented. However, in general, publics 
were expected “to comply passively and gratefully with the policies of those who 
know best” (Welsh & Wynne, 2013, p. 561) within this imaginary. 
The second modality of imagined publics identified by Welsh and Wynne, 
“publics as incipient threats,” evolved in the 1990s. The authors describe this 
imaginary of publics as threat as scientists’ and policymakers’ frustrated reactions to 
increasing public resistance to science and technology. It parallels the deficit model 
with its conception of irrational ignorant publics resistant of science and technology. 
The third and most recently developed modality of imagined publics is 
referred to as “politicised public as subjects of policing and surveillance” (Welsh & 
Wynne, 2013). The authors argue that parallel to the normative move in science 
policy and science studies in the 2000s from public education to dialogue, public 
engagement and participation, publics were increasingly perceived as security 
threats. When the publics’ positions diverge from mainstream science policy, the 
authors claim, authorities perceive them as threats to the social and economic order 
and as potential danger for important scientific innovation. This imaginary of highly 
politicized anti-science groups is for example expressed in increased surveillance 
and control.  
It is important to remember that these modalities identified by Welsh and 
Wynne (2013), although they developed in different times, today all are relevant. 
Also, imaginaries and resulting practices may exist in hybrid forms. While the 
authors describe these modalities as grand state-scientific imaginaries, this thesis 
focuses on academic scientists’ imagined publics (which of course may draw upon 
such grand narratives) related to a particular emerging technology.  
Scientists’ imagined publics have mostly been addressed in the context of 
emerging technologies such as nanotechnology and biotechnology. Imagined publics 
are studied through survey studies or interviews with scientists or sometimes by 
observing or interviewing in the context of concrete public engagement activities as 
publics are also constructed through such activities.  
As mentioned before, while an emerging literature addresses public 
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engagement with offshore wind energy, only very few studies change the 
perspective and address experts’ engagement with publics related to offshore wind 
energy in particular or renewable energy in general. Furthermore, the few studies 
dealing with imagined publics in the context of renewable energy focus primarily on 
experts, who directly are involved in particular developments, rather than on 
academic scientists. At first sight, scientists may seem less obvious socialization 
agents than experts directly involved in the implementation of particular 
developments. However, focusing on scientists makes it possible to investigate the 
implications of imagined publics not only on implementation and engagement 
activities but also on the design of the technology itself. In addition, it enables an 
evaluation of the communication mandate attributed to scientists by science policy.  
How have publics been constructed by experts in the context of offshore 
wind in particular and renewable energy in general? Imagined publics related to 
offshore wind energy are touched upon peripherally by only a few studies about 
public engagement. Through a focus on processes of public participation and how 
these influence public attitudes, these studies also address experts’ perceptions of 
publics. For example, in a study about barriers to the Firth of Forth offshore wind 
farm in Scotland, stakeholders imagined particular publics, mainly the fishing 
industry, as potential barriers. The general public, by contrast, was not imagined as 
barrier because the wind farm was planned to be placed far offshore where it would 
hardly be visible (O'Keeffe & Haggett, 2012). 
One study explicitly dealing with imagined publics and offshore wind energy 
among other renewable energy technologies is the study by Walker et al. (2010), 
which is based on interviews with actors within the renewable energy industry and 
policy development. However, the authors refer especially to offshore wind energy 
only in a few sentences. They find that interviewees expected offshore wind to 
generate less public resistance than onshore and attribute the strong focus on 
offshore wind energy in the UK to the prospect of not having to deal with public 
opposition. For renewable energy technologies collectively, Walker et al. (2010) 
find that their interviewees imagined the public to be generally supportive. However 
interviewees expected resistance to specific renewable energy developments. Thus, 
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imagined publics parallel the NIMBY (not in my backyard) concept. Onshore wind 
energy appears to play a prominent role in experts’ imaginings of renewable energy 
publics as talk of resistant publics commonly referred to it.  
Several studies show how experts’ imagined publics advance different 
approaches to public engagement (see e.g., Cotton & Devine-Wright, 2012; 
Skjølsvold, 2012). For onshore wind energy, Barnett et al. show that publics were 
imagined as knowledge deficient and concerned and that engagement strategies were 
constructed accordingly as “information provision and addressing concerns” 
(Barnett, Burningham, Walker, & Cass, 2012, p. 46). Cass & Walker (2009) 
describe how industry actors strategically dismissed onshore wind opposition by 
constructing public concerns as emotional. Engagement activities would then have 
as objective to moderate emotions.  
Again, studies about imagined publics related to renewable energy are few 
and focus mainly on industry actors, developers and other stakeholders directly 
involved in implementation. This thesis focuses is on academic scientists. How have 
academic scientists across disciplines imagined publics?  
Besley and Nisbet who review the literature on scientists’ views of the public 
find that scientists often imagine the public either as one homogeneous group or as 
several “specific homogeneous groups of lay-persons” (2013, p. 648). This is similar 
to Michael’s (2009) differentiation between the public in general (PiG) and publics 
in particular (PiPs). Publics in particular could be stakeholders and interest groups 
such as environmental organizations or broader groups such as consumers, citizens 
or neighbors. Several studies also observe a distinction between constructions of 
public that are “purely imagined” and constructions based on “actually experienced” 
publics (Blok, Jensen, & Kaltoft, 2008; Burningham, Barnett, Carr, Clift, & 
Wahrmeyer, 2007).  
Braun and Schultz (2010) differentiate between four imaginings of publics, 
which, they argue, are constructed in different contexts of public engagement: the 
general public, the pure public, the affected public and the partisan public. The 
general public refers to a generalized public collectivity and is, according to Braun 
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and Schultz, constructed through surveys that aim to produce knowledge about the 
public understanding of the science or technology in question. The pure public is 
constructed through engagement formats such as citizen juries. Ideally, the pure 
public is not linked to any interest group, is ignorant of and has no opinion about the 
scientific or technological topic to be discussed and at the same time open to be 
educated about it. The affected public represents people, who themselves or whose 
relatives have relevant experiences, such as living with a disease. The affected 
public is involved in engagement activities in order to provide knowledge in form of 
authentic experiences to the experts; education is thus going from publics to experts. 
Last, the partisan public is made up of organizations or stakeholders with strong 
opinions about the scientific or technological issue in question. In contrast to the 
pure public, they “form an ‘impure public’ of opinionated trouble-makers” (Braun & 
Schultz, 2010, p. 413). The partisan public is consulted in order to get an overview 
of the landscape of arguments “out there.” 
Research on scientists’ imagined publics suggests that scientists imagine 
publics as ignorant, as having little information and expertise, or in other words, a 
knowledge deficit (Besley & Nisbet, 2013; Boer, McCarthy, Brennan, Kelly, & 
Ritson, 2005; Burningham, et al., 2007; Powell, et al., 2011; Wynne, 2001). 
Scientists imagine the public and its concerns as irrational, emotional and self-
interested and set the public up against rational, factual science. Thereby, scientists 
“other” the public, which is often perceived as being critical of science. Scientists 
demarcate themselves and create a cognitive divide between science and the public 
(Burningham, et al., 2007; Cook, Pieri, & Robbins, 2004; Kurath & Gisler, 2009; 
Michael & Birke, 1994; Stilgoe, 2007). Public resistance is explained with 
knowledge deficits and attitudes based on emotion, self-interest, and irrationality, 
and is thus declared illegitimate. Publics are also depicted as passive and vulnerable 
to the influence of for example NGOs, media and other interests. 
Scientists are seen to blame particularly the media for “wrong” public 
attitudes. They are critical of the media coverage of their area of expertise and 
accuse the media of having a negative influence on the public (Besley & Nisbet, 
2013; Boer, et al., 2005; Burchell, et al., 2009; Petersen, Anderson, Allan, & 
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Wilkinson, 2009; Young & Matthews, 2007). Tøsse (2013), e.g., describes that 
climate scientists blamed journalists for misinterpreting and misrepresenting climate 
science. Young and Matthews (2007) find in the case of aquaculture that experts’ 
critical perspective on media coverage correlated with their supportive attitudes 
towards aquaculture science, while experts less supportive of aquaculture had more 
trust in a responsible media coverage. Hence, they refer to the “hostile media 
effect,” i.e. that “partisans in highly controversial issues typically perceive media 
coverage as hostile to their own position” (2007, p. 134), to explain scientists’ media 
blaming.  
To summarize, imagined publics are believed to be performative and 
influence technology design as well as its socialization. Earlier research indicates 
that imagining publics involves boundary work; demarcating scientific knowledge 
from lay knowledge, or rather lay knowledge deficits. Hence, constructions of others 
are at the same time construction of selves. Through the imagining and construction 
of others, in this case publics, scientists also construct their own role. Thus, I will 
now discuss some previous research on scientists’ views of their own role in science 
communication and public engagement.   
Scientists’ communication with the public 
Increasingly, scientists and other experts seem to believe that they have a role as 
agents of socialization in public engagement (Barnett, et al., 2012; Boer, et al., 2005; 
Burchell, et al., 2009; Walker, et al., 2010). Objectives for scientists’ engagement 
are manifold and complex, ranging from facilitating a democratization of science to 
preventing negative public attitudes or expecting increased funding (Barnett, et al., 
2012; Burchell, et al., 2009). Despite the increased awareness of public engagement 
as part of their role as scientists, earlier research points to a hesitation among many 
scientists to take on the role as agents of socialization and engage with society. This 
has particularly been noted among European scientists (Bijker & d'Andrea, 2009; 
Neresini & Bucchi, 2011).  
Explanations for this hesitation to engage with publics are manifold. 
Scientists regard potential socialization activities mainly as science communication 
54

through mass media. However, as we have seen above, they are often critical of the 
coverage and fear to be misrepresented in the media. Science communication is 
perceived as difficult and dangerous (Davies, 2008) or as McDaid (2008, p. 28) puts 
it, it involves “getting out of their comfort zone and working in unfamiliar territory.” 
Furthermore, scientists’ hesitation to socialize their research has been explained with 
a (perceived) lack of capacity, which includes both institutional constraints such as 
an exclusive focus on academic publications and a lack of time and reward for 
public engagement, and scientists’ limited abilities or insecurity about their abilities 
to communicate their research. Moreover, an involvement in public engagement 
activities is believed to have negative impacts on career advancement and reputation 
(Gregory & Miller, 1998; Kyvik, 2005; McDaid, 2008). However, Poliakoff and 
Webb (2007) find that in addition to scientists’ perceived capability for science 
communication other factors influenced their intentions to involve in public 
engagement. These factors include the extent of scientists’ earlier experience with 
public engagement, the perceived extent of their colleagues’ involvement in 
engagement activities and their own attitudes towards public engagement.   
However, whether active or hesitant agents of socialization, we may expect 
scientists at least to have some thoughts about how socialization activities should be 
carried out. How have scientists conceptualized science-public relations and in 
particular their (potential) role in science communication? As outlined above, 
different approaches to public engagement have been developed. Previous studies 
suggest that the deficit model, although widely criticized in social science, is a 
dominant construction of science-public relations among scientists (Besley & 
Nisbet, 2013; Davies, 2008; Irwin, 2001; Michael & Brown, 2005; Powell, et al., 
2011; Tøsse, 2013). This dominant deficit model is in line with the dominant 
imaginings of publics as ignorant and irrational, and thus as passive recipients of the 
information provided by the scientists. However, a few studies indicate that some 
scientists question the need for public education so prominently declared. 
Burningham et al. (2007) refer to a way of thinking about the public, which they 
describe as “they don’t know, but why should they?” Similarly, Besley and Nisbet 
(2013, p. 648) report from recent survey data that “scientists agree the public knows 
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too little about science but disagree on whether this presents a problem.”  
Dialogic and participatory approaches to public engagement are usually only 
found among a minority of scientists (Besley & Nisbet, 2013; Davies, 2008). Still, 
Burchell et al. (2009), for example, find that biological scientists increasingly 
constructed publics as “intelligent, supportive and scientifically capable publics” 
(Burchell, et al., 2009, p. 6). Thus, in some cases there is evidence for a move from 
deficit to dialogue also in scientists’ imaginings of publics.  
To sum up, earlier research indicates that the public education approach to 
science communication and public engagement is dominant among scientists. We 
have seen that publics are often imagined as ignorant, irrational and resistant to 
science and socialization consequently as public education. However, earlier studies 
also note that scientists are hesitant to act as agents of socialization and 
communicate their research.  
*
In this thesis I aim to study the socialization of offshore wind technology by 
addressing scientists as potential agents of socialization. However, why should 
scientists engage in socialization activities and make an effort to link technology to 
society?  
As we have seen there is an increasing pressure from science policy that 
scientists should disseminate their research and engage in dialogue and participative 
activities with publics. Thus, we may expect scientists to react to that pressure. We 
have also seen that scientists commonly imagine publics as potentially resistant and 
may expect these imagined publics to lead to active socialization strategies that aim 
to prevent this imagined resistance.  
On the other hand, we may as well expect that scientists do not engage in 
socialization activities as earlier research observes a hesitation among scientists to 
involve in public engagement due to a lack of capacity, perceived inability and 
ambiguous relation to the media as main channel of communication. Also the 
particular context of offshore wind technology as a technology that may be 
implemented “out of sight, out of mind” is likely to play into scientists’ views and 
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strategies of socialization.    
However, before discussing these questions in a cross-cutting analysis of the 
three research papers that form the basis of this thesis, I will give attention to a 
second agent of socialization, namely, the media. As we have seen, scientists 
attribute an important role to the media. On the one hand, media are blamed for their 
negative influence on public opinion. However, at the same they provide an 
important communication channel to the public. How may we then understand the 
news media as agents of socialization?  
Media as agents of socialization 
News media have an important role in the socialization of emerging technologies 
(Petersen, et al., 2009). News media could be described as interface between techno-
science and the public. They can be characterized as agents of socialization, in that 
they create links between technology and society. Schäfer (2012, p. 651) claims that 
“science coverage in the mass media was and still remains the major channel that 
bridges the gap between science and the general public.” News media are a major 
source of information for the public (Nelkin, 1995). Although the “media effects” on 
public attitudes and perceptions are disputed, their agenda-setting power has been 
acknowledged (Cox, 2010; A. Hansen, 2010; Olausson, 2011).  
News media can also be said to be a representation, although partial, of the 
public. Franzen et al. (2012, p. 8) argue that media construct the public, which 
unless organized in any form “only exists as an abstract ‘referent’ of actions and 
communication.” Further, they claim, that “[t]his relation between an intangible and 
unorganized ‘public’ and the ‘public’ constructed by the mass media justifies 
regarding the mass media as an analytical proxy for the public” (Franzen, et al., 
2012, p. 8). As such, news media are not only a source of information about science 
and technology for the public, but also a source of information for scientists about 
public concerns and debate, influencing as we have seen, their imagined publics and 
thus their socialization strategies. Hence, media have diverse and complex roles in 
the socialization of technology.  
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News media are at the same time an arena for domestication, where 
technologies are framed and made sense of, and agents of socialization by 
contributing to embedding technology into society. As we will see below, science is 
increasingly interconnected with the media. One concept to explore the increasing 
entanglement of media and science is “mediatization.”   
Mediatization is a contested concept within the field of media and 
communication studies. The concept is widely used. However, there is a diversity of 
ways of theorizing and defining it. Most generally, mediatization refers to mutual 
relations and influences between changes in the media field and changes in other 
social fields (Hepp, 2013; Jansson, 2013). Couldry and Hepp refer to mediatization 
“as a way of capturing the wider consequences of media’s embedding in everyday 
life” (Couldry & Hepp, 2013, p. 195).   
Couldry and Hepp try to organize the diversity of approaches by 
differentiating between two traditions of understanding mediatization; the 
institutionalist and the social constructivist traditions. In the institutionalist tradition, 
mediatization is understood as the process whereby different social fields adjust to 
and become dependent on the rules of the media. Media is here viewed as an 
independent institution following its own rules (Couldry & Hepp, 2013). The term 
media logic is frequently used to refer to these media-specific rules, and 
mediatization thus as permeation of other social fields by media logic (Hepp, 
Hjarvard, & Lundby, 2010). 
In the social constructivist tradition, Couldry and Hepp argue, mediatization 
is understood as “the process of a communicative construction of sociocultural 
reality and analyzes the status of various media within that process” (Couldry & 
Hepp, 2013, p. 196). Here, the concept of mediatization is used in the study of the 
construction of reality in the media as well as how media influence the general 
construction of sociocultural reality in communication. Thus, the approach is 
broader than a focus merely on media logic.   
Indeed, the use of the notion of media logic in the study of mediatization has 
been criticized, inter alia for conceptualizing mediatization as linear process. Hepp 
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(2013), for example, draws upon actor network theory and introduces the notion of 
the “moulding forces of the media,” which he characterizes as the potential for 
human action revealed by the media. He criticizes the thinking that media have 
certain specifics, media logics, and argues that media get powerful only in relations 
and that they shape rather than cause action. Furthermore, he emphasizes the 
openness of the concept of mediatization, which he understands as “a panorama of a 
sustained metaprocess of change” (Hepp, 2013, p. 69) comparable to conceptual 
constructs like globalization or individualization. Driessens et al. (2010) approach 
mediatization through practice theory, arguing similarly that mediatization should 
not be understood through looking at the effects of media logics on other social 
fields but through how practices relate to (or avoid) the media.  
Since this thesis addresses the relationship between techno-science and the 
public, I would like to draw upon the work of several German-speaking scholars, 
who theorize mediatization particularly in relation to science. These scholars 
sometimes distinguish mediatization (Mediatisierung) with a “t” from medialization 
(Medialisierung) with an “l,” while using these terms interchangeably in other 
occasions. Franzen et al. (2012) argue that medialization is a narrower concept as it 
focuses merely on mass media in contrast to mediatization, which more generally 
deals with technologies for mediated communication.  
Rödder and Schäfer, however, stay with the term “mediatization,” which 
they define as “the dynamics of the relationship between science and the media, both 
understood as social systems that can be analytically and empirically differentiated, 
despite the fact that they mutually influence and (re)construct each other’s 
functioning and complexity” (Rödder & Schäfer, 2010, p. 250). Hence, by referring 
to mutual influence and construction they avoid the criticized linearity of the idea of 
a media logic causing change in other social fields.   
Weingart (1998, 2005) introduces the thesis of the medialization of science
to refer to a changed relationship between the media and science, or what he terms 
the science-media-coupling. He characterizes mediatization by referring to two 
mutually dependent dimensions: First, science is increasingly becoming a public 
issue. The “inner life” of science, from procedures of conflict resolution to 
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competition for reputation and authority, is made public. Science is constructed, 
imagined and represented in and through the mass media. Weingart (2005) speaks of 
the “publicity of science” (Öffentlichkeit der Wissenschaft). Schäfer (2009) 
characterizes this first dimension of mediatization by referring to an extensified, 
pluralized and more controversial media coverage of science. Second, science itself 
is increasingly changing by adapting to constructed public expectations, and by 
orienting towards the mass media for public accept. Here, Weingart (2005) speaks of 
the “science of the public“ (Wissenschaft der Öffentlichkeit). Thus, as he argues, 
“the thesis of medialization claims an indirect impact of the orientation to the media 
on science itself” (Weingart, 1998, p. 872).  
However, Rödder and Schäfer (2010) claim that science is a societal arena 
where mediatization is much less distinct than in other areas. Science is only 
mediatized in so-called phases of mediatization, which the authors differentiate from 
routine phases. Thus, certain scientific fields, usually connected to everyday life, 
may get mediatized in limited periods of time. These phases of mediatization 
parallel the first dimension of the thesis of the medialization of science (Weingart, 
2005), which is characterized by increased and more pluralistic and controversial 
coverage.  
Thus, caution is required about the common assumption that the normative 
move from PUS to PES, or from Mode 1 to Mode 2 science, which I referred to 
above, also implies changes in the media coverage of science (Schäfer, 2009). As 
Schäfer (2009) argues, mediatization may be dependent on the scientific field and its 
extensiveness may vary. This is in line with empirical findings of research within the 
field of public engagement about the co-existence or hybridity of different 
approaches. 
To summarize, this thesis about the socialization of offshore wind 
technology addresses the media as potential agents of socialization by drawing on 
the concept of mediatization. Is offshore wind technology mediatized? Can we 
observe the two dimensions of medialization referred to by Weingart (2005), an 
increased and pluralized media coverage and an increased orientation of science to 
the media? 
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After discussing the theoretical framework and concepts, which I chose to 
approach scientists and media as agents of socialization of offshore wind technology 
and before drawing these theoretical considerations together in the cross-cutting 
analysis of my three papers, I would like return to the notion of socialization once 
more. In the following section, I will explore how the notion of Dingpolitik (Latour, 
2005a) and its main call for a movement from matters of fact to matters of concern
can be considered a socialization practice.  
Dingpolitik as socialization 
Let us return to the notion of socialization of technology. As we have seen, Bijker 
and d’Andrea (2009) refer to socialization as embeddedness. Socialization addresses 
relations between technoscience and society, between the technical/material and 
social. In this section, I want to explore the concept of socialization and the 
embeddedness of technology and society further by proposing to regard the notion 
of Dingpolitik (Latour, 2005a) as a socialization practice. Dingpolitik will also be 
one of the theoretical notions guiding the cross-cutting analysis in the next section. 
However, before discussing Dingpolitik, I will introduce a snapshot of some STS 
approaches, namely the social construction of technology, the social shaping of 
technology and actor network theory, which emerged alongside each other in the 
1980s and informed the notion of socialization of technology. How do these 
approaches understand the embeddedness of technology in society? 
When I introduced the socialization of technology approach above, I already 
touched on some of its underlying STS notions by referring to their common 
criticism of technological determinism. Hence, although the three approaches I will 
present here have a lot in common in their thinking of technology-society relations, 
each is characterized by some distinctive issues.  
The main features of the first approach, the social construction of technology 
(SCOT), were formulated by Pinch and Bijker (1984) in their paper “The social 
construction of facts and artefacts: Or how the sociology of science and the 
sociology of technology might benefit each other.” Transferring insights from the 
well-established sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) to the study of technology, 
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the authors aimed to build a new sociology of technology. Central was the notion of 
symmetry, which implies studying failure and success of technological artefacts in 
the same manner.  
The SCOT approach considers both science and technology as socially 
constructed. Instead of a linear model of innovation, Pinch and Bijker (1984, p. 411) 
propose a multi-directional model, in which they describe technology development 
as “an alternation of variation and selection.” Variation refers to the interpretive 
flexibility of technological artefacts. Social groups concerned with the technology in 
question interpret it in various ways. However, not only people’s definition of 
technology is flexible but also the design of the technology itself. The different 
social interpretations lead to different developments of technology design. As Bijker 
& Law (1992, p. 13) put it, technologies “are built in a process of social construction 
and negotiation, a process often seen as driven by the social interests of 
participants.”  
Selection, then, refers to processes in technology development that make 
some variations of technological design succeed and others fail. Pinch and Bijker 
(1984) used the notion of closure mechanisms to describe processes through which a 
certain degree of stabilization of artefacts is reached. Instead of competing 
interpretations, then, a particular interpretation and design designates the meaning of 
the technology.   
As we have seen, the SCOT approach focused on the role of relevant social 
groups in technology development. In addition to highlighting interpretive flexibility 
and closure mechanisms, the approach addressed the relation between the content of 
a technology and the wider sociocultural and political context of the relevant social 
groups. In other words, here the embeddedness of technology in society could be 
said to refer to how social groups and their sociopolitical context influence or 
determine technology design. 
The social shaping of technology (SST) approach as laid out by MacKenzie 
and Wajcman (1985) was like the SCOT approach critical of technological 
determinism. It aimed to show how social factors shape technologies. A key 
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thinking in SST was that technology design and implementation involves a range of 
(unconscious) choices between different technical options (Williams & Edge, 1996). 
Sørensen (2002) argues that this initial SST approach differed from the SCOT 
approach in that it was interested in the influence of particular predefined social 
interests and values and sociodemographic categories such as gender or ethnicity. 
The SCOT approach, by contrast, left it more open to analysis what the “social” 
includes.  
Soon, however, the term social shaping of technology was used to refer to a 
more overarching approach to technology studies drawing on the initial SST 
approach, SCOT, and actor network theory among others. Williams and Edge (1996, 
p. 892) describe SST as “a ‘broad church,’ without any clear orthodoxy.” The 
approach has been extended from focusing on the social shaping of technology 
development and design to include also areas of application and use (Russell & 
Williams, 2002).  Furthermore, while the initial SST framework could be described 
as social determinist (Williams & Edge, 1996), the new broader SST approach 
considers social change as result of interaction of technology and society, of the 
material and social (Sørensen, 2002). This new SST approach is based on insights 
also from actor network theory, which is the third approach I would like to present 
here as entrance to the discussion of Dingpolitik as socialization.  
Law describes actor network theory (ANT) as “a disparate family of 
material-semiotic tools, sensibilities, and methods of analysis that treat everything in 
the social and natural worlds as a continuously generated effect of the webs of 
relations within which they are located” (Law, 2008, p. 141). This focus on material-
semiotic relations and the symmetrical treatment of the material and the social is 
articulated in Latour’s (2005b) call for a “sociology of associations” instead of a 
“sociology of the social.”  
Thus, the social does, according to Latour (2005b), not refer to a specific 
sphere or domain but lies in the relations or associations between entities. Arguing 
both against technological and social determinism, everything is considered as 
constituted in networks, in the relations (Law, 1999). Neither technology nor any 
given social factors are thought to determine social change. The symmetrical 
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treatment of the material and the social in ANT does also imply that both humans 
and non-humans are considered as having agency. They are actors, or actants, 
because they generate effects, or as Latour (2005b, p. 71) puts it, they “modify a 
state of affairs by making a difference.” Thus, an actor network consists of 
associations between human and non-human actors.  
Latour claims that the main ANT tenet is “that actors themselves make 
everything, including their own frames, their own theories, their own contexts, their 
own metaphysics, even their own ontologies” (Latour, 2005b, p. 147). Hence, the 
research strategy is to follow the actors and their associations.   
Thus, socialization could be regarded as process of coproduction of the 
social and the technical. Law (2008, p. 147f) argues “that it simply isn’t possible to 
explore the social without at the same time studying the hows of relational 
materiality.” Similarly, Latour (2005b) claims that the separation of technology and 
society into two coherent and homogeneous entities does not made sense. Hence, the 
embeddedness of technology and society is brought to a different dimension as both 
society and technology are viewed as actor networks of human and non-humans and 
as interconnected, entangled and co-produced of the material and the social.   
Technology, as other actors or socio-technical entities, could thus be 
regarded as an increasingly stabilizing network of relations between human and non-
human elements. This view on technology and also on science is relevant for the 
following discussion of Dingpolitik with its central call to think of objects as 
gatherings and hence as matters of concern instead of as matters of facts.
Latour (2005a) introduces the concept of Dingpolitik to call for a different 
approach to politics or as he puts it, a movement “Back to Things” in political 
thinking. The Germanic term “Ding” or “Thing” has long been used to describe a 
place or an assembly where people meet around an issue of concern. A prominent 
example is one of the oldest parliamentary institutions, the Althing meeting at 
Thingvellir assembly place in Iceland. Still today the Icelandic parliament is called 
Althing, the Norwegian Storting and the Danish Folketing, all containing the term 
Ding/Ting/Thing in the names for their parliaments. Thus, Ding refers to “the issue 
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that brings people together because it divides them” (Latour, 2005a, p. 23).   
Instead of maintaining Realpolitik, which Latour describes as “positive, 
materialist, no-nonsense, interest-only, matter-of-factual way of navigating through 
power relations” (Latour, 2008, p. 309) with a focus mainly on political procedures, 
he argues that we should approach politics as Dingpolitik. Rather than merely giving 
attention to political procedures, Dingpolitik implies a turn of political thought to 
things, to the objects or issues of politics. Latour claims that the procedures of 
authorization and legitimation are “only half of what it is to assemble: the other half 
lies in the issues themselves, in the matters that matter” (Latour, 2008, p. 311). 
Drawing on the work of the pragmatist thinkers Lippmann and Dewey, 
Marres (2005, p. 217) argues that “issues call a public into being.” Objects - or 
issues - of politics create opportunities for contestation, for agreement and 
disagreement. They gather different patterns of opinions and emotions, as well as 
various interested parties, around themselves. For each object of politics, different 
actors, opinions and procedures are generated. Latour argues that these objects “bind 
all of us in ways that map out a public space profoundly different from what is 
usually recognized under the label of ‘the political’” (Latour, 2005a, p. 15). In an 
object-oriented democracy, then, we should bring both the objects of politics and the 
relevant actors into the debate; “the Ding designates both those who assemble 
because they are concerned as much as what causes their concerns and divisions” 
(Latour, 2008, p. 316).  
Central for a substitution of Realpolitik by Dingpolitik is a transition from 
matters of fact to matters of concern; from objects to things. When objects become 
things, matters of fact are changed to matters of concern. According to Latour 
(2008), objects of politics have misleadingly been depicted as matters of facts, 
thereby ignoring inter alia the contextualities, uncertainties, complexities and 
relationalities involved, which are included in the understanding of science and facts 
implicated in the move to Dingpolitik and to matters of concern.   
For instance, Goeminne & François (2010) refer to environmental politics, in 
particular related to climate change, as example of the prevalence of matters of fact. 
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The authors claim that a scientization of environmental politics reduces issues such 
as climate change to scientific puzzles leaving only small spaces for decision about 
acceptable risks, technological options and market instruments for politics. 
Environmental issues are merely framed as matters of fact.  
Following Latour’s call back to things, Goeminne and François (2010) argue 
for an understanding of environmental issues as things, as matters of concern instead 
of matters of fact. This changed understanding of environmental issues entails more 
space for politics to negotiate not only issues of risk in scientific terms, but more 
substantial issues or as the authors put it, it entails “a struggle over topical truth” 
(Goeminne & François, 2010, p. 126). Regarding environmental issues as things 
enables debate about the question of what to be concerned with. However, 
Goeminne (2011) argues that this changed perspective on environmental issues does 
not necessarily exclude matters of fact from environmental politics. Matters of fact, 
such as CO2 in the case of climate change, may be involved in producing matters of 
concern. However, here we should remember that matters of fact always also have 
been matters of concern that are merely blackboxed to matters of fact, or as Latour 
(2004, p. 247) puts it: “All objects are born things, all matters of fact require, in 
order to exist, a bewildering variety of matters of concern.”  
 Callon (2005, p. 312) states that: “Matters of concern exist only if the 
concerned groups create them as such by making them visible and perceptible in the 
public sphere.” Hence, Dingpolitik as movement from object to things, from matters 
of fact to matters of concern, could be described as form of socialization. Objects 
(technologies) are made public and links are created to society. Politics gets not 
reduced to dealing with matters of fact, with decisions about the few uncertainties 
left by science, but with things, with matters of concern involving both what to be 
concerned about and who to be concerned.   
Krauss (2010) argues that the implementation of wind energy in Northern 
Germany could be described as Dingpolitik. He describes wind turbines as “things 
that bring forth new assemblies and changes in power relations” (Krauss, 2010, p. 
206). How is this with regard to offshore wind energy in Norway? Can the 
socialization be considered Dingpolitik? Can we observe a transition of matters of 
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fact to matters of concern? The following cross-cutting analysis will address these 
questions among others.  
Cross-cutting analysis: The difficulty of socializing matters of 
concern
After this rather long account of different theoretical approaches and notions, which 
in some way or another relate to the socialization of technology, I finally return to 
the three papers forming the body of this thesis. Guided by my discussions of 
scientists and media as agents of socialization as well as of Dingpolitik, in this 
section I aim to summarize some findings cutting across the three papers. I will refer 
to the papers as paper 1,13 paper 214 and paper 315 according to the order in which 
they appear in the thesis.  
However, let us very briefly consider the context again. This thesis deals 
with the socialization of the emerging offshore wind technology in Norway. While 
the development of offshore wind energy globally is expected to increase greatly, 
prospects for an implementation of offshore wind technology in Norway are 
characterized by ambiguity and uncertainty. The particular energy situation of 
Norway is one factor contributing to the uncertain offshore wind future. Norwegian 
policymakers do not seem to see the same necessity for the implementation of 
offshore wind technology as is the case in other comparable countries. On the other 
hand, the country focuses on research and development of offshore wind technology 
and a home market would facilitate industrial development and participation in the 
rapidly growing international market. Further, Norway has great potential in terms 
of wind resources and valuable offshore/marine expertise. A development of 
offshore wind could strengthen Norway’s position as source of renewable energy for 
other European countries.  

13Paper1referstothepaper“Theendofcontroversy?Movingrenewableenergyproduction
offshore”(seeChapter2).
14Paper2referstothepaper“Sublimetechnologyandobjectoffear:Offshorewindscientists
assessingpublics”(seeChapter3).
15Paper3referstothepaper“Outreaching,outsourcing,anddisembedding:Howoffshorewind
scientistsconsidertheirengagementwiththepublic(seeChapter4).
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This particular situation of offshore wind technology with promising 
potential but in need of public support due to high initial investment costs as well as 
the aspect that offshore wind is an emerging technology puts the scientists 
developing the technology, who are the main focus of this thesis, in a foregrounded 
position when it comes to socializing the technology. Another important aspect to 
consider is that a central driver for the development of offshore wind energy 
globally is the expectation that moving energy production at sea will change the 
ways in which publics relate to the technology. This expectation may also influence 
the socialization of the technology.  
When I summarized the three papers earlier in this chapter, I claimed that all 
three papers together tell a surprising story of the socialization of offshore wind 
technology. The first paper analyzing the media discourse on offshore wind energy 
finds that it was largely written about in positive terms. The second paper about 
scientists’ imagined publics, finds ambivalent constructions of publics. Next to a 
dominant narrative about the public to be relatively positive to offshore wind energy 
since the turbines are placed out of sight, a narrative about a negative public 
resisting offshore wind was surprisingly prevalent. Hence, from a largely positive 
media discourse we move to ambivalent and contradictory (positive and resistant) 
imagined publics. The third paper then addresses scientists’ socialization strategies 
and finds that the majority of the interviewed scientists did not engage in 
socialization, although their constructions of the public as potentially resistant in 
addition to the pressure put forward to them to act as agents of socialization and the 
particular Norwegian context should motivate them to engage with society.   
How may we understand this story of socialization of Norwegian offshore 
wind technology? The theoretical considerations outlined in the previous section 
generated three sets of questions regarding the socialization of offshore wind 
technology and news media and scientists as agents of socialization, which I will 
discuss as follows: First, I address the issue of the mediatization of offshore wind 
energy. Second, I turn to news media and scientists as agents of socialization. And 
third, I attend to Dingpolitik and how matters of fact and matters of concern play a 
role for the socialization of technology.  
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As we have seen, Weingart (2005) differentiates between two dimensions of 
mediatization, the publicity of science (Öffentlichkeit der Wissenschaft) and the 
science of the public (Wissenschaft der Öffentlichkeit), to describe the increased 
coupling between science and media. The first dimension refers to increased and 
pluralized media coverage. Can we observe a mediatization of offshore wind 
according to this first dimension? 
Paper 1 addresses the news media discourse on offshore wind energy. It 
finds that the media coverage has both increased and become pluralized between 
2000 and 2010. In plain numbers, articles in Norwegian newspapers containing the 
search words for offshore wind energy have increased from less than 10 in the year 
2000 to 250 in 2010. Regarding the pluralization, I argue that the emergence of 
offshore wind technology was accompanied by an evolving controversy, 
characterized both by a diversity of actors and a plurality of perspectives and 
arguments. However, positive arguments were clearly dominant.  
The controversy displayed utopian and dystopian visions of the technology 
from expecting offshore wind to be Norway’s new industrial adventure to 
considering it a holocaust for birds. Offshore wind was contested in different 
frameworks; both supporting and opposing actors expressed economic, 
environmental, and moral concerns. Hence, I argue that media coverage entered 
what Rödder and Schäfer (2010) refer to as a phase of mediatization.  
However, although media coverage has increased and pluralized, offshore 
wind did not make it into many headlines and front pages. Considering the total 
number of 654 articles published in all Norwegian newspapers16 between 2000 and 
2010 and the fact that the interviewed scientists disagreed about the question 
whether offshore wind energy was covered in the Norwegian media at all, it may be 
more appropriate to describe it as a limited mediatization triggered by the emergence 
of the technology, which was made visible and public through first policy efforts 
and proposals for local offshore wind developments.  

16ThisreferstoallNorwegiannewspapersavailableintheonlinearchiveRetriever.Onthe
22.03.2014thetotalnumberofnewspaperswas162.
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The second dimension of mediatization Weingart (2005) introduces, refers to 
an increased orientation of science to the media and hence an increased influence of 
media on science. Can we observe this second dimension of mediatization in 
relation to research on offshore wind energy? What role did the interviewed offshore 
wind scientists attribute to the media? Paper 2 and 3 touch on a few aspects of these 
questions. Together, they indicate that scientists have diverse and ambivalent 
perspectives on news media.  
In paper 2, I argue that mediatized conflicts about energy infrastructure 
developments played into the interviewed scientists’ imagined offshore wind publics 
in different ways. The scientists referred to the media coverage mainly of onshore 
wind energy and of power lines (which they characterized as very negative to the 
infrastructure development in question) to construct the narrative of the positive 
public. In other words, the positive offshore wind public was constructed in contrast 
to the negative onshore and power lines publics because the scientists expected 
offshore wind energy to be “out of sight, out of mind” of the public and hence non-
controversial. At the same time, though, the scientists used the same references to 
construct the narrative of the negative public. Here, the scientists seemed to transfer 
the public resistance they noted in the media coverage of onshore wind and power 
lines to the offshore wind public. A few references to local newspaper reports on 
public protest against offshore wind energy did also play into the narrative of the 
negative public. Hence, the news media influenced the offshore wind scientists’ 
ambiguous imaginings of publics.  
In paper 3, which analyzes narratives about scientists’ socialization 
strategies, the interviewed scientists addressed news media more directly. They 
blamed the media for creating “wrong,” sensationalist and emotional stories or 
myths about offshore wind energy. These media-induced myths are, according to the 
scientists, responsible for the negative attitude of the public because they misinform 
the public. An example drawn on by many scientists was that the media pictured 
wind turbines as bird killers. This kind of media blaming happened in the narrative 
of the outreaching scientist where scientists conceptualized socialization as public 
education. They argued that more facts were needed in the public debate in order to 
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fight the myths and misinformation created by the media. However, at the same time 
mass media were seen as main channel for public education and information 
dissemination. Hence, an ambivalent relation to the media is disclosed here.  
The media also played a role in the narrative of the difficulty of being an 
outreaching scientist. Here, scientists referred to the problems involved when 
dealing with the media. One the one hand, this included again some media blaming. 
Scientists expressed fear to be misunderstood and to expose themselves to a tough 
debate in the media. On the other hand, they claimed that they were lacking 
competence to deal with the media as this would require a more thorough 
understanding of how society and media works as well as the ability to simplify 
research results and jargon. Furthermore, scientists doubted that their engagement in 
the form of, for example, communication through the mass media would change 
anything. They believed that they have little possibility to influence public opinion. 
Thus, many scientists concluded that it would be better to outsource science 
communication.  
We have seen that media play diverse roles both in narratives about 
scientists’ imagined publics and in narratives about scientists’ socialization 
strategies. Does this suggest that offshore wind science is influenced by and oriented 
towards the media? We could argue that since media seem to have a significant 
influence on scientists’ imagined publics and since such constructions of publics are 
potentially thought to be performative, or inscripted, in technology design (Akrich, 
1992; Maranta, et al., 2003; Woolgar, 1991), media do influence research and 
development of offshore wind technology. Further, scientists’ socialization 
strategies are clearly oriented towards and influenced by their perspectives on the 
media. Thus, we could observe a limited mediatization of offshore wind science and 
technology both in terms of the first and the second dimension of Weingart’s 
concept of mediatization.  
However, regarding the mediatization of the scientists’ socialization 
strategies it is important to note that the scientists referred to the strategies as 
something they as scientists “ought to do,” rather than as something they were 
already doing. Only very few of the interviewed scientists were actively using the 
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media to socialize offshore wind technology. Does this indicate that offshore wind 
technology is not becoming socialized?  
This brings us to the second issue to discuss in this cross-cutting analysis: 
news media and scientists as agents of socialization. As we have seen, the particular 
context of offshore wind energy in Norway with its dependence mainly on scientists 
and industry actors for the socialization of the technology in order to obtain the 
necessary public support for implementation, points to science communication as 
key issue and hence to scientists and media as central agents of socialization. How 
do they engage in the socialization of offshore wind technology?  
I have argued earlier that media both can be regarded as agents of 
socialization and as arena for other socialization agents. The analysis of the media 
discourse in paper 1 has shown that journalists as well as various other actors 
contribute to linking the emerging offshore wind technology to society and to 
making sense of it in the news media. The plurality of actors allowed into the media 
debate emphasizes particularly the role of news media as arena for socialization and 
domestication. However, the limited extent of the mediatization described above 
could be interpreted as limited degree of socialization.  
How do offshore wind scientists enact the role as agents of socialization? 
Already the analysis of the media discourse in paper 1 reveals that not many 
scientists were among the contributors to the debate on offshore wind energy. The 
interviews conducted with the offshore wind scientists confirm this finding; the 
great majority of interviewed scientists were hesitant to engage in the socialization 
of offshore wind technology.  
On basis of the theoretical considerations and previous studies outlined 
above I developed different expectations related to the scientists’ socialization 
efforts, which lead in different directions. On the one hand, we may expect scientists 
to actively engage in socializing offshore wind technology for several reasons. First, 
science policy requires scientists to communicate their research to the public, 
particularly in the context of emerging technologies. Second, the particular 
Norwegian context of offshore wind energy should motivate scientists to act as 
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agents of socialization to get public support for implementing the technology in 
Norway. Third, earlier studies find that scientists construct the public as potentially 
resistant to the technology in question. Hence we may expect scientists to act upon 
this resistance and pursue a public education socialization strategy, as many earlier 
studies suggest.    
On the other hand, we may as well expect scientists to hesitate to be active 
agents of socialization for the following reasons. First, earlier studies point to a lack 
of capacity, which includes both factors such as lack of time and reward, but also 
perceived inability to communicate with the public and fear of negative 
consequences of involvement in media debate, leading to reluctance among 
scientists to engage with the public. Second, the expectations of positive or 
indifferent public perceptions of offshore wind energy due to the fact that it is placed 
at sea and thus “out of sight, out of mind” of the public may lead scientists to 
consider socialization unnecessary.   
The findings of paper 2 and 3 suggest that the interviewed offshore wind 
scientists actually oscillate between these expectations.  
The requirement to act as agents of socialization formulated by science 
policy and the motivation to socialize offshore technology in order to obtain public 
support are both aspects informing the scientists’ views on socialization. Both the 
narrative of upstream engagement, which refers to an early public involvement in 
technology development, and the narrative of the outreaching scientist outlined in 
paper 3 include a depiction of scientists as active agents of socialization. However, 
as mentioned above, only very few of the scientists constructing these narratives 
were engaging with publics upstream or reaching out to the public to educate them. 
Rather, scientists often confined themselves to statements such as “As a scientist 
you should communicate” or “We have to blame ourselves that we are not more 
present.” Hence, in paper 3, I argue that the expectation put forward to scientists to 
be socialization agents merely did lead to bad conscience and excuses for inactivity. 
This became particularly articulated in the narrative of the difficulty of being an 
outreaching scientist, which very often followed the narrative of the outreaching 
scientist.
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While the common socialization strategy of public education involves a 
construction of the public according to the deficit model, we will see below that the 
offshore wind scientists interviewed for this thesis produced more complex and 
ambivalent constructions. However, considering the dominance of the narrative of 
the difficulty of being an outreaching scientist, we could argue that some scientists 
constructed themselves as deficient and unable to socialize the technology. In the 
narrative of the outsourcing scientist, in contrast, scientists supported the idea of 
public education about scientific facts, but most of them made it clear that they did 
not see it as their job.  
Furthermore, the scientists’ imagined publics played a role for how they 
viewed their role as agents of socialization. While previous research of imagined 
renewable energy publics suggests that experts construct a potentially resistant 
public, paper 2 finds that offshore wind scientists’ imagined publics were very 
ambiguous. I characterize these imagined publics as a balancing between 
technological optimism and cultural pessimism, between regarding offshore wind as 
sublime technology generating a positive public and viewing it as object of fear 
producing a negative public. Scientists’ imaginings of a negative public were linked 
to the public education socialization strategy. Likewise, scientists’ constructions of a 
positive public were often accompanied by the socialization strategy I referred to as 
the narrative of disembedded technology development.
The notion of disembedded technology development, which I use both in 
paper 2 and 3, can be linked to the initial question about what moving renewable 
energy offshore does to the socialization of technology. Paper 2 argues that the 
scientists’ imagined publics portray a disembedding of technology development 
from the public. The narrative of the positive public indicates that scientists do not 
have to deal with the public because the wind turbines are placed “out of sight, out 
of mind.” Similarly, by constructing the public as irrational resistant “other” in the 
narrative of the negative public, scientists delegitimized public opposition. Hence, 
they created room to develop the technology without having to consider the public.  
The narrative of disembedded technology development, which I discuss in 
paper 3, questions the need for a socialization of technology. The public is regarded 
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as irrelevant for the development and implementation of offshore wind technology. 
Although a public knowledge deficit of offshore wind energy is observed, scientists 
do not regard this as a problem and hence see no need for science communication or 
public engagement. I already mentioned before that this narrative of disembedded 
technology development frequently was accompanied by the “out of sight, out of 
mind” narrative of the positive public. Thus, it can be linked to the expectations of a 
less or non-controversial implementation associated with moving renewable energy 
production offshore.     
The idea that offshore wind turbines will be “out of sight, out of mind” is a 
recurrent motive in all three papers. In paper 1, it is part of the supporting arguments 
for offshore wind energy in the media discourse. In paper 2, it designates the 
narrative of the positive public and in paper 3 it serves as reason for not socializing 
offshore wind technology. We could also argue that by constructing the technology 
to be “out of sight, out of mind” of the public, the public becomes “out of sight, out 
of mind” of the scientists.  
A different way to understand the hesitation of the scientists to act as agents 
of socialization is to look at the socialization from the perspective of Dingpolitik, or 
more specific, the role of matters of fact and matters of concern. This brings us to 
the third set of questions to address in this cross-cutting analysis: Can the 
socialization of offshore wind technology be considered as Dingpolitik? Do we 
observe a movement from matters of fact to matters of concern in the socialization?  
Latour’s (2005a) notion of Dingpolitik, the politics of things, focuses on the 
objects of politics, on the things that gather relevant actors and concerns around 
themselves. Marres (2005) argues that issues make publics. Who are the offshore 
wind publics? Paper 1 shows how a diversity of interested actors, or PiPs, publics in 
particular (Michael, 2009), engaged in the media debate on offshore wind energy. 
These actors included politicians, industry actors and representatives of 
environmental organizations, tourism organizations and the fishing industry.   
What kind of offshore wind publics did scientists make? Here we encounter 
much more uncertainty about who the offshore wind publics are. To emphasize this 
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uncertainty I suggest using the notion of the public as phantom (Latour, 2005a; 
Marres, 2005). Both in paper 2 and 3, scientists mostly referred to the PiG, public in 
general (Michael, 2009), such as “people” or “the Norwegians.” However, in a few 
cases they also referred to PiPs such as electricity users, the fishing industry and 
environmental organizations. In paper 2, I argue that the “phantom public” becomes 
“real” and influential through the scientists’ constructions of resistant publics. 
However, because scientists’ constructions of the public are so ambiguous and 
messy through moving back and forth between the different narratives, I argue that 
the public at the same time keeps its slippery phantom-like features. 
Central for the notion of Dingpolitik is the transition from matters of fact to 
matters of concern. Paper 1 does explicitly draw upon Dingpolitik and argues that 
the news media discourse on offshore wind energy is characterized by contested 
concerns and not facts. Matters of concern are made controversial not matters of 
fact. Further, the analysis of the news media discourse indicates that the Ding, the 
offshore wind technology, is blackboxed in the debate. Hence, I argue that the 
debate illustrates a twisted Dingpolitik: publics are gathered around the issue of 
offshore wind energy, but the Ding itself, which should be in the focus, is absent.  
The offshore wind debate seems to be different than, e.g., the public 
controversy about climate change where issues largely are reduced to matters of fact 
(Goeminne & François, 2010). Hence, Latour’s (2005a) call for more matters of 
concern is not necessary here, as we only have matters of concern and no matters of 
fact.   
What role do matters of fact and matters of concern play in the other papers 
about scientists as agents of socialization? In paper 2, I argue that scientists 
construct publics both as morally and intellectually deficient in the narrative of the 
negative public. The deficit model of the public stood strong in the interview 
material. Resisting public attitudes were thought to be caused by knowledge deficits, 
for instance about costs, number of birds killed by wind turbines or amount of 
energy produced by a wind turbine, i.e. matters of fact in the view of the scientists. 
However, matters of concern, such as the concern for jobs, environmental 
friendliness, the role of nature in Norwegian identity and people’s resistance to 
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change, featured even more prominently in scientists’ explanations of public 
attitudes.     
Accordingly, in the public education narrative outlined in paper 3 scientists 
first argued that the public needs information about scientific facts so that the media-
induced sensational and emotional misinformation of the public would be 
counteracted. However, when following up with the question what the interviewees 
thought the public needed to know, the scientists argued that the public did not need 
to be informed about technological details of offshore wind, but rather about socio-
technical imaginaries such as general benefits of offshore wind energy, 
environmental consequences and about the electricity market. Hence, also here, is it 
more about matters of concern than matters of fact.  
In paper 3, I further argue that some scientists were ambivalent or became 
ambivalent about the need for knowledge dissemination to the public. One scientist, 
for example, pointed out that the scientists themselves are very vague and uncertain 
about the technology they develop and he questioned the use of communicating this 
to the public. Hence, here offshore wind technology itself was opened up as a matter 
of concern (presumably due to its emerging status) rather than regarded as a matter 
of fact. On the other hand, the analysis of scientists’ socialization strategies in paper 
3 also indicates that scientists do not feel confident and competent to leave their 
narrow field of research on technological details and communicate broader ideas 
related to offshore wind technology as matters of concern. This may also be a reason 
for their hesitation to act as agents of socialization. Maybe scientists would be more 
willing to be socialization agents if the controversy would be about matters of fact as 
in the case of climate change, while socializing matters of concern seems too 
difficult for the scientists.  
To conclude, offshore wind energy seems to generate a twisted Dingpolitik 
or a dingpolitical paradox. The object of politics, the offshore wind technology, and 
matters of fact play a minor role; they are “out of sight.” Hence, the call for more 
matters of concern is superfluous here. On the other hand, the absence of matters of 
fact seems to complicate the socialization of the technology for the scientists.  
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By drawing upon the notions of mediatization and Dingpolitik in the study of 
socialization, I have generated some interesting and new insights and perspectives. I 
particularly highlighted the important role of the media not only as agent of and 
arena for socialization, but also for scientists’ constructions of publics and 
socialization strategies. Furthermore, I emphasized the significance of matters of 
concern and matters of fact for the socialization of technology and suitable agents of 
socialization.   
Let us now return to the story of socialization mentioned in the beginning of 
this section. I hope to have illuminated this story a little bit so that it is not as 
surprising anymore. The issue of moving renewable energy production offshore has 
been of significance for all three papers with “out of sight, out of mind” a central 
motive. The thesis has made clear that although “out of sight,” socialization is still 
necessary for a technology to be successfully implemented. However, scientists 
seemed to use the “out of sight” motive to construct socialization as irrelevant and 
disembed technology development. Hence, the new trend to produce renewable 
energy at sea may present some new challenges for its socialization. 
Since the scientists do not take on the task as socialization agents, which they 
are expected to fulfill, we may conclude that the respective policy instruments are 
not sufficient. Furthermore, if the scientists do not participate in the socialization of 
offshore wind technology, other actors must do it or the technology will stay in the 
laboratory. Hence, following up this thesis, a study of other potential agents of 
socialization appears relevant. Moreover, the inactivity among scientists does open 
up for the question whether it really should be the scientists who ought to socialize 
emerging technologies. Other actors may be more suitable agents of socialization, 
and hence the scientists’ strategy of outsourcing the socialization an appropriate 
strategy.  




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Method
We start in the middle of things, in medias res, pressed by our 
colleagues, pushed by fellowships, starved for money, strangled by 
deadlines. […] No matter how grandiose the perspective, no matter how 
scientific the outlook, no matter how tough the requirements, no matter 
how astute the advisor, the result of the inquiry – in 99% of the cases – 
will be a report prepared under immense duress on a topic requested by 
some colleagues for reasons that will remain for the most part 
unexplained. And that is excellent because there is no better way.
(Latour, 2005b, p. 123) 
This following account of the methods mobilized in this thesis is a retrospective 
construction and a retrospective justification of what I did during the three years of 
working with this thesis. It has often been claimed that there is a discrepancy 
between how we actually do method and how we later write about it. Hence, also 
this section is an attempt to make sense of the messy and complex processes of 
gathering and analyzing data, which I present more linear and straight-forward here 
than they have actually been.  
Law (2004) argues that method is performative. In the same manner, I do not 
claim that the methods I will present here enable me to report “reality” or depict the 
“truth.” Rather, I acknowledge that these methods contribute to produce realities, or, 
as Law (2004, p. 143) puts it, method “re-crafts realities and creates new versions of 
the world.” By assembling particular methods and data I tell particular stories about 
the socialization of offshore wind energy, and leave out others. This argument 
already indicates the researcher’s participation in the production of realities. 
Interpretation always involves the researcher, her preconceptions, assumptions and 
scholarly socialization. 
When I embarked on this PhD project in the fall of 2010, I was a newly 
graduated M.A. in social anthropology and had just moved to Norway. I was new to 
the country and new to the field of science and technology studies. Hence, while the 
methodological approaches and epistemologies seemed relatively familiar, the 
theoretical perspectives and the context of renewable energy in Norway were 
something I had to acquaint myself with. My PhD project was part of a larger 
project interested in Public Engagement with Post Carbon Strategies (project 
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manager: Knut H. Sørensen) and offshore wind energy was the ‘post carbon 
strategy’ I should focus on. As we have seen in the introduction of this first chapter I 
started on the project at a time when offshore wind energy was hyped in Norway. 
However, soon this enthusiasm faded and the expected development of offshore 
wind energy in Norway did not happen mainly due to a change of political priorities. 
This particular situation was one of the reasons why the initial project focus on 
public engagement and my initial plans to mainly interview public stakeholders and 
representatives of the “general public” and to study public perceptions and 
engagement related to the technology, increasingly changed to a focus on 
socialization. Another reason was that we stumbled across work on, e.g., imagined 
publics, which we found interesting and motivating to pursue. Moreover, we 
realized that socialization issues had gained little attention by earlier research in the 
context of renewable energy technologies. Hence, a focus on socialization and 
socialization agents rather than on public engagement and perceptions entered the 
project.
This thesis focuses on two agents of socialization of offshore wind 
technology, news media and scientists, which both play an important role in science 
communication. Accordingly, the thesis combines two sets of data and different 
methods for analysis. Each of the three papers included in this thesis already 
addresses the particular methodological issues relevant to the individual paper, 
however, I want to use the opportunity to discuss and reflect my choice of methods 
and the processes of data collection and analysis more detailed here.   
Analyzing news media discourse 
I started my project with an analysis of the news media discourse on offshore wind 
energy. I was interested in science/technology-public relations and news media 
seemed a good starting point due to their role as mediators between 
science/technology and publics. They are involved in the sense-making of the 
technology and are at the same time a source of information for publics about 
science and technology and for scientists about public debate. Further, starting the 
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project with a media analysis allowed me to get a first impression of relevant issues 
related to offshore wind energy in Norway.  
When I write that I analyzed the news media discourse, I refer to the word 
“discourse” in a very general sense, or as Clarke (2005, p. 148) describes it, “the 
concept of discourse writ large: communication of any kind around/about/on a 
particular socially or culturally recognizable theme – contemporary and/or 
historical.” 
I chose to study the discourse in newspapers. Newspapers have a strong 
position in Norway with a large number of titles and readers (Østbye, 2008). Other 
than broadcasting media such as television or radio, newspapers were easily 
accessible for research and allowed an analysis of written text. Further, due to their 
debate sections and the possibility to publish letters to the editor and feature articles 
newspapers allow for a different participation of public actors.  
Newspaper articles belong to the type of data Charmaz (2006) refers to as 
extant texts. The specific feature of extant texts as data is that the researcher is not 
involved in their construction like she would be involved in the construction of 
interviews or observation protocols. Extant texts are produced for other purposes 
and have other intentions than to serve as data in a research project. When analyzing 
extant texts one can for instance, address its form and content, its audiences and 
authors and its production and presentation.   
I collected my data, the newspaper articles, via the online archive Retriever17
with the following search words “vindkraft til havs” and “offshore vindkraft,” i.e. 
the main Norwegian words for offshore wind energy. I searched for articles 
published between 2000 and 2010 and included all Norwegian newspapers in my 
search in order to provide a good overview of the Norwegian newspaper landscape 
and to enable the consideration of national and local concerns in the analysis. After I 
manually removed newspaper items from my sample that did not seem relevant, 
such as articles where offshore wind energy was only mentioned in the discussion of 
other topics, or in advertisements, I was left with 654 articles to be analyzed.   

17www.retriever.no
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I included both news articles written by journalists and letters to the editor 
and feature articles in the analysis. Clearly, these are two different types of 
newspaper features that many would claim should be analyzed separately. However, 
the aim of my analysis was to investigate how offshore wind energy was made sense 
of in the news media, how the newspapers as a whole fill the technology with 
meaning. Not only journalists but also other actors use the newspapers as an arena 
for debate and sense-making, and together they influence public sense-making. 
Hence, I argue that a combination of these different types of newspaper features is 
legitimate for the purposes of my study. 
The data analysis was a qualitative analysis, which I supplemented with 
some quantitative data retrieved from the online archive Retriever about the number 
of articles published about offshore wind energy per year. Further, I quantified the 
articles in order to provide an overview of the proportion of positive and negative 
arguments. This was done on basis of the qualitative coding of the articles.  
However, since I was interested in the construction of meaning of offshore 
wind energy, I focused on the qualitative analysis, which was inspired by Charmaz’ 
(2006) constructivist approach to grounded theory methods. Weick (1995), for 
example, mentions grounded theory as suitable method for studying sense-making. 
Through their focus on systematic coding, grounded theory methods are also very 
useful to identify categories and clusters of arguments. 
Grounded theory methods were developed as strategies to conduct 
qualitative data analysis. Instead of applying existing theories on the data material, 
theories, so-called middle range theories, should be grounded in the data, i.e. a 
grounded theory is a result of the data analysis. Charmaz (2006, p. 2) describes that 
“grounded theory methods consist of systematic, yet flexible guidelines for 
collecting and analyzing qualitative data to construct theories ‘grounded’ in the data 
themselves”. The term grounded theory is used in different ways in the literature. 
Used in its original sense, the term refers to the outcome of the research. However, 
the term is mostly used to describe the methods employed in the research process 
(Jacobsen, 2002). To avoid this confusion of theory and method, Bryant and 
Charmaz (2007) propose using the term grounded theory methods to refer to the 
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methods of data analysis employed. Here, I follow their example.  
Distancing herself from earlier positivist approaches to grounded theory 
methods (see e.g., the original grounded theory text by Glaser & Strauss, 1967), 
Charmaz’ (2000) constructivist approach emphasizes the mutual construction of 
knowledge, of the data and the analysis. Categories and theory developed during the 
analysis and the data itself are produced through the interaction between the 
researcher and the research field, between the viewer and the viewed. The final text 
is a story composed by the researcher, a construction of how the researcher and the 
people being studied construct their realities. It is one of many possible 
interpretations. This indicates that instead of assuming one external reality, 
constructivist grounded theory “assumes the relativism of multiple social realities” 
(Charmaz, 2000, p. 510). Hence, Charmaz shifts the focus on (the construction and 
production of) meaning.   
Although Charmaz (2006) advocates the constructivist approach, she 
emphasizes that grounded theory methods do not have to be tied to a single 
epistemology. Regardless of the theoretical or epistemological background of the 
research GTM can provide practical tools for data analysis. Charmaz describes the 
following processes of data analysis: coding (initial and focused), memo-writing, 
theoretical sampling, theorizing and writing.  
Accordingly, I started my analysis of the newspaper articles with an initial 
coding. The initial coding, also referred to as open coding, involves a close reading 
of the data while “naming each word, line, or segment of data” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 
46). However, I carried out the analysis in two steps. In order get an overview of the 
news media discourse and to identify its main topics and whether these changed 
over the selected timeframe, I first coded the 443 articles published between 2000 
and 2009 with the article as unit of analysis. In a second step, I coded the 211 
articles published in 2010 more detailed with an open line-by-line coding in order to 
identify not only broad topics but also actors, arguments and framings related to 
offshore wind energy. In both cases, I developed the codes while reading the articles 
and did not apply codes I had worked out beforehand. Some samples of the initial 
coding process are provided in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Examples of initial coding 
Monstervindturbiner
[…] Jeg er enig med ham i hans begrunnelser for at Norge ikke trenger slike 
fugledrepere som også er naturødeleggere og ulønnsomme kraftprodusenter 
sammenlignet med vannkraft. Og hvorfor skal nordmenn betale for billig strøm 
til EU? Dessuten nødvendiggjør oppsettingen bygging av brede veier frem til 
alle turbinene. Kanskje helikoptre kan gjøre jobben? Men grøfter til kablene 
trengs i alle fall. For vindturbiner i sjøen blir kablene en plage for fiske og 
skipsfart, og i områder begrenses ankringsmulighetene. 
Men for all del. Norges fagkunnskap for vindturbiner bør fortsatt utvikles, slik 
at vi kan bygge og i hvert fall selge vindturbiner til land som ikke har den langt 
mer effektive vannkraft. 
Energimangel i Midt-Norge
[…] Mange steder i Norge fører det til protester og demonstrasjoner når 
kraftledninger skal bygges, og vindmøller skal reises. De fleste vil ha 
miljøvennlig kraft, men ønsker samtidig at selve installasjonene skal være 
usynlige. De vil ikke ha utsikten sin ødelagt. Det kan ikke være lett å 
tilfredsstille alle disse ønskene samtidig. 
Her hvor jeg bor, utenfor Frøya et en god plass. Her vil kun en promille av 
Norges befolkning kunne se vindmøllene. Her er det god plass også for andre 
typer energiproduksjon. F.eks. biodrivstoff. Plass til å bygge havmøller. Hvis 
det også i tillegg blir satt i gang et gasskraftverk på Tjeldbergodden, så ville 
kraftsituasjonen i Midt-Norge se mye lysere ut. Alt dette kan sees i 
sammenheng i en langsiktig samfunnsutvikling. 
Vi her ute er glad i vår vakre natur og ønsker at det skal være muligheter for at 
det skal bo mennesker her også i framtiden. Mulighetene for å bruke kysten, 
både til energiproduksjon og til matproduksjon, er stor.  
Dette bør utnyttes i en verden som hungrer etter både mat og energi. Nå har 
Mausund velforening et enstemmig vedtak fra årsmøtet på at de ønsker en slik 
satsing på vindmøller i sitt nærmiljø velkommen. 
[…] Vi ønsker å delta i mulighetene samfunnet byr på. Det være seg kulturelle 
aktiviteter, idrettsaktiviteter og jobbmuligheter både på Frøya og i Trondheim. 
Med satsing på vind- og havmøller her ute kan dette bli en realitet. En drøm vil 
gå i oppfyllelse for oss her ute. Fastlandsforbindelse og nye arbeidsplasser. 
Norge kan produsere mer fornybar og co2-fri energi, uten konflikt med 
lokalmiljøet. Her kan det bli muligheter til å forske på flere typer energi fra 
havet. Elektrifisere deler av Nordsjøen.
turbines killing birds 
turbines destroying nature / 
not profitable 
Norway vs. Europe 
area conflict – fishermen, 
shipping 
Norway vs. other countries 
developing for technology 
export 
employing NIMBY 
visual pollution 
solution for Mid-Norway’s 
energy crisis 
beautiful nature and OWE not 
mutually exclusive 
local development 
local community supporting 
OWE  
employment 
local development 
no conflicts 
electrification of oil 
installations
I then grouped the codes referring to arguments towards offshore wind 
energy into larger categories of “pro” and “contra” arguments. The supportive 
arguments were subsumed under four categories: (1) economic benefits, (2) 
environmental friendliness, (3) moral responsibility, and (4) prevention of 
resistance. The opposing arguments were also clustered in four categories: (1) high 
costs, (2) visual impact and biodiversity conservation, (3) opposition to energy 
export, and (4) area conflicts.  
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Following the initial coding was a focused coding, which implies a further 
and more thorough investigation of very frequent or significant codes. Focused 
coding is used to “sort, synthesize, integrate, and organize large amounts of data” 
(Charmaz, 2006, p. 46). In this phase, also some theoretical concepts chosen on base 
of the initial coding may be used to approach the empirical data. For example, after 
finding that different concepts of nature are employed in the news media discourse, 
a second reading of the articles inspired by literature on the subject focused more 
thoroughly on contested natures. 
To enable comparison across articles and facilitate the writing process, I 
created a chronological overview of the data including relevant quotes and codes.  
Table 2: Snapshot of data display 
As illustrated here, central to grounded theory methods is a continuous 
interaction of the researcher with the data. “[G]rounded theory includes reasoning 
about experiences for making theoretical conjectures and then checking them 
through further experience” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 103). Hence, it can be characterized 
as abductive (Dey, 2004). Data analysis involves both inductive and deductive 
processes in the continuing moving back and forth between data collection and 
analysis and between generating codes through empirical analysis, choosing 
theoretical concepts based on the coding and returning to the data with the chosen 
theoretical concepts.    
85

Interviewing scientists   
The second set of agents of socialization this thesis investigates is offshore wind 
scientists. As we have seen, in the ambiguous and uncertain situation of offshore 
wind energy in Norway characterized by a lack of political support, socialization is 
largely left to scientists and industry actors. Also the strong Norwegian policy focus 
on research and development of offshore wind energy through the two national 
research centers and the increasing pressure on scientists from science policy to 
engage in socializing their research suggest that scientists are relevant potential 
agents of socialization to address.  
What is an offshore wind scientist? Clearly, it is a label, which I gave to 
scientists who in one way or another were involved with research on offshore wind 
technology and energy. The scientists I interviewed for this thesis were associated 
with two Norwegian research centers for environment-friendly energy research 
(FME), NOWITECH and NORCOWE. However, their daily work life was spent in 
different university departments or research institutions as electrical or mechanical 
engineers, physicists or meteorologists and as PhD candidates, researchers or 
professors (see appendix 1 for an overview of all interviewees). Hence, they were 
many other things than offshore wind scientists. This is particularly true for the 
senior researchers, who all were involved in research on other topics than offshore 
wind energy as well; interestingly it was not uncommon that they also did petroleum 
research.  
The research centers, then, could be described as meeting places where the 
scientists come together from their different universities, departments and 
institutions and meet as offshore wind scientists. Often, this did happen in the form 
of conferences or seminars. Particularly in the first year of my PhD I visited quite a 
few offshore wind conferences and seminars. Through listening to the scientists’ 
presentations and discussing their posters I gained a first insight in the topics of their 
research. I was particularly alert towards any mentioning of policy and publics, 
which, although being rare, provided some food for thought and background for the 
following interviews. Further, being at these seminars and conferences enabled me 
to establish first contacts with potential interviewees. Other interviewees were later 
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contacted through email and telephone. Given that the research centers had lists of 
all associated researchers, getting interview partners was rather easy.  
The interviews, then, were a combination of two focus groups (with 4 and 5 
participants), two one-on-two interviews and 22 one-on-one (or two-on-one) 
interviews; one of the latter was a telephone interview. Hence, in total 35 scientists 
were interviewed. Seven interviews including the two focus groups were conducted 
together with my colleague Robert Næss, one interview was carried out by Robert 
Næss alone and another by Alexandra Klimek and Marie Komissar already in 2010. 
The remaining 17 interviews I conducted alone. The interviews were semi-structured 
with the same interview guide (see Appendix 2 and 3 for the interview guide) used 
in each interview (except for the one conducted in 2010). However, the guide was 
handled very flexibly, particularly in the focus groups. The interviews covered two 
major topics: the scientists’ perspectives on offshore wind energy in Norway and 
their views on the role of publics and media.  
The original plan was to have more than two (or four, since the two-on-one 
interviews also were planned as focus groups, however some participants did not 
show up) focus groups in order to learn how scientists negotiate the relevant issues 
related to offshore wind energy. It is often advised that focus groups should be 
composed of participants sharing some common ground so that different 
perspectives can emerge (Barbour, 2007; Macnaghten & Myers, 2004). The 
common ground as offshore wind scientists and different backgrounds from 
different departments seemed a good starting point for focus groups. However, the 
limited number of scientists willing to participate in focus groups and the practical 
issues of finding a date and place convenient to all participants led us to proceed 
with individual interviews.  
Focus groups, arguably, should have a different dynamic than one-on-one 
interviews. However, as the participants in the focus groups did not show major 
disagreements and ambivalences and different perspectives also were produced in 
the one-on-one interviews, focus groups and individual interviews had similar 
effects in terms of the display of multiple narratives. Also, both focus groups and 
individual interviews are interactions where meanings are constructed and realities 
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produced (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995; Rapley, 2004). Czarniawska (2004) describes 
interviews as a site for the production of narratives. Hence, the narratives of 
scientists’ imagined publics and socialization strategies that I discuss in Chapter 3 
and Chapter 4 of this thesis could be described as product of the interview situation. 
However, one could argue that the interviewer tends to have a more prominent role 
as co-producer of realities in individual interviews than in focus groups.  
Holstein and Gubrium (1995) introduce the term “active interview” to 
highlight the co-production of meanings by the interviewee and interviewer. They 
describe the objective of the active interviewer “to provide an environment 
conducive to the production of the range and complexity of meanings that address 
relevant issues” (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995, p. 17). Further, the authors suggest 
narrative analysis as suitable for the analysis of active interview data. Also my 
analysis of the interview data, which I will outline in the next section, was informed 
by my interest in the narratives produced in the interview situation.  
Creating and analyzing narratives 
There is scholarly disagreement about how “narrative” should be defined and what 
“narrative analysis” involves (Gubrium & Holstein, 1997; Squire, Andrews, & 
Tamboukou, 2013). Unlike for other qualitative methods, such as grounded theory 
methods, there are no general guidelines or rules for how to do narrative analysis. 
Squire et al. (2013, p. 14) state that “it’s challenging to convey the nuts and bolts of 
narrative research.” Instead of providing general methodological guidelines, most 
often scholars provide examples from their own work on narratives to demonstrate 
narrative analysis; these approaches, though, may differ considerably. What most 
scholars do agree on, however, is that a narrative or a story (the term story is often 
used interchangeably with narrative) requires linkages or relations between elements 
(Gubrium & Holstein, 1997; Polkinghorne, 1995; Riessman, 2008). Gubrium and 
Holstein (1997, p. 147) argue that “[n]arratives need not be full-blown stories with 
requisite internal structures, but may be short accounts that emerge within or across 
turns at ordinary conversations, in interviews, or interrogations, in public 
documents, or in organizational records.” The authors refer to narratives as 
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“meaning-making device[s]” (p. 147). Narratives are used by individuals or groups 
for sense-making.  
My analysis of the interviews was guided by two sets of questions; one 
concerned with the scientists’ constructions of publics and the other with the 
scientists’ constructions of their own role in the socialization of technology. 
Approaching the data with narrative analysis allowed me to consider each interview 
as scene where narratives are produced. Hence, instead of assigning one way of 
constructing publics or one construction of socialization to one interviewee, I was 
able to find different narratives in one interview and thus point to contradictions and 
ambivalences within interviews. Squire et al. (2013, p. 2) argue that “we frame our 
research in terms of narrative because we believe that by doing so we are able to see 
different and sometimes contradictory layers of meaning.” Narrative analysis 
enables to emphasize complexity, ambiguity and contradictions. 
Furthermore, narratives could be described as enactments of the self; 
identities are constructed and negotiated through narratives (Andrews, Sclater, 
Squire, & Tamboukou, 2002; Riessman, 2008). Andrews et al. (2002, p. 102) refer 
to stories as “creative spaces in which […] selves could take shape again and again”. 
Coffey & Atkinson (1996) mention that actors construct their identities in relation to 
other actors. Returning to the interview data, we could therefore argue that the 
scientists’ narratives about publics also involve constructions of their own role as 
scientists; scientists construct the selves by constructing others. In addition, narrative 
analysis emphasizes the context in which the narratives are produced (Coffey & 
Atkinson, 1996).  
Polkinghorne (1995) differentiates between two kinds of narrative inquiry: 
analysis of narratives and narrative analysis. The first kind, analysis of narratives, 
refers to an approach, which is mainly based on classification or “paradigmatic 
reasoning,” as Polkinghorne calls it. Here, data are collected as narratives, the 
paradigmatic analyses of which “result in descriptions of themes that hold across the 
stories or in taxonomies of types of stories, characters, or settings” (Polkinghorne, 
1995, p. 12). The second kind, narrative analysis, involves what Polkinghorne refers 
to as “narrative reasoning,” i.e. recognizing diversity and context. Narrative analysis 
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could thus be described as a synthesizing of data into stories. Polkinghorne (1995, p. 
12) summarizes the differences of the two approaches as follows: “[A]nalysis of 
narratives moves from stories to common elements, and narrative analysis moves 
from elements to stories”. As we will see below, I could argue that my analysis of 
the interviews involved some of both kinds of analysis.  
Due to my prime interest in the content of narratives rather than structures, 
my analysis of the interviews could be characterized as thematic analysis (Riessman, 
2008). Contrary to analyses based on grounded theory methods that fragments data 
into categories (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996), my analysis aimed to regard the whole 
interview as unit of analysis. Hence, after interviews had been transcribed (I 
transcribed twelve interviews myself, the remaining fourteen were transcribed by 
hired assistance), the first step was to read through the interviews and write 
summaries of each of them in order to keep the stories intact.  
However, soon I found out that most interviews had produced several often 
contradictory narratives. Hence, instead of regarding the interview as one narrative, I 
regarded it as space for different narratives. I created a table with an overview of 
interviews including references to the narratives related to the main research 
questions. This made it easier to compare across interviews and to identify dominant 
and minority narratives. However, the narratives presented in papers 2 and 3 (see 
Chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis) are constructed or synthesized from different 
interviews in order to illustrate as many relevant aspects, patterns of argumentation 
and linkings as possible. So, in that way, the analysis could be described as both an 
analysis of the interviews as narratives and as a synthesis of different elements from 
different interviews to narratives.  
*
To summarize, this thesis deals with two agents of socialization of offshore 
wind technology: news media and scientists. Hence, two sets of data were drawn 
upon to address these different socialization agents: newspaper articles and 
interviews with scientists. In addition, field notes taken at offshore wind energy 
conferences and seminars as well as policy documents on renewable energy and 
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science policy served as background for the analyses outlined here.  
Looking back, of course, there are additional issues that could have been 
raised and additional sets of data that could have been included in this thesis to 
address the socialization of offshore wind technology. For example, although the 
media analysis was carried out in the first half of 2011, it could later have been 
extended to include at least one more year (2011) in order to serve as a better 
background and context for the interviews, which were conducted in 2011. 
The scientists interviewed represent a large proportion of offshore wind 
scientists in Norway and I consider the number of interviews as adequate to address 
the issues investigated in this thesis. However, what about other agents of 
socialization than news media and scientists? Bijker & d’Andrea (2009) mention 
also civil society organizations and political administrations as potential agents of 
socialization. Further, my media analysis reveals that for example politicians, 
industry actors and environmental organizations were actively using newspapers as 
arena for socialization. Hence, in hindsight, it would have been interesting to look at 
other agents of socialization as well. 
Moreover, to add to the story of socialization it would have been interesting 
to look into the domestication of offshore wind technology beyond analyzing media 
as site for domestication and hence as partial representation of public debate. How 
do publics (PiPs and PiG) make sense of offshore wind? Among many other 
exciting things, this would enable relating scientists’ imagined publics to “real” 
publics and to the publics’ imagined publics. Part of this work is ongoing; together 
with colleagues several focus group interviews were carried out with publics across 
Norway. However, time did not allow this to be included in this thesis. Hence, also 
this thesis has its limits regarding time and space, choices had to be made and 
boundaries set. Nonetheless, in total, I regard the data gathered and analyzed as 
sufficient to illuminate the questions raised in this thesis. 
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Chapter 2: Dingpolitik at Sea: Offshore wind energy 
in the news media discourse

Abstract
This paper investigates the news media discourse on the emerging 
offshore wind technology. Offshore wind energy is commonly regarded 
as a solution to implementation problems onshore, as it is “out of sight, 
out of mind.” However, does moving renewable energy offshore really 
prevent controversy? Drawing on the perspectives of “Dingpolitik,” i.e. 
a politics of things, and “Naturpolitik,” the paper finds that both 
supporters and opponents make sense of offshore wind energy within 
economic, environmental, and moral frameworks. Values and concerns 
are contested, while the technology, in its physical form, goes largely 
unacknowledged. Hence, the paper suggests that the debate over 
offshore wind energy represents a twisted Dingpolitik, wherein the Ding 
– the technology itself – is blackboxed.  
Keywords: offshore wind energy, media analysis, Dingpolitik, 
Naturpolitik, Norway 
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Introduction: News media as a meaning-making arena  
The development of new renewable energy is frequently accompanied by conflicts 
related to its high land-intensiveness relative to conventional energy production. 
Hirsh and Sovacool (2013) argue that new land-intensive renewable energy makes 
electricity production and distribution visible, whereas these processes have been 
largely invisible to most people, due to the concentrated and remote placement of 
conventional power plants. Having energy production in view forces people “to 
ponder […] that their electricity-based lifestyles require new sources of energy” 
(Hirsh & Sovacool, 2013, p. 723f), and may thus lead to opposition. Particularly in 
the context of onshore wind power, controversies over natural and environmental 
consequences affecting biodiversity and landscapes have been widely observed 
(Devine-Wright, 2009; Ellis et al., 2007; Solli, 2010; Toke, 2005; Warren et al., 
2005; Wolsink, 2007). 
However, it is commonly assumed that moving renewable energy production 
offshore, and thus back to “invisibility,” would prevent such controversies (Haggett, 
2008), as offshore energy production promises to be “out of sight, out of mind.” By 
analyzing the news media discourse on offshore wind energy in Norway, this paper 
investigates whether controversy can really be prevented in this way.   
Globally, the deployment of offshore wind energy is expected to increase 
greatly over the following decades. Thus far, development has mostly been in 
Europe, but other countries, including the US and China, are expected to also 
contribute to the development of this energy. A main motivation for offshore wind 
energy is climate change mitigation. In addition, concerns for energy security, good 
wind conditions and free space, the opportunity to site power plants close to major 
coastal cities, less impact on the environment and humans, and less public resistance 
than onshore are noted drivers for offshore wind development (Kaldellis & Kapsali, 
2013; Timilsina et al., 2013; Veum et al., 2011). 
A development of Norwegian offshore wind energy could not only increase 
renewable energy production in Norway, but also supply renewable energy to other 
European countries. However, the current situation of offshore wind energy in 
107

Norway is ambiguous and uncertain. The country, with its long coastline, has 
excellent offshore wind potential, but its energy situation is characterized by the 
export of oil and gas. In addition, abundant clean and inexpensive hydropower 
represents a kind of “gold standard,” against which other energy production is 
measured (Sørensen, 2007). Thus, policymakers regard the development of offshore 
wind energy one option among many, and there is less drive behind its development 
in Norway than in other European countries.  
Only one offshore turbine, Hywind – a floating pilot – has been installed in 
Norway. The first commercial offshore wind power plant, Havsul, was planned to 
operate by 2015. However, it was put on hold in December 2012 due to lack of 
political support. While there is quite a strong focus on research and development of 
offshore wind technology, future implementation remains uncertain. Hence, in the 
context of an emerging technology such as offshore wind in Norway, which is 
characterized by many uncertainties, an analysis of how the news media make sense 
of the technology is particularly relevant.  
News media are important for the sense-making of emerging technologies. 
They present an arena for information and debate, not only for journalists, but also 
for other actors. News media also serve as a reference point for the public. They 
communicate information about issues such as renewable energy, and frame and 
ascribe meaning to these issues (Cox, 2010; Hansen, 2010; Lester, 2010). Media can 
be described as being at the interface between science/technology and the public.     
This paper pursues its research questions by analyzing the news media 
discourse on offshore wind energy, examining newspaper articles published between 
2000 and 2010. How is offshore wind energy made sense of? Which actors are 
involved in the media debate, and how do they argue?  
Haggett (2011) argues that discussion of offshore wind energy can be seen as 
a continuation of the onshore debate. Many issues, such as participation, trust, 
environmental and visual impact, and local context, are relevant to both offshore and 
onshore debates. The continuous importance of aesthetic values and visual impact to 
public attitudes is particularly emphasized (Gee, 2010; Haggett, 2008; Waldo, 
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2012). Wolsink (2010) argues that public attachment to seascapes may have the 
same role as public attachment to landscapes. Also, contested environmental values 
play into offshore wind controversies (Firestone & Kempton, 2007; González & 
Estévez, 2005). Thus, research challenges the common belief that siting wind 
turbines offshore will solve implementation problems encountered onshore. 
The few prior studies of the media discourse on offshore wind energy also 
suggest a dominance of aesthetic issues. Based on his analysis of the newspaper 
coverage of a proposal for offshore wind development in the Nantucket Sound, 
Massachusetts (US), Thompson (2005, p. 259) claims that “the newspapers fell well 
short of facilitating high-quality public debate” because they failed to report 
sufficiently on most social and environmental issues, beyond aesthetics. He also 
argues that the newspapers mainly overlooked the link to global climate change, 
focusing instead on local aspects of offshore wind energy. Kuehn (2005) studied the 
reception of offshore wind farms in Denmark, and finds that local newspapers 
mainly presented negative attitudes towards offshore wind, including aesthetic 
concerns and high electricity prices, while propositions for local employment 
opportunities through the wind farms were given less attention.   
The dominant focus on aesthetic issues and on local, rather than global, 
environmental concerns, makes media discourse on offshore wind comparable to 
that on onshore wind. For example, Stephens et al. (2009) observe that US media 
coverage of onshore wind energy seldom linked the technology to global warming. 
Furthermore, Wolsink (2000) presents a Dutch case in which an onshore wind 
project was formally opposed due to noise. However, the regional and local press 
focused more on landscape and visual issues, than on noise.  
Offshore wind energy in Norway has been given little scholarly attention so 
far. Thele’s (2008) study of the controversy over the planned Havsul near-shore 
wind farm is an interesting exception. He found the controversy to mainly pertain to 
conflicting definitions of nature. Similar observations have been made about wind 
energy on land. Bye and Solli (2007) observe that the public perception of onshore 
wind in Norway has changed from the view that it is an environmentally friendly 
energy to the opinion that it is a controversial technological intervention in nature. 
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Rygg claims that arguments both for and against onshore wind energy are locally 
embedded. Opponents point to the need for nature conservation. Supporters, in 
contrast, have emphasized employment opportunities and economic benefits, 
thereby turning wind turbines “into modernization hybrids, representing a tempting 
opportunity for the inhabitants” (Rygg, 2012, p. 175).  
News media as an arena for “Dingpolitik” and “Naturpolitik”  
The study of environmental media can be regarded as a subfield of environmental 
communication. Cox (2010, p. 20) defines environmental communication as the 
“pragmatic and constitutive vehicle for our understanding of the environment as 
well as our relationship to the natural world; it is the symbolic medium that we use 
in constructing environmental problems and negotiating society’s different 
responses to them.” Thus, the way we communicate about environmental issues, 
such as offshore wind energy, influences our perceptions of these issues. News 
media is an important arena where such communication takes place.  
News media can be regarded as a mediator between science and the public 
(Bucchi, 2008). They provide a space for relevant actors to deal with issues of 
concern and express their perspectives. Cox (2010, p. 208) describes the media as an 
“important public sphere within which many voices and claims to rationality 
compete.” The relationship between news media and the public is complementary: 
on the one hand, the media have a responsibility to engage the public; on the other 
hand, citizens, themselves, have a responsibility to engage (Dahlgren, 2009). 
Likewise, Lester (2010, p. 165) states that “media invite their audiences […] to 
respond” in different ways; public response or engagement can, for example, involve 
interest, affect, or participation.  
However, as studies on media effects (i.e. the influence of media on public 
attitudes and perceptions) show, it is difficult to establish a direct link between the 
media and public perceptions (Cox, 2010; Hansen, 2010). Hansen (2010, p. 169), for 
example, argues that demonstrating the specific ways in which the media influence 
publics “has proven a more elusive task.” However, the media may have agenda-
setting power (Ader, 1995; Cox, 2010; Hansen, 2010; Olausson, 2011). The media 
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might not strongly influence what people think, but they do tell people what to think 
about. This is especially prevalent in relation to unobtrusive, as well as global and 
national (as opposed to local), issues (Hansen, 2010). Another important function of 
the media is to provide frameworks, within which the information presented can be 
made sense of (Cox, 2010; Hansen, 2010).  
In this context, audiences should not be conceived of as passive recipients of 
news media. In contrast, they actively use media in conjunction with many other 
sources in their social lives, to make sense of environmental issues. Hansen (2010, 
p. 181) states that: 
The media and media coverage of environmental issues are best 
conceived of as a – continuously changing – cultural reservoir of 
images, meanings and definitions, on which different publics will draw 
for the purposes of articulating, making sense of, and understanding 
environmental problems and the politics of environmental issues.  
Olausson (2011) criticizes research on climate reporting for “media-
centrism,” on the basis that it has assumed a central role of the media in shaping 
public understanding without empirically supporting that claim. Instead, she argues, 
the media are just one of several resources for the meaning-making activities of the 
public, constituting an overall framework for sense-making that people actively fill 
with their own experiences. However, she acknowledges that the media are “the 
primary intermediary between science, politics, and the citizens” (Olausson, 2011, p. 
295). Boykoff (2009, p. 448) expresses it as follows: “[media] coverage does not 
determine engagement but shapes their possibilities.”  
News media do not mirror the public debate, but they provide an edited arena 
that influences science, as well as the public. They are very complex and diverse, 
influenced by varied interests and constructed of complex interactions with different 
actors (Dahlgren, 2009; Hansen, 2010). Lester (2010, p. 60f) proposes that we view 
news media as “a deeply contested site where issues develop and agendas are set.” 
Hansen (2010), for example, comments on the media’s gatekeeping role, 
emphasizing their control of the selection of issues, sources, and arguments that 
enter their domain. Factors constraining the media include, among others, 
organizational, cultural, economic, and political factors, and professional norms and 
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values (Cox, 2010; Hansen, 2010; Lester, 2010).  
To summarize, the media are an important source of knowledge and opinions 
of science and technology. They play a central role in the construction of meaning, 
and they represent, although partially, public concerns (Boykoff, 2009; Hansen, 
2010; Lester, 2010; Ryghaug, Sørensen & Næss, 2011; Skjølsvold, 2012). In this 
paper, I regard news media as an arena for “Dingpolitik” and “Naturpolitik,” 
wherein “things” and “natures” are made sense of and contested.  
The concept of Dingpolitik, as introduced by Latour (2005), refers to a 
changed way of approaching politics. Rather than “Realpolitik,” Latour argues that 
we should use the term Dingpolitik, which implies a turn to things – a focus on the 
objects of politics rather than political procedures. The procedures of authorization 
and legitimization are only “half of what is needed to assemble. The other half lies 
in the issues themselves” (Latour, 2005, p. 16). These objects – or issues – of 
politics gather different opinions and emotions, as well as various interested parties, 
around themselves. For each object of politics, different actors, opinions, and 
procedures are generated. Latour (2005, p. 15) claims that these objects “bind all of 
us in ways that map out a public space profoundly different from what is usually 
recognized under the label of ‘the political’.”  
Hajer (2003) elaborates on similar ideas concerning the creation of a public 
space for deliberation and political activity. However, he does not concentrate on the 
object of politics as a trigger for political activity, but, instead, focuses on the 
policymaking around such objects. Hajer (2003, p. 109) asserts that “policymaking 
can function as a public ‘stage’ where deliberation on goals and means can and 
indeed does take place.” Using offshore wind energy to exemplify this idea, the 
policy initiative of establishing an offshore wind power plant would create what 
Hajer calls “communities of fate,” composed of actors who are affected by the 
policy initiative and therefore become political actors within this limited frame.  
Latour (2005), however, places the object of policymaking in the center of 
his analysis, creating an object-oriented democracy. Central to an object-oriented 
democracy is consideration of both the objects of politics (what is to be considered) 
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and the relevant actors (who is to be concerned). Latour further argues that objects 
of politics should not be seen as matters of fact, but as matters of concern. He calls 
for a movement “Back to Things.” “Ding” describes a place or assembly where 
concerned people meet around an issue, and it refers to “the issue that brings people 
together because it divides them” (Latour, 2005, p. 23). However, in addition to this 
participatory democratic aspect, Dingpolitik can also refer to profiting, fighting for 
one’s own interests, or gaining public acceptance (i.e. the advocacy aspect of public 
engagement). In my analysis, I regard offshore wind technology as an “object of 
politics” – a matter of concern that is expected to gather publics. At the same time, I 
pursue Hajer’s (2003) argument that policy initiatives around such objects can act as 
triggers for engagement.  
As mentioned above, several perspectives towards wind energy are closely 
connected to issues of “Naturpolitik.” An aspect of Dingpolitik, Naturpolitik refers 
to the ways in which nature is conceptualized by different actors. Macnaghten and 
Urry (1998) show that nature has multiple, often contested, meanings; it would 
therefore be more appropriate to speak of “natures,” in plural. The authors 
emphasize that natures and environments are produced by social practice and 
discourse. Morton (2007, p. 21f) considers nature “an arbitrary rhetorical construct, 
empty of independent, genuine existence behind or beyond the texts we create about 
it.” Particularly in examinations of controversy, different meanings and 
constructions of nature that are employed to support arguments and attitudes can be 
discovered and analyzed.  
Castree and Braun (1998) distinguish between two perspectives of nature. 
The first is based on a culture–nature dualism. Representatives of this perspective 
aim to protect nature from intervention by humans. The second subverts the culture–
nature dualism and stresses the linkage and integration of humans and nature. “From 
this perspective, human intervention in nature is thus neither ‘unnatural’ nor 
something to fear or decry” (Castree & Braun, 1998, p. 4). In short, nature is 
conceptualized differently depending on context, and filled with a diversity of 
meanings. 
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This paper investigates the discourse on offshore wind energy in the 
Norwegian news media. Using Dingpolitik as a starting point, I analyze how the 
technology is made sense of and contested in the media, and which actors and 
perspectives are included. As noted earlier, offshore wind controversies may be 
considered a continuation of onshore wind disagreements, wherein media discourse 
is dominated by aesthetic concerns and lacks references to global issues such as 
climate change. In addition, previous studies of wind energy in Norway point to the 
importance of Naturpolitik. Does this also apply to Norwegian media discourse on 
offshore wind energy? Does the media discourse engage with Dingpolitik or 
Naturpolitik, or both?  
Method
This paper is based on an analysis of Norwegian newspaper articles published 
between 2000 and 2010. With a large number of titles and regular readers, 
newspapers hold a strong position in Norway (Østbye, 2008). The articles used in 
this paper were collected from the online archive Retriever18, through searches 
containing the main Norwegian terms for offshore wind energy. 19  Due to the 
relatively small number of articles about offshore wind energy, and since wind 
energy issues – especially those pertaining to particular developments – are often 
discussed locally, I included all Norwegian newspapers in my search, including 
small, local newspapers. After manually removing irrelevant articles (such as those 
that only mentioned offshore wind energy in discussion of other topics, and 
commercial or job advertisements) from the sample, a total of 654 articles remained.    
In my analysis, the term “discourse” is used in its everyday sense as talk, 
speech, conversation, or communication. Thus, the method of data analysis used to 
study the newspaper articles is not discourse analysis. Rather, I complemented a 
qualitative analysis inspired by grounded theory methods with quantitative data. 
Articles were counted in order to provide an overview of, for example, the 

18 www.retriever.no.
19 The Norwegian search words were: vindkraft til havs and offshore vindkraft.
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proportion of positive and negative arguments and the change in the number of 
articles over time. However, since I was interested in meanings, rather than just the 
spread and relative strength of arguments in the data, the qualitative analysis was 
most important.    
The qualitative analysis was inspired by Charmaz’ (2006) constructivist 
version of grounded theory, due to its strength in identifying categories and clusters 
of arguments in play. Because of the rather large sample, the analysis was conducted 
in two steps. In order to gain an overview of the development of the media 
discourse, I first coded the 443 articles from 2000 to 2009 with an open coding – 
that is, I did not apply predefined codes, but instead developed codes while reading 
the articles. The article was the unit of analysis, and the aim was to identify the main 
topics of the debate and determine if and how these changed over those years.  
The 211 articles from 2010 were analyzed in more detail. In order to identify 
actors, arguments, and framings, I began with an open line-by-line coding of the 
articles. I then grouped codes referring to arguments towards offshore wind energy 
into larger categories of “pro” and “contra” arguments. The category “economic 
benefits,” for instance, subsumed codes such as “developing supply industry,” 
“emphasizing big international markets,” “local development,” and “potential for 
industrial development.” Following the initial coding, I investigated some codes 
(which were chosen mainly because of their significance in the data and on the basis 
of previous studies and theory) further, with a focused coding. To develop an 
overview of the material and enable quantification, a table was created to list each 
article with its corresponding codes and important quotes. In the process of data 
analysis, findings, ideas, and questions were jotted down as memos. The theoretical 
framework presented in the previous section inspired further questions, with which I 
approached the data. Thus, my analysis can be characterized as abductive (a 
movement between induction and deduction): generating concepts through 
induction, choosing a theoretical framework based on those concepts, and returning 
to the data with the chosen theoretical framework (Dey, 2004). 
The quantitative data, which complement the qualitative analysis, were also 
produced in two steps. The Retriever search provided an exact number of articles per 
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year containing the respective search words, which I used to illustrate how the 
number of published articles about offshore wind energy changed between 2000 and 
2010. In order to establish the proportion of negative and positive arguments in the 
2010 articles, I coded the articles on the basis of the line-to-line codes, whether they 
included only positive, only negative, or both positive and negative arguments. I 
then counted each category.  
The analyzed articles were written by journalists or were letters to the editor 
and feature articles written by public contributors. Of the analyzed articles from 
2010, more than one third (36 percent) were letters to the editor or feature articles. 
This points, already, to some public engagement with the issue at that time.  
Although news articles, letters, and feature articles are different types of 
newspaper features, I decided to combine them in my analysis because I was 
interested in how newspapers, in general, made sense of offshore wind technology. 
As mentioned, news media provide an arena for debate not only for journalists, but 
also for other actors. All three types of newspaper features are involved in the 
provision of meaning with respect to offshore wind technology. Moreover, I did not 
analyze the media discourse as a representation of public views; rather, I 
acknowledged that the data present a particular debate of offshore wind energy, and 
reflect the media’s gate-keeping role. However, the importance of the media in the 
public construction of meaning legitimizes the use of such data.  
The results of the media analysis are presented in the following three 
sections. I first demonstrate how the media discourse developed between 2000 and 
2010, in order to provide insights related to the volume of coverage as well as the 
emergence of some main arguments. I follow with a detailed analysis of the actors 
and arguments in the year 2010. 
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An evolving controversy: How media discourse developed from 
2000–201020
The petroleum resources are being used up, and the risk for a global energy 
crisis truly exists. Norway has unique possibilities to contribute to curb the 
crisis by developing offshore wind power, the world’s fastest growing energy 
form.21   
News media discourse on offshore wind energy in Norway emerged in parallel to 
the worldwide growth of the energy form. Figure 1 illustrates the increase in the 
number of articles mentioning offshore wind energy from fewer than ten articles in 
2000 to 250 articles in 2010.22
Figure 1: Number of articles containing the search words vindkraft til havs or offshore vindkraft in Norwegian newspapers 
between 2000 and 2010. Source: retriever.no.
In particular, the steep curve upwards after 2006 reflects the new focus on 
offshore wind in Norwegian energy policy, research, and industrial development at 
that time. While offshore wind was increasingly on the agenda, was the emerging 
technology accompanied by an evolving controversy? How controversial was 
offshore wind energy in early newspaper discourse? To answer these questions, I 
present the main features of the media discourse between 2000 and 2010. 

20 All newspaper quotes in this paper were translated from Norwegian to English by the author. 
21 Dagens Næringsliv, January 22, 2005. 
22 These figures were retrieved before irrelevant articles and advertisements were removed from the 
data. 
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The starting phase of newspaper discourse between 2000 and 2005 was 
characterized by references to the huge potential of offshore wind energy. Big, 
floating, offshore wind power plants situated far from the coast to solve the 
problems experienced with onshore wind power plants were imagined: “Here is the 
solution for those who think that windmills destroy the landscape: Hydro pursues to 
put up the first floating windmill in 2007.”23
The increased number of published articles from 2006 onwards can also be 
explained by the public disclosure of plans for the first commercial offshore wind 
power plant, Havsul. Contrary to imaginings of floating, far offshore sites, Havsul 
was planned as a bottom-fixed near-shore wind power plant. Many contributors 
were critical of Havsul. Beyond concerns of noise, danger for birds, and 
consequences for tourism and fishery, the dominant argument against Havsul 
referred to the wind farm’s visual impact. In contrast, some supporting voices 
pointed to the wind farm’s sustainability and potential contribution to reducing 
carbon emissions and mitigating climate change. 
In 2007, offshore wind energy became a relevant issue for politicians and the 
media on a national level. A global perspective was added, through references to a 
global market for the technology and the possibility that Norway might become a 
leading actor in technology development. Offshore wind energy was seen to offer a 
potential technological leap.   
The European perspective was added to the newspaper discourse in 2008. 
Through a combination of offshore wind and hydropower, Norway was imagined to 
be able to act as “Europe’s battery.” Expectations were so high that offshore wind 
energy was referred to as “Norway’s new oil.” However, this enthusiasm was curbed 
through criticism referring to the technology’s expense and to possible area 
conflicts. In 2009, offshore wind energy was additionally discussed in the context of 
electricity prices. Apart from this focus on electricity prices, the arguments in 2009 
did not differ much from the ones in 2010, which I present in more detail in the 
following two sections. 

23 Adresseavisen, November 4, 2005. 
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In sum, media discourse began with technology optimistic statements about 
future possibilities. Social aspects became relevant in the local controversy over 
Havsul. A national debate emerged when topics such as electricity prices and energy 
export were included. Thus, the emerging technology was accompanied by an 
evolving controversy encouraging the engagement of “PiPs,” or “Publics in 
Particular” (i.e. interested stakeholders, as opposed to the “PiG,” or “Public in 
General”) (Michael, 2009). Rödder and Schäfer (2010, p. 257) distinguish between 
routine and mediatized phases of media coverage of science, wherein “phases of 
mediatization are characterized by an increase in coverage and by more pluralistic 
debates.” The year 2006 marked the beginning of such a mediatized phase of 
offshore wind energy, represented by an increase in the number of articles published 
and the participation of a diversity of actors in the controversy.  
One view of this controversy is as a pro and contra debate uncovering 
utopian and dystopian visions of the innovation. However, these pro and contra 
arguments were not balanced in the media coverage. Of the 211 newspaper articles 
from 2010, around 50 percent were found to present mainly supportive arguments, 
while only around 10 percent were found to present mainly skeptical arguments. The 
remaining articles were found to present either a balance of supportive and skeptical 
arguments, or “neutral” information about new laws or technology development.  
A wide range of actors participated in this controversy; that is, they were 
either given voice by journalists in news articles or allowed into the debate via 
letters to the editor or feature articles published. My analysis identified a group of 
actors in support and a group in opposition to offshore wind energy. However, not 
every participating group and individual was easily defined as a supporter or an 
opponent. There were some “in betweens,” which I, following Bell et al. (2005), 
labeled “qualified supporters.” By this I mean that they supported offshore wind 
energy only when certain conditions were met. In the following two sections I 
present the supporting and opposing groups and their main arguments, reflecting 
how they made sense of offshore wind energy.  
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A new green industrial adventure: Offshore wind energy supporters 
In the next couple of years we have a unique chance to take floating offshore 
wind energy as the next big industrial adventure in Norway.24
The supporting group was found to engage in the media debate with high 
expectations of offshore wind opportunities and the benefits for Norway. 
Representatives of offshore wind related industries and research institutions were 
included in this group, and they focused on technological and industrial 
developments and associated business opportunities. A second, very active, 
supporting group consisted of politicians from nearly all parties. This group pointed 
to the necessity of developing renewables to prevent climate change and to the 
potential of offshore wind for generating industrial development. However, some 
local politicians could also be characterized as qualified supporters. These 
politicians supported offshore wind development only when certain conditions, such 
as extra income tax for the affected community, were met. A part of the 
environmental movement that was more technology-oriented and focused on climate 
change mitigation was also in support of offshore wind energy. However, 
environmental organizations only provided qualified support, tying the development 
of offshore wind to conditions such as the protection of biodiversity. A few 
supporters lacked institutional affiliation and focused on the potential positive 
effects on local development. In addition, some local initiatives expressed support 
for offshore wind energy in connection with their protest against onshore wind 
power plants. Collected, the arguments employed by the supporting actors can be 
divided into four categories: (1) economic benefits, (2) environmental friendliness, 
(3) moral responsibility, and (4) resistance prevention.  
The first category of arguments in favor of offshore wind energy in Norway 
referred to the expected national economic benefits, emphasizing the considerable 
advantage that the technological development of offshore wind energy could bring 
to Norwegian industry. In these arguments, Norway was considered a potentially 
leading industrial actor in the European supply industry. As the research director of 
Aker Solutions stated: “There is a giant market out there and we are well prepared to 

24 Bergens Tidende, December 11, 2010. 
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supply this market with equipment.”25
Although Norway has limited experience with wind energy, supporters 
emphasized the country’s abundant experience with offshore oil, gas, and marine 
technology. A Labor Party member wrote: “Norway has big industrial expertise 
when it comes to installations and solutions offshore. In addition, we are a great 
energy nation. We have to make sure that this expertise will make us world leading 
within renewable energy.”26
Offshore wind was also considered a solution for Norwegian industry in a 
post-oil era. Some thought that offshore wind energy had the potential to become 
Norway’s next industrial adventure and to create new jobs.27 Supporters also pointed 
to possible positive local consequences of offshore wind farms, such as new jobs 
and additional sporting and cultural activities, in addition to advantages for the 
national economy.28
The second category of supporting arguments centered on the environmental 
friendliness of offshore wind, mainly in relation to climate change. Most Norwegian 
politicians and some members of the environmental movement considered the 
development of offshore wind energy a strategy for reducing CO2 emissions and for 
meeting the EU directive of increasing the proportion of new renewables in the 
energy mix. A Labour Party member wrote that “the world has to solve the climate 
crisis and at the same time billions need access to more energy to get out of poverty. 
We won’t manage this without big technological leaps. Offshore wind technology 
can be an important Norwegian contribution.”29
This official statement also refers to the third category of arguments, which 
employed the moral perspective. Norway has greater wind resources than most 
countries, and offshore wind conditions are considered better and more stable than 
conditions onshore. Accordingly, some supporters felt that Norway should use these 
resources to contribute to solving global energy challenges.  

25 Fædrelandsvennen, November 29, 2010. 
26 Adresseavisen, April 3, 2010. 
27 Adresseavisen, April 3, 2010; Nationen, October 20, 2010; and Trønder-Avisa, July 5, 2010. 
28 Adresseavisen, November 30, 2010. 
29 Trønder-Avisa, July 17, 2010.  
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Furthermore, electricity from offshore wind power plants was thought to not 
only be used for the electrification of oil platforms or to meet the increased needs of 
electric vehicles. According to some supporters, Norway could become Europe’s 
green battery, by combining hydro and wind power. This energy export was seen 
from an economic as well as a moral perspective:  
The country is not only rich on energy. We do also have a high level of 
technological competency to find out how Norway best can exploit and 
interconnect the renewable energy resources. With our oil wealth on top of 
this, we have a moral responsibility to deliver green energy to the world.30
These supporting arguments expressed a belief in progress informed by 
technological optimism. The first category (economic benefits) dominated the 
debate and represented the self-interests of Norway as a nation, of local 
communities, and of industrial and R&D actors. Similar to what Rygg finds in 
relation to onshore wind, offshore wind technology was conceptualized as a 
“modernization hybrid” (Rygg, 2012, p. 175), promising industrial development and 
new job opportunities. The second category (environmental friendliness) 
corresponded with more altruistic thinking – however with arguments that were 
mainly directed towards nature. Hence, this second category exemplified a 
Naturpolitik perspective, focusing on abstract concepts like sustainability and 
climate. The third category, focusing on Norway’s moral responsibility, shifted the 
emphasis to altruism, arguing that Norway should be willing to bear costs for the 
global benefit. 
Supporters also emphasized that placing wind turbines offshore would 
prevent public resistance; this is reflective of the fourth category of arguments. 
Because offshore wind power plants would be out of sight and far from people’s 
homes and recreational areas, supporters believed that conflicts with the local 
population would be avoided: “Gradually most wind parks will end up far at sea, 
where they just bother the seagulls.”31 This argument for offshore placement was 

30 Aftenposten, June 15, 2010. 
31 Bergensavisen, November 1, 2010. 
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frequently made in the context of opposition towards onshore wind power plants.32
Haggett (2008, p. 292) describes this phenomenon as follows: offshore wind energy 
“is seen as a good thing not just in its own right, but because it may be the answer to 
many of the problems encountered with onshore developments.” 
To summarize, supporters made sense of offshore wind energy within 
economic, environmental, and moral frameworks.  
Expensive turbines, endangered birds, and area conflicts: Offshore 
wind energy opponents 
As mentioned above, only 10 percent of the newspaper articles from 2010 included 
merely arguments that opposed offshore wind energy. The aim of this section is to 
identify the opposing actors and analyze their arguments and sense-making of 
offshore wind energy. On the basis of controversies over onshore wind, we would 
expect the opposing actors to have engaged mainly with Naturpolitik.  
Similar to the supporting group, the opposing group consisted of PiPs 
(publics in particular) representing various interests. Among the political parties I 
identified in the debate, only the small Coast Party (without national influence) 
expressed a skeptical outlook. However, as mentioned above, there were local 
exceptions to the general positive attitude among other political parties. This 
opposition was directed towards the placement of particular offshore wind power 
plants that was considered to conflict with local interests. Also, a part of the 
environmental movement was critical towards offshore wind energy, more 
generally. Representatives of the Norwegian fishing industry also participated in the 
opposition; they took a clearly negative position, focusing on potential area 
conflicts. Further skeptical statements came from tourism or recreational 
organizations, and from a few individuals with no institutional affiliation.  
Supporters mostly presented a range of arguments in favor of offshore wind. 
Opponents tended to concentrate on a few arguments that lay within their particular 

32 Adresseavisen, October 29, 2010; Adresseavisen, October 28, 2010; Bergens Tidende, October 1, 
2010; Fosna-Folket, September 28, 2010; Stavanger Aftenblad, June 18, 2010; and 
Fædrelandsvennen, April 22, 2010. 
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areas of interest. I observed four categories: (1) cost, (2) visual impact and 
biodiversity conservation, (3) opposition to energy export, and (4) area conflict. 
The first category consisted of arguments that the costs of wind turbine 
production, installation, and maintenance would be too high to be profitable without 
heavy subsidies. Opponents argued that offshore wind energy could not compete 
with other energy forms, be they modern gas power plants33, hydropower34, or 
onshore wind power35. The technological optimism observed among the supporters 
was not shared by the opponents.  
The second category consisted of arguments emphasizing the visual and 
environmental impacts of offshore wind energy and the sentiment that Norway’s 
extraordinary landscape should be protected from visual pollution. Wind turbines 
were thought to potentially destroy views to the open sea, which is advertised as a 
main tourist attraction. 36  In this context, the aim of the opposition was nature 
conservation. Norwegian nature and landscapes play a special role in the Norwegian 
identity and Norway’s international image. Thus, dimensions of place attachment 
and identity were at stake in arguments of nature conservation. However, it is 
important to note that, in contrast to most other categories of arguments, which 
referred to far offshore sites, arguments connected to visibility mainly referred to 
near-shore sites that would be visible from the coast.  
In addition, opponents declared a danger for biodiversity – in particular birds 
and sea animals. Very polemically, the writer Gjelsvik wrote: “The windmill parks 
will also make up a holocaust for the natural environment. Where should the birds 
go in a renewable paradise?”37 Furthermore, the planned Havsul wind power plant 
was criticized by the Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature for being 
placed in a migration corridor for seabirds and the feeding ground for South 
Norway’s biggest seal colony.38

33 Stavanger Aftenblad, March 19, 2010. 
34 Bergens Tidende, December 23, 2010. 
35 Teknisk Ukeblad, June 24, 2010. 
36 Andøyposten, October 14, 2010. 
37 Bergensavisen, December 4, 2010. 
38 Klassekampen, November 25, 2010. 
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The third category opposed the supporters’ moral arguments for offshore 
wind. Although most opponents welcomed Norway’s involvement in offshore wind 
technology and the potential for supplying a global offshore market, specific plans 
to erect offshore wind farms in Norway and to export energy to other countries were 
criticized. Due to Norway’s hydropower resources, opponents saw offshore wind 
farms as unnecessary, and felt that Norwegian taxpayers should not provide Europe 
with highly subsidized green energy.39 Such arguments created a division between 
Norway and the rest of Europe, as well as between rural coastal areas and cities like 
Oslo and Bergen, where decisions affecting rural areas are often made.40
The fourth category, area conflicts, consisted of arguments mainly connected 
to the fishing industry. According to a regional fishing association, the places chosen 
for offshore wind power plants tended to be the best areas for fishing.41 This area 
conflict created opposition, even within political parties that were generally 
supportive of such developments, such as the Conservative Party, whose mayor 
from the island of Andøy commented:  
Concerning the area conflict with the fisheries, I am sure that Andøy as well as 
Vesterålen will speak completely in line with the opinion of the Norwegian 
Fishing Association; that is to say that this type of installations [offshore wind 
farms] is not compatible with fishing activities because it will close a 
considerable area of the shelf.42
Such opposition indicates the symbolic importance of the Norwegian fishing 
industry. Other area conflicts suggested by opponents were with the petroleum, 
shipping, and military surveillance industries.43
In summary, the scope of the opposing arguments was local, national, and 
partly European, relative to the supporting arguments, which focused mainly on the 
national and global levels. The opposition category relating to costs and subsidized 
energy export included national, as well as individual, interests. The area conflicts 

39 Bergens Tidende, December 23, 2010. 
40NynorskPressekontor,October15,2010.
41 Nynorsk Pressekontor, October 15, 2010; and Stavanger Aftenblad, March 6, 2010. 
42 Harstad Tidende, December 1, 2010. 
43 Bergens Tidende, December 23, 2010. 
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category represented the local interest of opponents. Only the Naturpolitik 
perspective of nature conservation included altruistic thinking towards nature. 
However, the global and moral responsibility articulated by supporters was absent in 
these opposing arguments.  
The different scope of supporting and opposing arguments in the media 
discourse analyzed here contrasts with Rygg’s (2012) findings of local perceptions 
of onshore wind energy in Norway, which indicate that both supporting and 
opposing arguments have local references. One explanation for this difference in 
findings may be that offshore wind energy is in an emerging state, with no 
installations in Norwegian waters. Thus, apart from a few contributions around 
particular planned wind farms (such as Havsul), wind turbines, in their physical 
form, were largely absent from media discourse.  
Conclusion: Contested concerns 
The news media are an important reference point for public sense-making and for 
ascribing meanings to environmental issues. It could be claimed that the media 
construct virtual futures for, e.g., emerging technologies. This paper has analyzed 
the Norwegian news media discourse on the emerging offshore wind technology. 
Moving renewable energy production offshore is commonly believed to 
prevent controversies about area use and environmental consequences. However, 
previous studies claim that the debate over offshore wind energy can often be seen 
as a continuation of the onshore debate, with an emphasis on aesthetics (Haggett, 
2011). Offshore wind energy technology is not always out of sight, and seascapes 
are as valued as landscapes (Wolsink, 2010). The findings of this paper demonstrate 
that offshore wind energy, in the news media, was mainly made sense of within 
three frameworks: economic, environment, and moral. Supportive, as well as 
oppositional, engagement was most frequently triggered by economic issues. 
Supporters emphasized economic benefits, while opponents referred to the high 
costs of the technology. Thus, economics emerged as a privileged frame of 
interpretation.  
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Engagement was also triggered by concerns over nature. Supporters 
constructed offshore wind as an environmentally friendly technology, while 
opponents considered it a danger for biodiversity and a visual disturbance. In 
addition, there were area conflicts. Hence, both supporters and opponents engaged 
with Naturpolitik to strengthen their arguments. The idea of nature as a “landscape” 
and “as threatened and in need of protection” was contrasted to ideas of nature as 
“providing resources and life support essential to human survival” and “the 
environment” (cf. Macnaghten and Urry 1998, p. 74). This corresponds to Castree 
and Braun’s (1998) distinction between the view that nature should be preserved and 
protected from human destruction, and the view that humans and nature are 
integrated, which approves of human intervention. Thus, the analysis unveiled a 
conflict between a “traditional” nature conservation perspective and a technology-
oriented, climate-focused sustainability perspective. These different concepts of 
nature represent one explanation for the divided opinions on offshore wind energy. 
However, aesthetic concerns and the value of nature experiences related to near-
shore developments, only.  
Engagement was also triggered by moral issues. Supporters emphasized 
Norway’s moral responsibility to invest in new renewables, while opponents were 
skeptical of energy exports subsidized by Norwegian taxpayers.  
In addition to these three frameworks of interpreting offshore wind energy, 
the strategic argument that offshore wind development would be “out of sight, out of 
mind” was very common. This argument focused on the Ding of offshore wind 
energy by emphasizing future technological possibilities. It also focused on nature, 
which was not to be destroyed – at least not “in sight.” At the same time, the “out of 
sight, out of mind” argument was a strategy for non-involvement to avoid public 
resistance. Offshore wind could be a pure technical solution without public 
participation, without Dingpolitik. The media analysis indicated that this strategy 
was working – at least to a certain degree. Most articles introduced supportive 
arguments, while the opposing arguments were comparatively few. Onshore wind 
opposition groups supported offshore wind developments. Hence, the expectation of 
preventing controversy by moving renewable energy offshore was partially met.  
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In this way, the Naturpolitik did not disappear, but shifted to an emphasis on 
sustainability, climate, and biodiversity. Hence, in contrast to earlier studies of 
media discourse, global aspects were drawn upon in both a Naturpolitik and moral 
framework. In addition, area conflicts appeared to be important. This suggests that 
the offshore debate has a different Dingpolitik than the onshore and near-shore 
debates, with different actors and concerns gathered around the issue or object of 
politics; the controversy remains, but with a changed focus.  
Furthermore, we have seen that in the offshore wind debate analyzed here, 
values and concerns were contested, but facts were not. Following Latour (2005), 
matters of concern were controversial, not matters of fact. The debate was different 
from that of climate change, wherein scientific facts are contested and deficit 
thinking can be found (in the sense that people lack the facts needed to change their 
attitudes and behavior) (Tøsse, 2013). In the offshore wind debate, the opposing 
minority was not accused of lacking knowledge, but seen to express conflicting 
values and interests.  
The growing media discourse on offshore wind energy enables different 
actors to gather around the Ding of offshore wind technology and thus attempt to 
gain public opinion to make way for the “right” political decisions. However, the 
Ding – the technology – was quite absent from and abstract in the debate analyzed 
here. There was, for example, no discussion of design choices. Hence, the news 
media discourse illustrated a twisted Dingpolitik, wherein the Ding, itself, was not 
an issue of concern. Thus, using the concept of Dingpolitik in a study of the news 
media discourse invited a focus on the significance of the technology, itself, and 
revealed how it had become blackboxed. Latour calls us to consider matters of 
concern, in addition to matters of fact. In this paper, we have observed that to 
achieve a Dingpolitik debate about offshore wind energy, the dominant focus on 
matters of concern – what may be achieved by offshore wind turbines – should be 
corrected with a concern for the shaping of the technology, and thus for matters of 
fact.
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Chapter 3: Sublime technology and object of fear: 
Offshore wind scientists assessing publics 
Abstract
The development of offshore wind energy is often connected to 
expectations that the public will be positive or at least indifferent to the 
technology. Because turbines are placed at sea – out of sight, out of 
mind – they are expected to avoid public resistance experienced onshore. 
This paper examines offshore wind scientists’ constructions of the 
public(s) by identifying narratives in the research communities. It is 
based on 26 semi-structured interviews with scientists at two national 
research centres on offshore wind energy and technology in Norway. It 
finds that, although the dominant narrative of these scientists conveys a 
positive public, expectations of public resistance and constructions of 
public sentiment as NIMBY (‘not in my backyard’) are present in the 
research environments. This continued presence of narratives of 
irrational public resistance in the scientists’ imaginings could be 
understood as act of othering the public with the possible implication of 
a disembedded technology development. The paper concludes by asking 
whether the persistence of constructions of resistant publics mirrors a 
pessimistic engineering mindset.  
Keywords: Offshore wind energy, imagined publics, Norway, NIMBY 
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Introduction 
“This is a historic day. Offshore wind energy may become the next 
adventure for the Norwegian industry and energy sector”.44
With these enthusiastic words, Norway’s former Minister of Petroleum and Energy, 
Terje Riis-Johansen, in the summer of 2009, introduced a new act with respect to 
offshore renewable energy. A public debate followed this optimistic political 
rhetoric. It was dominated by supporting views of offshore wind energy 
(Heidenreich, forthcoming). Particularly its economic benefits were highlighted. 
Industrial actors emphasised the potential for Norwegian industry to become a 
leading actor within the supply industry in a growing international offshore wind 
market. In addition, the optimistic rhetoric included expectation of a positive public. 
Since turbines were to be placed far out at sea and thus would be ‘out of sight, out of 
mind’, the problems with public resistance would be avoided. Hence, in many 
contexts, offshore wind technology was portrayed with enthusiasm and fascination. 
It could, accordingly, be described as a technological sublime (see Nye, 1994).  
Against this backdrop, in 2009, two national research centres on offshore 
wind energy, NOWITECH45 and NORCOWE46, were established with the aim of 
becoming international leaders in developing technological designs mainly for deep 
water. Thus, a fairly large number of scientists were engaged in the development of 
a technology, which supposedly would be received positively by the public. This 
paper analyses whether these scientists’ constructions of the public(s) were similarly 
optimistic by identifying and examining narratives found in interviews with 
scientists associated with the two national research centers.  
Noticeably, the tailwind, in which the two research centers were founded, 
soon turned into a slight headwind when in March 2011 the new Minister of 
Petroleum and Energy, Ola Borten Moe, declared that: “There is no point in 
spending many tax billions to build a wind farm offshore only because it has to be 
offshore”.47 In other words, developing offshore wind energy in Norway was argued 

44Pressrelease82/09,MinistryofPetroleumandEnergy,26.06.2009
45NorwegianResearchCentreforOffshoreWindTechnology
46NorwegianCentreforOffshoreWindEnergy
47StavangerAftenblad17.03.2011(mytranslation)
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to be too expensive. The research centers responded by emphasizing their focus on 
developing cost-effective solutions for offshore wind energy. Still, the high initial 
investment costs make offshore wind energy dependent on political support.  
Thus, the current situation of offshore wind energy after 2011 appears 
ambiguous and uncertain. On the one hand, Norway focuses on research and 
development of offshore wind technology, an implementation of which promises 
industrial development. On the other hand, industry representatives complain of a 
lack of necessary political support (Hansen & Steen, 2011), which is demonstrated 
by the fact that no commercial offshore wind farm has been built yet.  
This ambiguity related to developing offshore wind energy in Norway needs 
to be understood in the context of the country’s particular energy situation, which is 
characterized by two distinctive features. First, nearly all electricity production 
comes from inexpensive and sustainable hydropower representing a gold standard 
against which new energy production is measured (Sørensen, 2007). Second, 
Norway has a large offshore oil and gas industry, which is of significant economic 
importance. The oil and gas industry is competing with offshore wind in terms of 
resources and manpower, while at the same time holding expertise that readily may 
be transferred to offshore wind energy. Besides, although produced far at sea and 
“out of sight”, Norwegian oil is very present in public debate. 
In addition to this particular energy situation, Norway has a history of 
controversy about energy infrastructure developments, such as hydropower, onshore 
wind energy or recently, the power lines in the Hardanger region of Norway, which 
also may play into the scientists’ imagined offshore wind public(s). These 
controversies stand out due to the prominent role attributed to nature conceptualized 
as pristine and in need of protection from human intervention (Bye & Solli, 2007). 
Earlier research on scientists’ imagined publics has mainly focused on 
emerging fields such as nanotechnology and biotechnology. A very common finding 
is that scientists imagine publics as ignorant and inadequately informed about 
science and technology (Besley & Nisbet, 2013; Blok et al., 2008; Michael & Birke, 
1994; Powell et al., 2011). Furthermore, publics are frequently “othered” by 
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constructing their concerns as irrational and emotional in opposition to factual, 
rational and objective science. For example, in his study about the function of the 
discourse of scientists working in the controversial field of crop genetics, Burchell 
(2007, p. 145) finds that scientists constructed the public as contingent ‘others’. 
Their ‘beliefs and actions are seen to derive from personal shortcomings, 
inclinations and self interest’, in contrast to the rational empiricist selves of the 
scientists.  
In the context of renewable energy, Walker et al. (2010) find that industry 
and policy development actors expected that ‘the materialisation both of negative 
responses and of active opposition is a “real and present danger” for RET 
[renewable energy technologies] development’ (Walker et al., 2010, p. 937). Fears 
of public hostility are often related to the NIMBY (‘not in my backyard’) concept as 
a narrative of irrational public resistance. A potentially hostile public is linked to 
specific developments in specific localities, and contrasted with a generally 
supportive public. Generalisations of the public are made to present it as positive 
towards renewable energy technologies, while accounts of hostile, opposing publics 
are more differentiated (Walker et al., 2010). Moreover, Cass and Walker (2009, p. 
65) find that their interviewees described opponents’ responses as ‘abnormal, 
involving passion, anger and “strong feelings”’, while support was construed as 
normal. The expectation of a negative public attitude and hostility towards 
technological development is found particularly prevalent related to wind energy 
(Walker et al., 2010).  
This paper deals with academic scientists, who arguably have different 
experiences with publics than the industry and policy actors referred to above, since 
they, for example, do not directly take part in planning and licensing processes 
where public hearings are obligatory in Norway (Gjerald, 2012). Hence, it is 
interesting to learn how academic offshore wind scientists navigate between 
expectations of public negativity towards wind energy in general, and the promises 
of offshore wind energy to be a technology, which they supposedly are free to 
develop without consideration of public resistance. What standing does the NIMBY 
narrative and other stories of public resistance (which should have been resolved by 
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moving the wind turbines offshore) have in the scientists’ constructions of the 
public(s)? In the following section, I introduce the theoretical considerations guiding 
my analysis of offshore wind scientists’ imagined publics.  
Imagined publics 
This paper draws upon two concepts – ‘imagined lay persons’ (ILP), as introduced 
by Maranta et al. (2003), and NIMBY (‘not in my backyard’) – within the broader 
theoretical approach of Public Engagement with Science and Technology (PEST). 
Walker et al. (2011) propose a framework for understanding public engagement 
related to renewable energy technologies (RET). This framework has four 
characteristics: (1) it is symmetrical, investigating both public engagement with the 
respective technologies as well as RET actors’ (actors who support, develop or 
implement the technologies) engagement with publics; (2) it focuses on expectations 
and anticipations that influence the engagement of both publics and RET actors; (3) 
it is dynamic in acknowledging development and changes in expectations and 
engagement over time; and (4) it recognises the contexts in which these interactions 
take place, like policy, regulations, place and history. In this paper, I draw upon the 
notion of symmetry by redirecting focus from the frequently analysed public 
engagement with science to scientists’ engagement with publics. I also focus on 
anticipations and expectations by investigating the scientists’ imagined publics 
while at the same time acknowledging their dynamics and situatedness. 
The concept of ‘imagined lay persons’ (ILP) was introduced by Maranta et 
al. (2003). The authors observe that face-to-face dialogue or interaction between 
experts and lay people is often absent. Nonetheless, experts form imaginings or 
constructions of lay people, often implicitly, which are integrated into their work, 
especially in the context of application. Woolgar (1991), for example, shows how 
the design and production of new microcomputers could be understood as a 
configuration of future users. This includes not only a construction of the identity of 
the users, but also definitions and constraints of the users’ future actions. Using the 
metaphors of ‘machine as text’ and ‘user as reader’, Woolgar (1991, p. 69) claims 
that ‘the text might be said to be designed (perhaps implicitly, perhaps 
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unconsciously, but always within a context of conventional resources and 
expectations) for the reader’.  
The imagined lay persons are functional constructions that experts need to 
shape technical solutions that are to be used by lay people or, as Maranta et al. 
(2003, p. 151) put it, ‘conceptions of lay persons as they are manifested in the 
products and actions of the experts’. Thus, experts not only deal with technical 
solutions and organisational procedures, but they are also ‘lay person makers’ 
(Maranta et al., 2003, p. 152). Their imaginings of the public become actors with 
agency that potentially may be performative and influence the development and 
implementation of technology, decision-making processes and future interactions 
with publics. Thus, the imagined public might have greater long-term influence than 
the ‘real’ public (Walker et al., 2010).  
Scientists, policymakers or industry stakeholders may imagine the public in 
many different roles. Earlier studies find the public construed as a customer, a 
consumer, a neighbour, a citizen, a ‘man on the street’ or a fuzzy generalised public 
collectivity (Besley and Nisbet, 2013; Burningham et al., 2007; Cotton and Devine-
Wright, 2012). Michael (2009) differentiates between PiPs (publics in particular) 
and the PiG (public in general). PiPs are stakeholders with a particular interest in a 
scientific or technological issue, while the PiG is the generalised public collective. 
Similarly, Maranta et al. (2003) differentiate imagined lay persons according to how 
experts assemble them as addressees of their engagement activities. While 
individualised ILPs are addressed as individuals (e.g. through science centers), 
representative ILPs are expected to represent a specific part of society (e.g. as 
participants in experiments such as consensus conferences). The generalised ILPs 
are addressed as a collective, similar to the PiG. The generalised ILP must be 
thought of in very general terms, so that all lay persons in the collective are 
accounted for. Thus, generalised ILPs ‘are more pure results of the concepts and 
theories that the lay person makers hold than with other ILPs’ (Maranta et al., 2003, 
p. 160).
Walker et al. (2010) propose to include the idea of the public as a phantom 
(Latour, 2005; Lippmann, 1993 [1927]), as it is ungraspable and slippery or, as 
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Latour (2005, p. 38) puts it, ‘this fragile and provisional concept’, in the attempt to 
understand imagined publics. The authors aim to analyse how the phantom public 
becomes imagined and is made real and influential, adding, however, that ‘we 
should not expect all to become transparent and self-evident, or to diminish the 
capacity for continual reformation and reimagination’ (Walker et al., 2010, p. 945). 
In addition, Walker et al. (2010) comment on the democratic implications of 
analysing imagined publics. Since literature on public engagement mainly deals with 
formal or staged engagement events, the incorporation of imagined publics can be 
seen as a virtual form of public participation. Thus, learning about scientists’ 
imaginings of the public may not only help us to understand technology design, 
implementation and public engagement activities, but also give the public a voice, 
although partial and generalising.  
According to Maranta et al. (2003, p. 154), the deficit model of the imagined 
lay person (i.e., ‘the ignorant lay person who is curious and eager to know all about 
science’) is the standard. However, Irwin (2006) argues that this knowledge deficit 
model increasingly competes with a trust deficit model; in addition to public 
ignorance, public mistrust of science is constructed as problem. This is articulated in 
science policy, for example on the European level, where a rebuilding of trust in 
science is mentioned as an important motive for public engagement (European 
Commission, 2002). Also the recent Norwegian science policy white paper describes 
trust in science as cornerstone for knowledge-based decision-making in a 
functioning democracy (St.meld.nr.18, 2012-2013). At the same time, though, the 
importance of scientific knowledge to the public is emphasized. Hence, Norwegian 
scientists are requested to communicate their research to a wider public in order to 
increase both public knowledge and trust in science.     
Scientists’ imagined publics are culturally and institutionally embedded. 
Constructions of publics are implicated in the contexts in which scientists operate. 
However, Wynne (1995, p. 364) argues that although scientific cultures differ, there 
are ‘fundamentally similar issues of the legitimation of science not only as 
instrumental knowledge but as a corresponding universalist culture’. He claims that 
deficit models of publics are functions of a ‘culture of scientism’ (Wynne, 2006, p. 
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214). Similarly, Irwin (1995) refers to a science-centered worldview, within which 
publics are constructed as ignorant and irrational. This worldview ‘does provide a 
powerful and frequently reiterated case for the centrality of scientific reasoning to 
social development’ (Irwin, 1995, p. 14).  
Accordingly, Wynne (2006, p. 219) argues that ‘scientific knowledge 
unwittingly performs its imagined publics in normative ways’. He holds a scientific 
culture, which lacks self-reflection, presents scientific knowledge as universal and 
certain, and continues to reproduce entrenched modes of thinking such as the deficit 
model, responsible for existing public alienation and mistrust of science. 
Uncertainties and contingencies are removed from this official representation of 
science (Delamont & Atkinson, 2001; Wynne 1992). Further, Wynne (1992, 1995) 
emphasizes a culture of control as characteristic of science. In this dominant 
scientific culture, legitimate public concern is reduced to questions of scientifically 
measurable risks while other concerns or alternative perceptions of risk are 
dismissed as irrational or ignorant (Gregory & Miller, 1998; Irwin, 2006; Wynne, 
2006). As we have seen, earlier studies find that constructions of publics as 
irrational are often contrasted to rational science. Hence, we can argue that 
imagining publics involves boundary work (Gieryn, 1983). Constructions of the 
‘other’ (publics) are also constructions of the self (scientists).  
As noted, actors connected to the development of renewable energy 
technologies commonly imagine the public to be resistant. Bauer (1995, p. 13) 
argues that, in an engineering context, resistance to technology traditionally is 
considered ‘deviation from the Rational writ large’. Engineers claim rationality. 
Thus, resistance to their technologies is seen as irrational. In addition, Bauer points 
out that resistance often is directed towards new technologies, emphasising that 
‘“Newness” makes a difference’ (Bauer, 1995, p. 20). This could be linked to the 
concept of ‘resistance to change’, which, according to Dent and Goldberg (1999), 
exists as a mental construct and largely unquestioned truth in organisational life. 
Also in this context, resistance is portrayed as irrational and deviant (Ford et al., 
2008).
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The NIMBY (not in my backyard) concept exemplifies the portrayal of such 
irrational resistance. It refers to public resistance against the building of prisons, 
kindergartens, airports or wind turbines, claiming that people generally are 
supportive of such developments, but for selfish reasons become hostile when they 
are built close to their homes. It is important to note that the NIMBY concept mainly 
is used pejoratively, as it alleges that people are irrational with double moral 
standards. Wolsink (2012, p. 86) claims that ‘accusing someone of NIMBY-ism is a 
direct insult’. Commonly, NIMBY is employed to explain the gap between high 
general support and strong local opposition. It has been widely used in the context of 
opposition towards renewable energy projects, particularly wind energy. 
During the last decade, the use of the NIMBY concept to explain public 
opposition has been strongly criticised (see e.g. Aitken, 2010; Devine-Wright, 
2009). It has been highlighted that the concept contains negative assumptions about 
the public, including ‘an unproblematic agreement that various developments are 
required, but that for selfish, irrational, and parochial reasons people are willfully 
and ignorantly preventing the siting of necessary development in the local vicinity’ 
(Haggett, 2011, p. 504).  
Additionally, it has been shown that the main assumptions underlying the 
NIMBY concept – the proximity hypothesis (i.e. that people are more negative when 
developments are closer to their homes) and the decreasing property value 
hypothesis (i.e. that development is opposed primarily because residents fear a 
devaluation of their property) – cannot be generally confirmed (Wolsink, 2012). 
Actually, many studies indicate that people living close to the respective sites have 
the same or even more positive attitudes than people living farther away (Jones and 
Eiser, 2010; Ladenburg, 2008; Warren et al., 2005).  
To summarise, it has repeatedly been claimed that the use of the NIMBY 
concept to explain public opposition is misleading and inappropriate (Burningham et 
al., 2006; Devine-Wright, 2011a). Consequently, mainstream academic thinking has 
abandoned NIMBY as an analytical tool (Devine-Wright, 2011b; Wolsink, 2012). 
However, the concept still lingers on – partly even in academic writing (as shown by 
e.g., Burningham et al., 2006; Wolsink, 2012), but mostly in the media and among 
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planners, developers and policy-makers (Cotton and Devine-Wright, 2012; 
Mcclymont and O'hare, 2008). Wolsink (2012) describes NIMBY as an 
unquestioned ‘self-evident truth’ within institutionalised technocratic thinking in the 
field of renewable energy deployment, to see issues of social acceptance mainly in 
NIMBY terms.  
As noted, earlier studies of imagined publics observe a presence of 
expectations of public resistance. Concepts of irrational resistance, for example a 
NIMBY public, seem to persist in many areas of society, despite criticism from 
social science. However, offshore wind energy could be an exceptional case where 
scientists are not concerned with public resistance, since the technology is ‘out of 
sight’ and thus also ‘out of mind’. Hence, I expected the offshore wind scientists to 
construct the public either as positive or indifferent towards offshore wind energy, 
or the public to remain a ‘phantom,’ in the sense that the scientists would not 
consider it necessary to deal with or to care about the public at all.  
Method
The paper is based on 26 semi-structured interviews conducted with offshore wind 
scientists associated with the two Norwegian centres for environment-friendly 
energy research dealing with offshore wind energy: NOWITECH and NORCOWE. 
These research centers host scientists in a range of mostly engineering sciences, 
from electrical, mechanical, civil and transport engineering to physical 
oceanography, marine technology, wind energy modelling and meteorology. Their 
positions range from PhD candidates to research managers and professors.  
The interviews were a combination of four focus groups and 22 individual 
interviews; in total with 35 scientists. This represents a high proportion of the total 
number of offshore wind scientists in Norway. Although focus groups should have a 
different dynamic than individual interviews and are mainly used to provide data 
about disagreements, negotiation and a variety of perspectives, in this case, focus 
groups and individual interviews functioned quite similarly. There were no major 
disagreements between participants in the focus groups and the ambivalences that 
emerged were, for the most part, also found in the individual interviews (see the next 
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sections for an illustration of those ambivalences). Interviews lasted between 35 and 
80 minutes and were partly carried out with a colleague. All interviews were 
transcribed and anonymised. Interviewees were grouped according to their position 
(e.g. PhD candidate, research manager, etc.) and given pseudonyms. 20 interviewees 
were Norwegian; 15 were of other nationalities.  
Data analysis was informed by my interest in interviewees’ narratives about 
publics. Gubrium and Holstein (1997, p. 147) refer to narrative as a ‘meaning-
making device [...] [which] assembles individual objects, actions, and events into a 
comprehensible pattern’. Narratives are used by individuals or groups as instruments 
for sense-making. Moreover, narratives are constructions of the self (Andrews et al., 
2002). Thus, as mentioned above, narratives of scientists’ imagined publics also 
include constructions of their own role as scientists.   
Narrative analysis allows addressing complex and ambiguous issues 
(Mitchell & Egudo, 2003). Hence, using narratives enabled me to highlight 
ambivalences in scientists’ imagined publics and to show how the scientists 
constructed and drew upon different and contradictory discourses about publics. 
Furthermore, narrative analysis emphasizes the situatedness of narratives and 
facilitates the consideration of contexts (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996).  
Riessman (2008, p. 5) writes that ‘stories demand the consequential linking 
of events or ideas’. Thus, instead of taking single arguments or short quotes out of 
the interviews to answer more general questions (as is done, for example, in 
grounded theory informed methods), I looked for series of arguments and attempted 
to analyse how narratives about the public developed during the interviews, as this 
would also enable me to detect inconsistencies and contradictions within the 
narratives.
A thematic analysis of the data was carried out by writing summaries of each 
interview, where relevant statements, arguments or episodes were extracted and 
ordered. These summaries were then examined to find patterns, similarity of 
arguments and differences between interviewee narratives. However, like 
Polkinghorne’s (1995) understanding of narrative analysis as movement from 
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elements to story, the narratives used as demonstration in this paper were 
synthesized from several interviews in order to include as many relevant aspects and 
linkings as possible. These narratives about scientists’ imagined publics are, of 
course, co-constructions of interviewee accounts, my questions and my reactions to 
their accounts (Riessman, 2008).  
The majority of the scientists interviewed were employed by Norwegian 
universities, but a few worked for other research institutions. Thus, although the 
association to the two research centers provided an institutional context regarding 
offshore wind energy, presumably the scientists’ everyday working context, i.e. the 
university departments and research institutions where they were employed, may be 
regarded as least as influential for the scientists’ narratives of imagined publics. 
Furthermore, although the research centers facilitated contact to the industry, 
potential public engagement activities were largely left to the individual scientists. 
As mentioned above, in Norway scientists are increasingly expected to communicate 
their research to the public. However, a large majority of the interviewed scientists, 
both PhD candidates and senior researchers, did not engage in science 
communication activities related to offshore wind energy. 
The interviewed scientists varied according to their position, discipline, age 
and nationality. Hence, we may expect also scientists’ imagined publics to vary 
along these parameters; for example senior researchers to construct publics 
differently than PhD candidates due to their supposedly greater experience within 
public engagement. Surprisingly, though, no noticeable differences or pattern related 
to these parameters were found. Hence, in the narratives presented below I do not 
differentiate between interviewees according to these parameters.    
It is important to note that most interviewees did not mention the public 
without being explicitly asked. When talking about the future of offshore wind 
energy or challenges connected to the development and implementation of this 
technology, interviewees focussed mainly on the political framework and 
technology development (see Walker et al., 2010 for a similar observation about 
their interviewees).  
143

In the next three sections, I present the narratives of scientists’ imagined 
publics related to how scientists assessed public attitudes towards offshore wind 
energy. 
Out of sight, out of mind: the narrative of the positive public 
As expected, the offshore wind scientists were keen to put all worries about public 
resistance aside by arguing that siting wind turbines far out at sea would place them 
away from public concern. All interviewees agreed that there would be fewer 
conflicts when siting wind turbines offshore than on land, as it was believed that the 
public would be positive towards the technology when they would not have to see 
the turbines. Research Manager Foss pointed out: ‘Offshore. So I think that people 
think, “Ok, get them out at sea so that I don’t have to see them, then it will be fine”. 
And it’s not more complicated than that, I think’ (Interview 25).  
Similarly, PhD Candidate Smith started her story by saying that people 
generally are negative towards wind turbines, though if the turbines were to be 
placed out of sight, people would be positive. Referring to her own experiences of 
talking to people about her research, she explained: ‘I feel that most people have the 
attitude that if you say you work with wind mills, then it is “Ugh” until you say that 
you work with offshore floating wind mills, then it’s “Oh yes, then we don’t have to 
see them, that’s nice”’ (Interview 8). According to Smith, a realisation of wind parks 
in Norway is only possible far offshore.  
So it’s like, if you want a wind park in Norway, then I think it depends on that you have 
a technological development which makes it possible to remove them [the wind 
turbines] out of our sight, that you can move them so far out that we don’t see them. 
But that’ll be big technological steps to take. (Interview 8)
Research Manager Berg also considered removing turbines from sight a 
solution: ‘The advantage, aesthetically, is that if you go far out at sea there is no one 
except for those in boats who see it. […] Nobody sees it. So who cares?’ (Interview 
5). However, according to Berg, it is not just overcoming public resistance due to 
visual disturbance, but also due to environmental and biodiversity issues. He 
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referred to the controversy about endangered seabirds, especially, the sea eagle, 
which has been important in the context of onshore wind energy in Norway (Solli, 
2010) and argued that this conflict, though not the problem, could be avoided by 
moving turbines far out at sea.  
When it [the bird] falls in the sea then nobody will see it. So the problem will be of the 
same magnitude [as on land], but it won’t be in the focus. […] Seen a little cynically, 
you could say that it is easier with offshore wind mills. First, they are out of sight. And 
second, everything that possibly dies out there, nobody will see. (Interview 5)
However, not all interviewees construed a positive or indifferent public 
based solely on the assumption that offshore wind energy would prevent conflicts 
related to visibility and environmental issues. Professor Antonsen, for example, 
imagined the public to be entirely positive towards offshore wind energy mainly 
because it is renewable and may result in economic advantages. He also thought that 
the public would be interested in and fascinated by the technology itself, somewhat 
in the sense of the technological sublime.  
I suppose people think that it sounds fun, a little exciting. Oh, imagine that you can, 
especially when it starts to get floating, imagine that you can manage to get it working. 
[…] And if you start to tell people how much energy you actually can get out of a large 
wind park, then I think they’ll be amazed. […] So I think people really appreciate it. 
(Interview 23)
To summarize, in this section, I have presented the scientists’ narrative of a 
positive public. Drawing on experienced or mediated stories about conflicts mainly 
about onshore wind energy, the interviewed scientists imagined offshore wind 
energy to generate comparatively less or no conflict. Their narrative was 
characterized by technological optimism; technological improvements were believed 
to solve the problem of public resistance. Offshore wind was constructed as sublime 
technology to be developed without considering public concern. However, taking 
into account the expectations of a hostile public identified in earlier studies, did the 
scientists really consider offshore wind energy an outright solution to potential 
problems emerging from public resistance? 
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New jobs and high electricity prices: the narrative of economic 
concerns
In addition to constructing the public as concerned with issues of visibility and thus 
positive towards offshore wind energy, there were other issues, which the scientists 
believed might affect public opinion towards the technology. Mirroring policy 
debate on offshore wind energy with its focus on costs, economic arguments were 
very frequently included in the scientists’ conceptualisations of public sentiments. 
While expectations of new jobs and industrial development were seen to generate 
positive views, some interviewees believed that people would be negative because 
offshore wind energy would lead to much higher electricity prices.  
The cost of developing and implementing offshore wind energy was a 
dominant topic in many interview accounts. In this context, the public was mainly 
conceptualised as a mass of energy users. Professor Dahl, for example, mentioned 
users as potential opponents. ‘Opponents will be the users who realise that this will 
get enormously expensive. […] Everybody, who sees the costs realistically, will be 
an opponent of offshore wind in Norway’ (Interview 6).  
Dahl linked his story of the user who is unwilling to pay more for electricity 
to the question of whether offshore wind energy should be used to strengthen 
Norway’s position as Europe’s ‘green battery’. This could be done by combining 
offshore wind energy and hydropower, using Norway’s hydropower plants as 
storage facilities and selling hydropower to European countries when demand is 
high. However, Dahl argued that people are sceptical of this idea, again because of 
expected costs. ‘Who is going to pay for this? Would you pay for this? […] How it 
is now, it will be us, the users in Norway, who have to pay to get permission to be a 
battery‘ (Interview 6). Here, Dahl identified with the users and constructed himself 
as part of the public.  
Later, Dahl qualified his negative remarks by arguing that public attitude 
depends on the way technology is presented. If Norway were to be a battery for an 
environmentally friendly Europe, the public would probably be positive towards the 
idea of combining offshore wind energy and hydropower for this purpose. However, 
if people were to find out how expensive this would be, they would be against it. ‘If 
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you find out that this will lead to the costs for our energy increasing to one fifty,48
why on earth should we pay for all the others?’ (Interview 6). In this manner, Dahl 
constructed the public as potentially negative, drawing on an economic framework 
of cost concerns.  
Some interviewees saw the economic issues differently, in particular those 
concerning the public attitude towards Norway as a green battery. PhD candidate 
Evensen argued this proposal could be seen as economically beneficial for Norway 
in the future (e.g. when Germany would be in so much need for renewable energy 
that it would cover the costs and pay for offshore wind in Norway). ‘When it is 
profitable, it will be easier to sell this argument, I think, because you create jobs in 
Norway […] and you add value for Norway the same way as we do with oil today. 
We don’t extract oil for ourselves’ (Interview 15).  
Also other interviewees mentioned the potential for industrial development 
and new jobs as crucial to peoples’ attitudes. Research Manager Berg said: ‘When 
there would come industrial jobs out of this, people would have a whole different 
attitude towards this. Then it would have been lucrative’ (Interview 5). Similarly, 
Research Manager Sunde stressed that:  
Then the other thing comes in that it creates jobs probably also here in Norway. You 
will get an industry; you have some areas, which you have developed within the oil and 
gas industry and that you can build on further. So you can work with a prepared supply 
industry. It creates jobs during construction but also during operation. It will create 
jobs along the coast. […] So I believe it will be a positive thing. (Interview 24)
In sum, as in media discourse and policy debate, economic concerns were 
prominent in scientists’ imagined publics. This focus may also derive from the 
research centers focus on developing cost-effective technology. 

481,50NOKу0,20EURperkWh.Althoughvaryingsignificantlydependingonregionandseason,in
2011(whentheinterviewswereconducted),averagepriceperkWhwas0,45NOKexcl.taxandgrid
rentand1,02NOKincl.taxandgridrent(SSB).
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Making the public NIMBY: the narrative of the negative public 
The narrative of economic concerns already points to publics constructed as 
potentially resistant towards offshore wind energy. Thus, although all interviewees 
imagined the public to be positive or indifferent towards offshore wind energy 
because wind turbines would be out of sight, most interview accounts were also 
characterised by some ambivalence. A fear of public resistance, as suggested by 
earlier studies of imagined publics, was present in 21 of the 26 interviews. How 
were these fears articulated? 
In addition to relating potential public resistance to a fear of high electricity 
prices, most interviewees also mentioned visual disturbance and environmental 
consequences of wind turbines. According to Research Manager Bakke, ‘if you ask 
people on the street, they either don’t really have an opinion about it or they’ve a 
very strong opinion that it destroys the horizon, the birdlife and animal life’ 
(Interview 10). People were believed to be sceptical of offshore wind because it is 
not natural to have turbines at sea. Among some interviewees there was also fear of 
protests by environmental organisations, mainly because of the consequences for 
seabirds. However, ambivalence became evident when it was mentioned that it 
would be much easier to gain public acceptance for offshore than onshore wind 
energy. On the one hand, issues of visibility and environmental consequences were 
taken to be irrelevant and the public imagined as positive because the turbines would 
be out of sight. On the other hand, the same turbine was a source of fear for public 
resistance.  
A few scientists drew upon environmental issues to construct a positive 
public. Offshore wind is considered environmentally friendly, renewable and 
‘green’, and this was thought to influence public opinion positively. Thus, as with 
onshore wind energy (see Bye and Solli, 2007), an ambivalent construction of 
people’s perception of wind energy was found in the scientists’ accounts. Wind 
power was green renewable energy climate change but also a threat to biodiversity 
and conservation of nature (mainly connected to birds and seascapes).   
To strengthen their case about a sceptical public, many interviewees referred 
to public opposition to onshore wind energy and new power lines. The stories Bakke 
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told about a hostile public included her own experiences of talking to people about 
wind energy, as well as stories she had heard from other people. One was about a 
family who wanted to build a wind turbine on their farm but met strong protests 
from the local community. Like many other interviewees, Bakke also referred to the 
controversy over power lines in the Hardanger region in Norway, a tourist 
destination known for its beautiful fjord landscape, as a prime example of excessive 
public opposition to technology that invades nature and landscapes. Several 
interviewees also drew upon the role of untouched wild nature in Norwegian identity 
as an explanation for public resistance. As Research Manager Sunde put it, ‘it’s 
caused by nature. I mean, nature in the Norwegian national soul, in my opinion’ 
(Interview 24).  
Another frequent explanation for an imagined negative public attitude was 
that Norwegians are spoiled because of Norway’s special energy situation. Norway 
does not have the same need for renewable energy as other European countries. In 
Norway, 99% of electricity production is by hydropower and is therefore already 
‘green’. As Research Manager Bakke pointed out, ‘We are spoiled with cheap 
electricity, and we have the oil. We have hydropower which is cheaper to develop 
[…]. So, all these interventions are kind of “Uhhh”’ (Interview 10). PhD Candidate 
Smith argued more generally that: ‘Norwegian people are very spoiled. You don’t 
want to see things. You want that it’s very safe, it should be environmentally 
friendly and you should not see it. You should not hear it either’ (Interview 8). 
Interviewees also argued that people generally oppose new things and are resistant 
to change. Researcher Arnesen added that she has the impression that people in 
general are tired of hearing about environmental issues (Interview 21).  
These explanations were also used to construct a particular Norwegian public 
in opposition to the imagined publics of other European countries (with Denmark 
used as the main reference). The latter publics were conceived as having a more 
positive attitude, partly due to a more pragmatic way of approaching the issue as 
opposed to Norway’s more idealised approach. In one focus group, interviewees 
elaborated on the idea that Norwegians are negative towards the materialised wind 
turbine but positive towards it as an idea or symbol.  
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Consider the following exchange:  
PhD Candidate Sandvik: They like it [offshore wind energy] as an idea or concept. […] 
People know very little about what it implies to have an electricity supply, which to a 
large degree consists of wind turbines. The Danes know about that. And it is much 
more pragmatic than here. […] But the romance about wind turbines is very alive here. 
PhD Candidate Evensen: But what they did there [in Denmark], are things which 
belong to the industry. It is because we don’t have an industry. 
PhD Candidate Sandvik: I just think that a wind turbine is put in a completely different 
light in Denmark, isn’t it, how extremely pragmatic... And it’s simply the fact that 
people don’t know that much about it which leads to that people can idealize it in that 
way. […] It has absolutely not been pragmatic in Norway so far.  
PhD Candidate Riise: I just wonder whether this is why it has been so successful in 
Denmark. Because it’s just been like all other industries. It’s just something we do 
because we have to do it like that. Instead of having a very idealistic thinking about us 
saving the world. (Interview 15)
In these accounts, interviewees imagined a general public, or PiG (Michael, 
2009), by referring to ‘the Norwegians’, ‘people’, ‘the man in the street’, ‘ordinary 
people’, etc. In addition, some specific publics, or PiPs (Michael, 2009), were 
mentioned as potential opponents – for example, the fishing industry, because of 
possible area conflicts at sea, and environmental organisations, because of potential 
negative environmental consequences.  
Local community initiatives were also mentioned as possible opponents and 
the strong Norwegian regional emphasis with respect to politics was seen as a 
hindrance for developing offshore wind energy. 
In many ways Norway is governed by regional policy concerns. We really want to have 
all these regions and all outskirts, and we want to keep them as long as possible. This 
is a state initiative we wish to have. So, all local communities get very strong in such 
debates about interventions in their area. It gets very close and opinions quickly 
become very outspoken. Although we are very few people in this country, we manage to 
make big headlines about those things. (Interview 10)
The problem of Norwegian local democracy for implementing offshore wind 
was also discussed in one focus group. PhD Candidate Riise stated: ‘It has been 
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possible to complain about decisions so that in the end those who wanted to develop 
got fed up because it costs money to keep the process going. […] The local 
democracy can be a hindrance. It is a little bit beyond the pale, but I actually believe 
that’ (Interview 15). PhD Candidate Evensen added that people do not know their 
own good, and referred to the (in his view) exaggerated opposition against the 
pylons in the previously mentioned Hardanger area. Later he told a story about a 
local coastal community where people threatened to blow up offshore windmills if 
they were built. Also, PhD Candidate Smith referred to her own experienced local 
protest: ‘If you read the local newspaper where I come from, then what happens 
there is that they want to stop the development of wind mills and they want to 
destroy everything’ (Interview 8).  
In as many as 14 of the 21 interviews, in which the public was imagined to 
be potentially resistant, interviewees referred to the NIMBY narrative to explain 
opposition. As PhD Candidate Olsen put it: ‘Basically people don’t want to have it 
in the backyard of their area’ (Interview 2). Research Manager Berg connected 
NIMBY to peoples’ concern for the environment: ‘It is the environmental part of 
this that everybody thinks that wind power is alright, but that it somehow doesn’t 
suit here where I live. What was it the American called this? Yes, NIMBY, not in 
my backyard’ (Interview 5). In half of the 14 interviews suggesting a NIMBY 
narrative, the term NIMBY, or ‘not in my backyard’, was mentioned directly, while 
it was paraphrased in the others. NIMBY was used across academic disciplines, 
position, age and nationality.  
In one focus group discussion, the NIMBY concept was also used to explain 
Norwegian public resistance as opposed to the widespread use of wind turbines in, 
for example, advertising, as a symbol of a positive future. PhD Candidate Sandvik: 
‘It is strange that people think it [the wind turbine] to be aesthetic, but at the same 
time nobody wants to have it in their neighborhood’ (Interview 15). The NIMBY 
narrative was often told simultaneously and seen as consistent with the argument 
that placing turbines offshore is a solution to problems of public resistance. PhD 
Candidate Smith: ‘It is very strange, but as long as it isn’t in your backyard it is 
somehow great. As long as you don’t see it, it is great’ (Interview 8).  
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Even though the NIMBY narrative is widely drawn upon by, e.g., media and 
policymakers to explain public opposition in other countries (Burningham et al., 
2006; Devine-Wright, 2011b; Wolsink, 2012), some interviewees used the concept 
to construct a particular Norwegian public in opposition to other countries’ publics. 
Research Manager Sunde commented, ‘Here in Norway, people in general are “not 
in my backyard”. […] This is strange. In Germany, I got the impression that the 
farmers are proud to have a wind turbine in their backyard’ (Interview 24).   
Interestingly, one interviewee criticised the focus on public NIMBY 
opposition by saying that locals, in particular, are positive towards these kinds of 
new developments in their area. Professor Helland claimed that the focus on local 
opposition for reasons of visual disturbance or intervention in nature is exaggerated, 
and that this opposition is mainly put forward by those who do not experience the 
new developments at close range (Interview 18). 
To summarise, an expectation of public resistance and a construction of the 
public as NIMBY were found in a majority of the interviews. This narrative of the 
negative public could be described as involving some degree of cultural pessimism 
as the public was imagined as morally and intellectually deficient. Although the 
interviews were about offshore wind energy, interviewees extensively referred to 
stories about experienced or mediatized opposition to onshore wind and pylons to 
make their point. It seemed as if they were transferring existing narratives about 
public attitudes to onshore wind energy, offshore. In that way, they constructed also 
offshore wind energy as an object of fear for the public. 
Conclusion: Are scientists pessimists?  
This paper analyses offshore wind scientists’ constructions of the public(s) by 
identifying narratives within the offshore wind research communities in Norway. 
With Woolgar (1991), it could be claimed that the scientists’ imagined publics have 
a configuring force in the sense that they construct identity and constrain action of 
the public. Maranta et al. (2003) describe ‘imagined lay persons’ as functional 
constructs. Imagined publics may be performative in that they affect the design of 
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the technology. Moreover, Walker et al. (2010) argue that imagined publics may 
have greater influence than ‘real’ publics.  
While earlier studies about imagined publics find widespread expectation of 
a resistant public, I expected offshore wind energy scientists either to imagine a 
positive or indifferent public or not to take the public into account at all, because 
turbines are to be placed far out at sea and thus ‘out of sight, out of mind’. My 
analysis shows that most offshore wind scientists constructed ambivalent narratives 
about the public. On the one hand, scientists wanted to believe in offshore wind as 
sublime technology. They imagined huge floating turbines far out at sea, hoping the 
technology to be developed and implemented without having to consider the public. 
As Haggett (2008, p. 292) claims, offshore wind energy ‘is seen as a good thing not 
just in its own right, but because it may be the answer to many of the problems 
encountered with onshore development’. However, scientists did not dare to fully 
believe in this promise, and constructions of a resistant public entered into their 
accounts. Only a few interviewees told a simple story based on only one of the 
identified narratives. Most told a more complex, messy and partly contradictory 
story. In their accounts, they moved back and forth between narratives. Thus, the 
‘phantom public’ becomes ‘real’ and influential in most scientists’ constructions 
while at the same time keeping its ambiguity and ‘slippery qualities’.  
The ambivalence may be explained with reference to the particular 
Norwegian energy context. On the one hand, there has been an official rhetoric 
enthusiastically describing offshore wind energy as technological sublime, which led 
to the establishment of the two offshore wind research centers of the interviewed 
scientists. On the other hand, the interviewed scientists continuously referred to 
Norway’s history of public resistance to energy infrastructure, which, as we have 
seen, influenced their imagined offshore wind publics.    
Furthermore, accounts addressing public attitudes about far offshore (out of 
sight), near shore and onshore wind energy were often mixed without their 
differences being made explicit. In the ‘out of sight, out of mind’ narrative, 
interviewees often referred to ‘real offshore’. The difference between near shore and 
‘real offshore’ was largely defined by distance and visibility, rather than by 
153

technology (e.g. bottom-fixed vs. floating). Hence, a distinction between near shore 
(as in sight) and offshore (as out of sight) would have been fruitful in this context 
(Bailey et al., 2011; Haggett, 2008; Wolsink, 2010).  
In addition to aesthetics, an economic framework was prevalent. This made 
offshore wind scientists largely imagine the public as mainly concerned with their 
self-interests. People were thought to support offshore wind when out of their sight 
and when it benefits their economy by creating jobs. They were thought to oppose 
offshore wind because they do not want it in their backyards or fear higher 
electricity bills. In contrast, constructions of the public as concerned with more 
common or altruistic values connected to, e.g., the potential of offshore wind to 
contribute to climate change mitigation or its dangers for biodiversity were seldom 
mentioned by the offshore wind scientists. This economic focus may be explained 
through the focus on cost-effectiveness in the research centers and economic issues 
prominently featuring in policy debates about offshore wind energy. 
A construction of the public as positive towards offshore wind energy was 
nevertheless predominant in many of the ambivalent narratives. However, accounts 
of a resistant public and NIMBYs abounded in the interviews. Like in earlier studies 
observing the persistence of NIMBY arguments (Burningham et al., 2006; Devine-
Wright, 2011a; Wolsink, 2012), interviewees used the concept to describe the 
public, even though NIMBY-related worries were unsubstantiated according to the 
scientists, as expressed in the ‘out of sight, out of mind’ narrative. It is particularly 
significant that the NIMBY concept persists even in the context of offshore wind 
energy, where it could be expected to be resolved because turbines are placed at sea. 
Thus, although the NIMBY explanation for public resistance has been abandoned by 
social sciences (Burningham et al., 2006), the concept ‘has become a common 
shorthand’ (Devine-Wright, 2011a, p. 61) in other areas of society. In the offshore 
wind research community studied here, it was used in an act of othering to construct 
an irrational resistant public in contrast to scientists’ rational selves. Hence, offshore 
wind scientists’ imaginings of publics involved boundary work. This is in line with 
Wynne’s (1995, 2006) and Irwin’s (1995) descriptions of a dominant scientific 
institutional culture or science-centered worldview, which produces deficit models 
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of publics. 
The imagined publics described here also portray a disembedding of the 
development of offshore wind technology. The dominant ‘out of sight, out of mind’ 
narrative was celebrating the idea of scientists not having to deal with the public 
because they would be either positive or indifferent. The NIMBY narrative 
constructed a resistant public as irrational ‘other’. By othering the public as 
irrational, the scientists delegitimise opposition. Thereby, they provide a space to 
develop the technology without having to consider the public’s opinion and values. 
Walker et al. (2010) mention the potential to regard the incorporation of imagined 
publics as virtual public participation. However, in this case, the imaginings of the 
publics produced exclusion rather than inclusion, an othering of publics from the 
development of the technology. The implications of these ambiguous imagined 
publics for the design of the technology need further study.  
This paper contributes to existing literature on imagined publics through the 
observation that the motor for scientists’ constructions of publics is to balance 
between technological optimism and cultural pessimism, between offshore wind as 
sublime technology and an object of fear. As we have seen, the policy context, 
Norway’s particular energy situation and the country’s experience with energy 
infrastructure controversies play into the narratives about offshore wind publics. 
Also the institutional context of the research centers, e.g. the focus on cost-
effectiveness, may have influenced the imagined publics. Particularly, the perceived 
resistance towards onshore wind energy seemed to be transferred to offshore 
technology, in contrast to observations of a public largely positive towards onshore 
wind energy (Karlstrøm, 2010; Rygg, 2012). Besley and Nisbet (2013, p. 656) 
suggest that scientists’ misperceptions of public opinion may be a result of 
‘pluralistic ignorance and false consensus – a failure to realize when one’s own 
opinion is in the majority or minority, respectively’. Furthermore, scientists blamed 
negative media coverage for causing public resistance even though it is mainly 
positive (Heidenreich, forthcoming). Thus, scientists themselves could have been 
victims of the “hostile media effect”, i.e. that people with a strong interest in an 
issue ‘tend to view even favorable coverage as slanted against their goals and point 
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of view’ (Besley and Nisbet, 2013, p. 656). 
To conclude, constructions of publics involve constructions of the scientists’ 
selves. Considering the surprisingly high prevalence of constructions of negative 
publics, the question could be raised whether the scientists’ constructions of 
ambivalent publics mirror a pessimistic engineering mindset. The presence of the 
narrative of a resistant public could point to a general (unconscious) insecurity or 
fear among scientists and engineers, especially related to wind energy, to be 
criticized or to fail because of public protest.  
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Chapter 4: Outreaching, outsourcing, and 
disembedding: How offshore wind scientists consider 
their engagement with the public 
Abstract
The role of scientists as socialization agents (i.e. actors who contribute 
to the embedding of technology into society), has been increasingly 
emphasized in science policy, as well as in scholarly fields such as 
science communication and public engagement with science. Through 
an analysis of scientists’ narratives of science–public relations, this 
paper investigates scientists’ socialization strategies, and how scientists, 
themselves, interpret their role as socialization agents. The analysis is 
based on semi-structured interviews of 35 offshore wind scientists, 
finding a diversity of narratives related to the questions of whether 
socialization of technology is needed and which socialization strategies 
scientists should pursue. The public education narrative was dominant. 
However, instead of pursuing the socialization strategy of educating the 
public in order to overcome anticipated resistance, many interviewees 
referred to the difficulties of being outreaching scientists, and held the 
view that others should be responsible for public education, that it 
should be outsourced. Another common narrative was that of 
disembedded technology development; no need for the socialization of 
technology. More ambitious socialization strategies, such as upstream 
engagement and the design approach (i.e. the adjustment of technology 
to overcome anticipated resistance) were minority narratives. Thus, 
despite the importance attributed to scientists for the socialization of 
science and technology, most interviewed scientists did not embrace 
their role as socialization agents. 
Keywords: Socialization of technology, socialization strategies, 
scientists, offshore wind technology, Norway 
162

Introduction
Over the past decades, public authorities have shown concern over public resistance 
to new technologies. Concurrently, science communication has largely been viewed 
as a “‘technical fix’ to impose social consensus” (Bucchi, 2013, p. 908). Hence, 
policymakers have increasingly expected scientists to engage with publics and 
contribute to the socialization of technologies, in order to manage anticipated 
resistance (Neresini & Bucchi, 2011). This paper investigates the ways in which 
scientists view their role in the socialization of offshore wind technology. 
The “socialization of technology” refers to processes of embedding new 
technologies into society. A low degree of embeddedness may explain many of the 
obstacles met when science and technology are implemented, which is why “agents 
of socialization” are needed to engage in such processes. Arguably, scientists should 
be important socialization agents (Bijker & d'Andrea, 2009). Since the late 1990s, 
this important role of scientists has been emphasized in science policy. For example, 
in the European Charter for Researchers (European Commission, 2005), all 
researchers are asked to disseminate their research to society in order to increase the 
public understanding of science. 
Furthermore, academic studies (e.g. within the fields of public engagement 
with science and science communication) increasingly address science–public 
relations and highlight the importance of scientists’ communication with society. 
Within the approach of “upstream engagement” (Rogers-Hayden & Pidgeon, 2007; 
Wilsdon & Willis, 2004), scientists are expected to actively engage with publics 
very early in the process of technology development, in order to timely address 
relevant public concerns, particularly in the context of emerging technologies.    
This paper investigates how scientists may meet such expectations. To what 
extent do they consider themselves socialization agents? What kind of socialization 
activities do they see as necessary? The paper illuminates these issues through an 
analysis of interviews of scientists working with offshore wind power. Offshore 
wind power is an emerging technology of renewable energy that promises minimal 
interference with the public in terms of visibility, but nonetheless depends on public 
support for realization, not the least due to high initial investment costs.  
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The interviews were conducted in Norway, where offshore wind technology 
encounters ambiguity and uncertainty regarding its implementation. First, 
Norwegian policymakers have alternative options for sustainable energy sources. 
Second, nearly 100 percent of electricity production is from hydropower, which sets 
high standards for environmental friendliness. Third, Norway still opts to produce 
oil and gas offshore, and the oil and gas industry competes with offshore wind in 
terms of resources and manpower. At the same time, offshore wind energy has been 
enthusiastically described as “Norway’s new oil”49 and “Norway’s next industrial 
adventure.”50 Presumably, this context should motivate scientists to engage with the 
public.
Scientists’ role as socialization agents has been particularly highlighted in 
the context of emerging technologies in Norway. The importance of science 
communication for making science more available to the public, for increasing 
public knowledge about science and technology, and for facilitating public debate 
and participation has repeatedly been mentioned in science policy white papers 
(St.meld.nr.18, 2012–2013; St.meld.nr.20, 2004–2005; St.meld.nr.30, 2008–2009). 
This should also motivate scientists to engage in socialization. However, previous 
research raises doubts regarding scientists’ actual willingness to engage with the 
public in addition to finding a diversity of engagement practices. What does this 
entail?
Scientists as socialization agents and their potential strategies 
Bijker and d’Andrea (2009, p. 62) conceptualize the socialization of technology as a 
broad notion that includes any “processes involved in the production, use and 
circulation of scientific research and its products in an inseparable connection with 
its social context.” The authors contextualize their approach to socialization by 
referring to a changed – that is, more entangled, complex, and intensified – 
relationship between science and society. This is also described by the notion of 
“Mode 2” knowledge production (Gibbons et al., 1994). However, at the same time, 

49 Minister of Petroleum and Energy Åslaug Haga in NTBtekst 05.02.2008.
50 Minister of Petroleum and Energy Terje Riis-Johansen in Kommunal Rapport 26.06.2009.
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Bijker and d’Andrea (2009) observe that many researchers are hesitant to adapt to 
this intensified science–society relationship, and stay rather isolated from society. 
Hence, the authors describe socialization processes as weak, particularly in Europe. 
Likewise, Neresini and Bucchi (2011) note that a culture of public engagement is 
lacking in European research institutions.  
Several studies find that scientists explain their hesitation to participate in 
science communication and public engagement activities as the result of limited 
capacity, such as a lack of time and reward. Involvement in public engagement 
activities is not perceived to be suitable for all scientists, and is even thought to have 
potentially negative effects on some scientists’ reputations and career progressions 
(Kyvik, 2005; McDaid, 2008). However, Poliakoff and Webb (2007) find that 
scientists’ attitudes towards public engagement, the extent of their previous 
engagement activities, and the perceived extent of their colleagues’ activities 
influenced their intentions to engage with publics, as well as their own perceived 
capability. Furthermore, scientists construct science communication as difficult and 
dangerous (Davies, 2008); they believe it involves “getting out of their comfort zone 
and working in unfamiliar territory” (McDaid, 2008, p. 28). 
As mentioned above, Bijker and d’Andrea (2009) explain many hindrances 
met by science and technology in society with a lack of socialization. Nielsen and 
Heymann (2012) extend this claim by showing that engineering communication 
affects the implementation, as well as the development, of technology. Further, 
Bijker and d’Andrea emphasize scientists’ role as socialization agents in their six 
areas of socialization: scientific practices, scientific mediation, scientific 
communication, evaluation, governance, and innovation. The concept of a 
“socialization agent” is very broad, including all actors “involved in activities that 
somehow contribute to the social embedding of science and technology” (Bijker & 
d'Andrea, 2009, p. 72). Accordingly, scientists as socialization agents can pursue 
many different socialization strategies.  
Earlier research indicates that scientists mainly pursue socialization 
strategies that can be described as public education or dissemination. Callon (1999), 
for example, describes the “public education model” as the most common way of 
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thinking about science–public relations. Through this perspective, scientific and lay 
knowledges are viewed as two separate spheres. Scientific knowledge is presented 
as objective, factual and value-free truth that is superior to other knowledges 
(Holliman & Jensen, 2009; Irwin, 2008). Moreover, scientists portray the public as 
ignorant and thus skeptical of science and technology. Deficits in the public’s 
scientific knowledge should be eliminated, in order to establish trust in science and 
prevent peoples’ resistance towards new technologies (Callon, 1999; Stilgoe & 
Wilsdon, 2009). The public education model is also referred to as the “deficit 
model.” 
Despite extensive criticism of the public education model and an increasing 
focus on dialogue and public participation, a wide range of studies (Barnett et al., 
2012; Besley & Nisbet, 2013; Blok et al., 2008; Braun & Schultz, 2010; 
Burningham et al., 2007; Davies, 2008; Devine-Wright & Devine-Wright, 2005; 
Michael & Brown, 2005; Powell et al., 2011) claims that the deficit model persists 
in constructions of science–public relations. Scientists construct their own roles as 
public educators in a one-way science–public relation, with the public as passive 
recipients. Hence, scientists usually conceptualize socialization within a rather 
narrow framework, at least in cases where they are involved as socialization agents.  
Besley and Nisbet (2013) find that most scientists imagine the public as 
uninterested and unknowledgeable about science and also as irrational, emotional, 
and self-interested in their thinking about science and technology. Burningham et al. 
(2007), for example, in their study on constructions of publics within the chemical 
industry, find that the scientists believed the public to lack knowledge and be 
passive receivers of information. The chemical experts in their study depicted 
environmental concerns and the concerns of their neighbors as selfish or incorrect.  
Similarly, Burchell (2007) shows how scientists in the field of crop genetics 
legitimated their actions and beliefs by claiming that they were based on objective 
methods and grounded in natural conditions; in contrast to characterizing the 
public’s views “as based on a mixture of subjective and personal inclinations and the 
malign influence of the media and NGOs” (Burchell, 2007, p. 159). According to 
Cass and Walker (2009) and Cook et al. (2004), such othering of publics is often 
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based on characteristics like emotional and irrational.  
Maranta et al. (2003) claim that the deficit model is the standard model of 
the “imagined lay person.” The imagined lay person is a functional construct that 
may be performative and potentially influence the design and implementation of 
technology, and scientists’ engagement with publics. However, Walker et al. (2010) 
find that with respect to renewable energy actors “there was significant resistance to 
pursuing the possibility of ‘the public’ as being an ‘engineering issue’” (Walker et 
al., 2010, p. 938). 
Davies (2008) observes that scientists’ constructions of science 
communication parallel the deficit model, as the purpose of both seems to be the 
education of lay people. Also, Tøsse (2013) observes how climate scientists aimed 
to educate the public, pursuing a communication strategy characterized by political 
robustness, which “supplements the concept of social robustness by introducing the 
need to cope with a communication situation characterized by social, economic, and 
political conflict” (Tøsse, 2013, p. 50).  Besley and Nisbet (2013) find that scientists 
often blame the news media for the public’s misunderstandings and lack of 
knowledge. Several studies have shown that scientists tend to view the general 
media coverage of science more negatively than their own experiences with the 
media (Peters et al., 2008). 
Clearly, the public education or deficit model is a common construction of 
science–public relations. However, it has also been widely criticized for overlooking 
that lay people actively deal with scientific knowledge instead of passively receiving 
it, and that lay knowledge is not inferior to scientific knowledge, but qualitatively 
different (Bucchi, 2008; Irwin, 2009). Science communication should not be 
considered a one-way, top-down process. Instead, critics propose alternatives, which 
can be roughly divided into dialogic and participative approaches. 
The dialogic approaches emphasize the value of lay people’s participation in 
scientific discussions, focusing on a two-way, more symmetrical relation between 
science and publics (Bucchi, 2008; Irwin & Wynne, 1996). Both scientific and lay 
knowledges are conceptualized as “socially and culturally contingent” (Bucchi & 
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Neresini, 2008, p. 451). Callon (1999) calls this approach the “public debate model.” 
Contrary to the public education model, the dialogic approach holds that lay people 
do not passively receive scientific knowledge, but actively debate science. However, 
scientific and public knowledges are still regarded as two separate spheres.  
Participative approaches, in contrast, try to overcome the separation between 
scientific and lay knowledges. Public participation is not viewed solely as a response 
to science. Publics may also actively engage with science and technology by 
participating in decision making, policy making, and knowledge production (Bucchi 
& Neresini, 2008). Callon (1999) calls this the “co-production of knowledge 
model.” In this context, the concept of “upstream engagement,” for example, refers 
to an early engagement of publics in science and technology development to ensure 
timely public participation and enable “scientists to reflect on the social and ethical 
dimensions of their work” (Stilgoe & Wilsdon, 2009, p. 22).  
Thus, we may expect socialization strategies to be dialogic and participative. 
Davies (2008) finds that only a minority of scientists depicts publics as complex, 
and considers communication as not only a one-way process, but also a debate. 
However, she argues that even these minority discourses “remain bounded by a 
framework of the ultimate primacy of scientific knowledge” (2008, p. 429). Still, the 
different approaches to science–public relations may be present simultaneously, 
often in hybrid forms (Bucchi, 2008; Davies, 2009; Irwin, 2008).  
Similarly, Holliman and Jensen (2009, p. 48) find that deficit thinking “is 
being conflated with dialogue approaches under the umbrella definition of public 
engagement.” However, most of the scientists they interrogated were thinking in 
terms of the deficit model, while only a few thought in terms of dialogue 
approaches, and there was only “some indicative evidence” (Holliman & Jensen, 
2009, p. 48) of participative approaches. Accordingly, Bauer and Jensen argue that a 
movement from dissemination to more dialogic formats “remains, however, a claim 
that is never really demonstrated” (Bauer & Jensen, 2011, p. 9).  
To summarize, science policy, as well as normative theory, emphasizes the 
responsibility of scientists to act as agents of socialization and to engage with the 
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public. However, previous studies indicate that scientists manage this responsibility 
in different ways. First, there seem to be two main communication strategies. One 
emerges from the deficit model and aims to educate the public. The other is related 
to an ideal of more interactive dialogue, and may reflect ambitions of upstream 
engagement. Second, while some scientists are reported to actively engage with the 
public, many studies find, as we have seen, that scientists and engineers are reluctant 
to participate in such engagement. They may, for example, be doubtful of their own 
skills in communicating or in dealing with news media, or they may claim a lack of 
capacity. Since offshore wind developments in Norway are vulnerable to political 
support, one might expect that offshore wind scientists would feel some pressure to 
engage with the public in order to elicit support. On the other hand, scientists might 
find reasons not to do so, either because they believe some of their colleagues may 
already meet the challenge, or because they are reluctant to take on such engagement 
tasks.  
Thus, the expectation is, first, a considerable diversity among offshore wind 
scientists with respect to the ways in which they talk about public engagement and 
their role in such engagement. Of particular interest is the way in which scientists 
place themselves with respect to the deficit versus the dialogue model. To what 
extent have the recent policy efforts in Norway to promote the dialogue model of 
engagement been influential? Finally, there is the issue of how the offshore wind 
scientists imagined their public in the ambiguous context of offshore wind 
development in Norway. How important is this construction to their thinking about 
public engagement with regard to offshore wind? 
Method
This paper is based on interviews with 35 scientists associated with the two national 
centers for environment-friendly energy research on offshore wind energy in 
Norway: NOWITECH and NORCOWE. The scientists’ positions ranged from PhD 
candidates to professors. The majority was employed by universities; however, a 
few worked for other research institutions. Their academic fields ranged from 
electrical and mechanical engineering to marine technology and meteorology. In the 
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following, I refer to them as (interviewed) scientists or interviewees, and I use their 
position and a common last name (e.g. PhD candidate Hansen), to provide 
anonymity. 
The interviews were semi-structured, using an interview guide employed 
flexibly according to the way conversations unfolded. The original plan was to 
conduct focus group interviews to learn about how the relevant issues were 
discussed. Four focus groups were carried out; however, two of these focus groups 
had only two participants. Because of the limited number of available informants, it 
was not possible to get more participants for the focus groups. Hence, the rest were 
one-on-one interviews (or two-on-one, as some interviews were done with a 
colleague). Focus groups, arguably, should function differently to one-on-one 
interviews, as they provide more data about positions and disagreements between 
interviewees. In this case, however, the participants in the focus groups did not 
disagree significantly about the relevant issues. In addition, ambivalences and 
positions also emerged in the one-on-one interviews. Thus, individual interviews 
were similar to focus groups, regarding the display of multiple narratives.  
In total, 35 scientists were interviewed. This represents quite a large 
proportion of the offshore wind scientists in Norway. The interviews lasted between 
35 and 80 minutes in length, and all interviews were transcribed. Of the 
interviewees, 20 were Norwegian and 15 were foreigners. Interviews were 
conducted in Norwegian, English, and German. For this paper, quotes from 
Norwegian and German interviews were translated into English. 
Most interviewees, in focus groups as well as in one-on-one interviews, did 
not tell a single unambiguous story about science–public relations. Interview 
accounts were messy and vague with different, sometimes contradictory, 
constructions. Thus, I was interested in the different narratives about science–public 
relations within interviews, rather than the attribution of a single construction to one 
interviewee. This interest in narratives shaped my data analysis, in that I regarded 
the interviews as a whole, in order to analyze the way in which the narratives 
developed. 
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I analyzed the data by reading and writing summaries of each interview. 
These summaries included and ordered relevant arguments, episodes, and 
representative quotes. On the basis of the summaries, I created a table with an 
overview of the interviews containing key words related to the main research 
questions. This enabled me to better compare across interviews and to identify 
dominant and minority narratives. For a richer presentation of the narratives in this 
paper and to illustrate the different patterns of argumentation, I chose to use 
examples and thus construct the narratives from different interviews.  
The term “offshore wind scientist” is my construction, and my “imagined” 
offshore wind scientists were certainly performative in the processes of preparing 
and conducting the interviews, and analyzing the data. Hence, the narratives about 
the ways in which scientists conceptualized science–public relations in the context 
of offshore wind energy and how they viewed their own roles as socialization agents 
are co-constructions (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995). In the following sections, I 
present five narratives of scientists’ socialization strategies, starting with the most 
ambitious.   
The ambitious socialization strategies: Narratives of upstream 
engagement and design against resistance 
Above, I presented scientists’ potential socialization strategies for embedding 
offshore wind technology into society: the public education strategy and dialogic 
and participative strategies. I also presented the possibility of scientists’ reluctant 
take on socialization tasks. I found some versions of all of these strategies in my 
interviews.  
The dialogic and participatory approaches correspond with current 
developments in science policy and theoretical approaches to public engagement 
with science, and are often referred to in a normative way as the “best” or “most 
ambitious” socialization strategies. I begin by considering traces of these formats 
among my interviewees, although these were only mentioned by a few.  
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Upstream engagement means that the public should be involved in the early 
stages of technology development. Only 2 out of 35 interviewees mentioned such 
engagement. One of them, Research scientist Holm, considered this strategy useful 
to gain acceptance from relevant stakeholders (such as the fishing industry) early on, 
in order to prevent resistance later. Thus, upstream engagement was to be used 
pragmatically to prevent public resistance and conflict, rather than used idealistically 
to enable democratic participation. Professor Nielsen came closer to the latter when 
he emphasized the general value of early public engagement: “I think it would be 
important to start discussing with the people maybe five or ten years before really 
starting [the implementation of offshore wind energy] so that people could express 
their opinions” (Interview 22).  
Some scientists presented another ambitious strategy through a narrative of 
design against resistance, extending public engagement into the actual design of 
technology. This strategy was based on a construction of publics as potentially 
resistant, and can be characterized as a preemptive effort to avoid conflict. The 
strategy did not include direct communication with publics. Its main feature was the 
integration of anticipated public concerns in the design of the technology. However, 
most of the scientists did not consider the public relevant to technology 
development. As research scientist Holm put it: “It is about getting a good 
technological solution and then you will see; can society accept it or not” (Interview 
13). The public was not considered an “engineering issue” (see Walker et al. 2010). 
In contrast, Research manager Sunde’s argued that public concerns did 
indeed play into the design of the technology, for example in the choice of having 
three, instead of one or two, blades, and with a tower instead of a jacket 
construction. These designs were caused by concerns regarding esthetics and public 
acceptance.  
It is quite interesting. Why are they round and cylinder shaped? This has almost no 
other than esthetic reasons. If you go back to the 1980s, then wind turbines were jacket 
constructions. Yes, it looked terrible. It looked like old Western style. It didn’t look 
well. It gets much nicer with a tower that is round. […] This is how it developed. From 
people’s acceptance of onshore solutions, I think. (Interview 24) 
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However, in the same interview, Sunde strictly denied that any engineer or 
scientist he knew considered esthetics when designing technology: “Well, none of 
the guys I know think about esthetics in this field (hahaha), no” (Interview 24). This 
suggests that concerns with respect to the public were ambiguous. 
Despite this general reluctance to consider public concern in technology 
design, some scientists engaged in a thought experiment during the interview, 
imagining how technology design could be adjusted to provide technical fixes to 
public resistance. Although research scientist Holm argued that potential public 
concerns should not constrain technology design, he considered the possibility of 
redesigning details. “It could maybe be some details that you could make less noisy 
and you could do things to keep the birds away so that they don’t get into the rotor 
blades” (Interview 13).  
PhD candidate Nilsen demanded more investment in technology 
development in order to overcome the challenges of public resistance. “First, I think 
for instance, we should develop the deep-sea offshore. […] Then it’s far from the 
shore and maybe local people may be satisfied with that” (Interview 3). He also 
mentioned that it is important that wind energy technology has an environmentally 
friendly design. “We should make the design of the wind turbine very friendly to the 
environment, I mean to aquaculture. […] If we could achieve that, the fishermen 
would be very happy” (Interview 3). Likewise, Professor Dahl proposed that wind 
parks be designed with corridors to accommodate the fishing industry.  
As PhD candidate Nilsen pointed out, replacing onshore with floating 
offshore technology seems an obvious example of design intended to prevent 
potential public resistance. The argument that wind turbines would be “out of sight, 
out of mind” was typical (Heidenreich, forthcoming). As scientific manager 
Antonsen put it: “It is in itself a motive to go offshore that you avoid a great deal of 
the environmental conflicts” (Interview 23).  
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Public education: Narratives of the outreaching scientist 
The public education model was, as expected, a dominant construction among the 
interviewed scientists, who explained negative public attitudes by pointing to 
knowledge deficits. It was argued that people’s attitudes towards offshore wind 
energy were based on feelings. Accordingly, it was important to inform the public 
about facts. 
Research manager Bakke described the public as having a knowledge deficit 
and lacking acceptance of offshore wind energy. She believed that information about 
offshore wind energy would help counter peoples’ negative attitudes. Furthermore, 
she argued that the opposition against offshore wind energy to be not well reasoned 
but intuitive and spontaneous:  
I believe most people don’t really think about it. They think that a wind park destroys 
the environment. […] They think: I don’t want to have them outside my window, it’s 
destroying my horizon or it destroys the animals in the sea. […] I think it’s a little bit 
like a gut decision for many. (Interview 10) 
Through such public education narrative, offshore wind scientists 
constructed the public as irrational and emotional “others” (see Cass & Walker, 
2009; Cook et al., 2004 for similar observations). This othering happened mostly in 
the context of discussions of the environmental consequences of offshore wind 
energy and, in particular, the potential dangers for seabirds. Senior researcher 
Monsen explained that “there are people who believe that wind power plants 
somehow are bird killers; that it is like when the birds fly they get injured. If you see 
a wind park, it is somehow like a guillotine for birds. They picture almost a 
massacre. Created by the media” (Interview 26).
Unsurprisingly, the news media were often accused of being the source of 
these “wrong” stories or myths about offshore wind energy among the public. PhD 
candidate Tangen claimed:  
People think that wind turbines are like these massive bird murdering machines. But 
they really don’t kill that many birds. I just, I think, that side of the story gets told more 
than the other side. Like, ok, they kill a few birds, but what about a coal power plant. 
How many birds does that kill, for example? […] The real extreme examples of things 
get put out in the media, and that’s what people hear about and that’s what sticks in 
their head. (Interview 17) 
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Research manager Berg, however, argued that public discussion would be 
less emotional in the context of offshore, rather than onshore, wind energy. The 
birds that die from offshore turbines fall into the water and are thus “out of sight and 
out of mind” for the public. However, Berg also complained about the role of 
feelings and myths in the public discussion: 
I think it is easier to focus on facts than on feelings. Because there are many feelings. A 
dead sea eagle is sad, a dead bat not quite that sad. […] Actually, this is what I often 
experience in environmental research, that myths are much worse than facts. Very 
often a myth is developing about this or that industrial actor as a danger for the 
environment. And in many cases it is definitely so that facts are much nicer than myths. 
(Interview 5) 
Through such reasoning, the scientists argued that the public should be 
provided with information and knowledge. Scientific facts rather than feelings and 
myths should inform people’s attitudes. This would lead to greater public 
acceptance.   
Most interviewees did not find it necessary for the public to know much 
about offshore wind technology. However, some were convinced that people should 
understand the function of electricity prices and the electricity market, and how 
Norway would benefit from developing offshore wind energy. In addition, they 
should know facts about environmental consequences. It was such knowledge that 
would make public sentiment more positive. As Professor Lund stated: “I would say 
that [...] the understanding of the energy price, to start to educate people so that they 
understand that the prices will be different in some years. […] The whole society 
must be geared towards renewables. I believe this for sure” (Interview 7). In one 
focus group, the discussion went as follows:  
PhD candidate Lindgren: I feel like this with the electricity prices, how it [the market] 
works and how they go up or how power trading works though. This is something I 
didn’t really understand before recently when I actively started to acquaint myself with 
the topic. And what most people believe is that we scale down the reservoirs to be able 
to sell a lot of power so that we don’t have anything ourselves. But what they don’t see 
is that Norway makes a profit by having a power trade. And I feel it is important to get 
people to understand that. 
PhD candidate Sandvik: It is tax money, simply. 
Lindgren: Yes. 
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Sandvik: Yes. This is important. But nobody sees this. How much could the Norwegian 
society get richer by a wind turbine? It would have been tip top to get that properly 
illustrated.      
This is similar to Davies’ (2008, p. 417) argument: “It is better to 
communicate ‘big ideas’ or key principles than detailed research.” 
However, not all scientists who claimed that the public needs knowledge 
about offshore wind energy argued from the deficit model. Some scientists 
mentioned other reasons for pursuing a public education strategy. First, interviewees 
referred to the general value of knowledge. Interviewees believed that, as citizens, 
people ought to know about important and socially relevant issues such as renewable 
energy. Second, interviewees believed that, since they fund the research as tax 
payers, the public has a right to be informed about the use of their money. PhD 
candidate Olsen argued: “After all, the money comes from the people. And it is quite 
a lot of money that is invested in that area. So people, I think, have the right to know 
what is done with the money. So I think it is our responsibility to disseminate the 
information to the people” (Interview 2).  
To summarize, in more than two thirds of the interviews and focus groups 
(19 out of 26) the interviewees mentioned that the public needs more knowledge 
about scientific facts. This claim was mostly expressed through the deficit model. 
Some scientists had other reasons for providing knowledge to the public, such as a 
belief that the public has a right and a duty to know. In general, interviewees put a 
varying degree of emphasis on the importance of scientific facts in the public debate. 
While some held strong opinions about the need for facts, others were more 
cautious. Some started to reflect on the need for knowledge dissemination to the 
public (see below for further discussion). Nevertheless, the deficit model narrative 
was present in many interview accounts. How did the scientists see their role as 
socialization agents through this perspective? 
Some mentioned that scientists are responsible for science communication 
and should provide the public with necessary knowledge. They believed that 
scientists should bring facts into the public debate, which currently was seen as 
dominated by myths and feelings. Research manager Berg stated: “As scientists we 
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should not proselytize. We should be neither for nor against wind energy. We should 
just get out facts” (Interview 5). Also, other interviewees mentioned that scientist 
should communicate research to the greater public audience.  
Mass media were seen to be the main channel for providing information, but 
other channels were also mentioned, like as school visits and participation in local 
debates or lectures. Research manager Bakke elaborated the importance of mass 
media: “Somehow you wish to reach out. And this [the mass media] is the only way 
you can inform people to get accept that this [developing offshore wind energy] is a 
way to go, that people get the information they need to make up their mind that this 
seems ok” (Interview 10). She presented public outreach as a task of the two Centers 
for Environment-friendly Energy Research. PhD candidate Hansen argued similarly. 
However, rather than presenting the deficit thinking as his own, Hansen portrayed it 
as a request from the research center: “They [from the research center] mentioned to 
us that as scientists we must transfer our knowledge to the media, to the society 
[because] if they don’t know they will think negatively about our activity” 
(Interview 1). 
Not engaging in public education: Narratives of the difficulty of 
being an outreaching scientist  
Only a small group of the interviewed scientists actually said they engaged in 
public education activities (mainly by writing feature articles for newspapers). The 
scientists’ statements about their role in communicating scientific knowledge were 
usually accompanied by the modal verb “should,” often with a slight self-criticism 
of their own inaction, like Professor Antonsen: “As a scientist you should 
communicate. So I think this is something we could be better at” (Interview 23). 
Senior researcher Tveit thought that technologists were bad at communicating: “We 
are doing it way too little. […] We are not good enough to use the media. […] It is 
typical for technologists that we somehow don’t see a purpose in going out in the 
media to be misunderstood” (Interview 19). Also Researcher Arnesen was self-
critical: 
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We should to a larger extent see it as our responsibility to influence the public opinion. 
This doesn’t just apply for wind research, but research in general where we complain a 
lot about a public opinion being wrong and reactionary and such, but we can’t expect 
that the public has the same information like we. So we have to blame ourselves for our 
lack of presence. (Interview 21)
As illustrated here, statements emphasizing the need for public education 
often went hand in hand with constructions of a resistant public. Still, only a low 
level of public engagement activity was reported by interviewees. 
A common explanation of this low level of activity was difficulties when 
encountering the public sphere. These difficulties were attributed to a lack of time 
and resources, like limited resources at universities, and a system that rewards 
publications in international journals over engagement with media and the publics; 
“Universities earn their money by educating students and publishing in reputable 
journals. […] And if we write in some newspapers: ‘What are you fooling around 
with? You are wasting your time’” (Professor Dahl, Interview 6).  
Furthermore, scientists were nervous about communicating their research 
through the media. They would need to simplify, and they could be misquoted or 
misunderstood, which might harm their reputations;   
It’s not without risk to involve yourself, and I know that many refuse to do it because of 
that. They don’t dare to enter the debate because it is a tough debate and you get put 
on the spot, so you get somehow attacked a little bit. Very quickly, you get into a 
defensive position. No, it is a scary field. It is safer with science, we can relate to that. 
(Researcher Arnesen, Interview 21) 
Arnesen also mentioned linguistic differences between the scientific and 
public/political fields:   
We almost don’t speak the same language. Politicians always have to express 
themselves with full certainty and be very convincing and never in doubt, while 
scientists will be reluctant to say something categorically. They will always say, ‘Yes 
but,’ and ‘You have to take into consideration,’ and ‘This only applies in this case.’ 
[…] You have to be very careful. We can easily make matters worse, just because we 
don’t speak the same language. And when a normal reader reads what we say, it will 
be perceived in a completely different way. It will sound as if we don’t know, as if we 
are not sure. (Interview 21)
Several interviewees referred to the science communication of climate 
scientists in order to emphasize these difficulties. According to Professor Antonsen, 
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communication often fails because scientists lack knowledge about society:  
We don’t have special research or expertise on economics or media or politics or such 
things. In this way, it is like what I have seen with respect to colleagues in the climate 
world. You think that you understand all these things with economics and politics and 
media and then you do something wrong […]. Even though you know about climate, 
you don’t know about society. So, we should be a little careful. (Interview 23) 
Thus, many scientists, referring to the difficulties of educating the public in 
line with Tøsse’s (2013) findings about political robustness, concluded that science 
dissemination should be outsourced. How was this argued? 
Others should educate the public: Narratives of the outsourcing 
scientist 
In part because of the difficulties mentioned above, many of the interviewed 
scientists did not want to engage in science communication, like Professor 
Antonsen: “We didn’t make any particular decisions about or have intentions to 
enter the public debate” (Interview 23). Rather, this group of scientists argued that 
“others” should act as mediators between themselves and the public.   
One reason for this reservation was that the specific technological details of 
their work were difficult to communicate beyond colleagues while many 
interviewees claimed to feel incompetent in commenting broader issues related to 
offshore wind. PhD candidate Amundsen phrased it like this:  
I’m working in a particular technological area and my opinion could be 
understandable or valuable only to people who are standing on that same platform. I 
don’t think that common people can understand much when I describe the benefits [of 
the technology] or something like that. (Interview 9)  
Therefore, he proposed other people to engage in science communication: 
“Of course there are other people who maybe can translate the technical effect into 
general life. And they will perhaps do a better job talking to people” (Interview 9). 
PhD candidate Hagen identified these “others” as politicians and social scientists: “I 
think people who work in social science should be the ones who inform the people 
about the advantages [of offshore wind energy]” (Interview 4). In one focus group of 
PhD candidates, this was discussed as follows.
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Interviewer: Who’se going to do that work, this translation? 
Stone: Maybe you guys [directed towards the two interviewers, both social scientists]. 
Miller: […] As far as people. Yes, I don’t really have time to go out and start shaking 
hands in the streets. 
Stone: That’s what the media is for. […] 
Miller: I mean on what level should this discussion be? I mean I have a thousand small 
technical issues which are of interest to a small community of researchers, right. But I 
mean that’s not the kind of things that we share. […] [I]f there’s the opportunity to 
write an article for a local publication I would probably do something like that. But – I 
mean...
Vik: It’s not our job. 
Miller: Yeah, it’s not really our job. In a way that’s true. (Interview 16)
Furthermore, the scientists questioned the impact of their contributions on 
public debate. As research manager Foss pointed out: “Scientists have little 
possibility to influence the public opinion in this area. We can talk, and we can write 
articles in the newspapers, and we can go to the politicians and do some marketing. 
But it is somehow not us who should do this” (Interview 25). 
In particular, some of the interviewed non-Norwegian scientists (though not 
all) stated that they were “separated from society” (Interview 1). This argument was 
used as an explanation and reason for not communicating with publics, like PhD 
candidate Jonsen in one of the focus groups:  
I’m never going to have that much of a contact with the Norwegian society, with the 
Norwegian people, because of the language barrier and other cultural barriers that 
can never be bridged. […] So a huge chunk of people will get influenced and inspired 
by offshore wind energy, and never able to inspire other Norwegians. (Interview 16) 
PhD candidate Tangen claimed that “there is kind of a big disconnect 
between research, especially among the PhDs and maybe the postdocs and then 
society in general” (Interview 17). He added that this disconnect is even greater 
when the research group consists only of foreigners: “I think that it‘s kind of a 
problem to connect what we’re doing with society in general that there are no 
Norwegians in my group” (Interview 17).  
As we have seen, the public education narrative was common in the offshore 
wind scientists’ interviews. Thus, a divide was constructed between the emotional 
and irrational public others and the factual, rational scientists. It was thought that 
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scientific facts should be communicated to the public mainly through the media, but 
the scientists held different views about who should initiate this communication. 
Both the narrative of the outreaching scientists and the narrative of the outsourcing 
scientists were presented as strategies to manage the public knowledge deficit and 
thus prevent resistance. In the narrative of “not doing public education,” scientists 
widely pointed out difficulties associated with science communication, which 
appeared to be particularly challenging for the non-Norwegian interviewees. Does 
this suggest that all of the interviewed scientists agreed about the need for the 
socialization of offshore wind technology? 
Narratives of a disembedded development of technology 
The socialization narratives presented in this paper have mainly focused on 
strategies of dealing with anticipated public resistance. However, whether these 
strategies include public education, upstream engagement or the design of 
technology to prevent public resistance, they were presented by interviewees as 
something that they, as scientists (or others), “should” do, rather than something 
already happening in the context of offshore wind energy. This reported lack of 
action challenges the assumed importance of addressing the public. 
Scientists’ dominant narrative about offshore wind energy in Norway was 
usually brought to light through questions about the future of offshore wind energy 
in Norway or the challenges for developing and implementing offshore wind energy. 
It did not refer to the public as significant for the development and implementation 
of offshore wind technology. Rather, the public was largely absent in that narrative. 
Scientists considered the development of technology (with the primary focus of 
reducing costs) and a lack of political framework and support as the main challenges 
for the successful development of offshore wind energy in Norway.  
Interviewees challenged the need for addressing the public as part of 
technology development by not mentioning the public in the dominant narrative of 
offshore wind energy or through active questioning about the assertion that the 
public needs knowledge about offshore wind energy.  “(S)cientists agree the public 
knows too little about science but disagree on whether this presents a problem” 
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(Besley & Nisbet, 2013, p. 648). 
This ambivalent stance was developed mainly within the narrative of the 
public education model. Some scientists started to question its premises and whether 
it represents a useful way of thinking about publics. In one of the focus groups, PhD 
candidate Sandvik referred to the many uncertainties connected to offshore wind in 
Norway when reflecting on the assertion that the public should engage with or know 
about offshore wind energy. He argued: “If we who work with this are so uncertain 
and diffuse, can we expect that a person on the street is less diffuse and vague?” 
Discussing whether the public needs knowledge about offshore wind energy, PhD 
candidate Jonson argued: “They really don’t need to go into details of technology, 
but they need to know that this is for their own benefit” (Interview 16). Similarly, 
research manager Sunde responded to a question about what people should know: 
This is a difficult question. I am almost tempted to answer ‘nothing’ (hahaha). […] So 
what people should know, I rather believe they should know more about the 
environmental aspects. Somehow, that it [offshore wind] is a green or regenerative 
type of energy source and they should know about how many consequential damages 
one can expect or if they don’t have this, that it actually isn’t harmful to have them 
standing close to your home or in the neighborhood. (Interview 24)    
Other ways of questioning the need for the broader public to be engaged or 
informed included arguing, as Professor Rønning did, that only the local population 
directly affected by plans for development should be informed (Interview 14); or 
claiming, as research scientist Holm did, that the public only needs to be informed of 
any serious negative consequences for society and the environment.  
If there are things that have great consequences for society then I think that all should 
know about possible consequences. […] Similarly, I expect that an industry as offshore 
wind also should have this openness, if it somehow has big negative consequences for 
the environment or the surroundings. But I somehow don’t see anything like that. 
(Interview 13) 
The narrative of questioning or challenging the need for informing or 
involving the public is a narrative of disembedded technology development. This 
narrative argues that development of technology happens outside the social context, 
without clear links to society and public concerns. Consequently, there is really no 
need for socialization efforts. This narrative was often presented with the narrative 
of a positive public. When the public was considered positive towards offshore wind 
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energy, the interviewed scientists saw less need for the technology to be socialized 
through their efforts.  
Because the interviews constructed the public as a relevant issue for 
scientists, they invited scientists to be supportive of the socialization of offshore 
wind technology. Thus, the interviewees would likely aim to present themselves as 
“good scientists” living up to the expectation of being agents of socialization. 
Consequently, the strong presence of the disembedded technology development 
narrative is notable.  
Conclusion: Taking cover in the ivory tower  
This paper analyzed Norwegian offshore wind scientists’ narratives about their 
engagement with the public. Starting from the concept of the “socialization of 
technology” (Bijker & d'Andrea, 2009), which refers to the processes of embedding 
technology into society, it discussed the degree to which scientists view themselves 
as socialization agents, and investigated which socialization strategies scientists 
pursue.
The analysis of the scientists’ narratives shows the expected diversity. 
Scientists provided five different narratives of public engagement, and thus five 
socialization strategies:  (1) narratives of upstream engagement and design against 
resistance, (2) narratives of the outreaching scientist, (3) narratives of the difficulties 
involved in being an outreaching scientist, (4) narratives of outsourcing scientists, 
and (5) narratives of non-engagement due to a perception of offshore wind 
development as disembedded. Narratives 3, 4 and 5 were the most frequently 
mentioned. Moreover, very few of the scientists who referred to upstream or 
outreach engagement described themselves as active socialization agents. In fact, 
most scientists presented these strategies as something they “ought to do,” rather 
than something they were actively doing. 
Also, as expected, the public education approach (or deficit model) was the 
most common element of the narratives. The normative move towards dialogic and 
participative approaches found in scholarly and policy circles left few traces. The 
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only socialization strategy loyal to the normative ideal, upstream engagement and 
design against resistance, were seldom mentioned in the interviews.  
What about the other four strategies? The narratives of the outreaching 
scientist live up to the expectation that scientists should be socialization agents. The 
narratives of the difficulty of outreach, which often follows the narratives of the 
outreaching scientist, is seemingly in line with the expectation that scientist should 
engage with socialization. However, the scientists who used this narrative did not 
engage in outreach. Similarly, the outsourcing strategy bows to the idea of the 
socialization of technology, but not to the idea of scientists as active agents of 
socialization. In contrast, the disembedding narrative denies the need for scientists to 
engage in socialization. Overall, the main observation was that the effect of the 
expectation that scientists should engage in socialization was bad consciences and 
excuses for inactivity.  
The scientists’ perceptions of the public played an important role in these 
outcomes. The narrative of the outreaching scientist was often linked to an imagined 
resistant public, while the narrative of disembedded technology development tended 
to be accompanied by reference to an imagined positive public. Thus, the deficit 
model was discarded by many interviewees who perceived the public as positive but 
lacking any significant role in the development of offshore wind technology. 
Consequently, these scientists could be considered disembedded and without 
responsibility to engage with the public.  
This raises issues with respect to their scientific culture because it seems as if 
the offshore scientists mainly wished to design and develop their technology without 
considering the social context or engaging in socialization of the technology. This 
may be attributed to limited capacity, but also to scientists doubting the impact they 
would make should they make an outreach effort. The scientists saw their role as 
being an insignificant part of a big machine, and thus lacked the motivation to 
contribute. As such, they disclaimed responsibility. The increasing pressure on 
scientists to act as agents of socialization seems ineffective. Most of the interviewed 
scientists preferred to overlook expectations that they would act as socialization 
agents. Rather, they took cover in the ivory tower.  
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Appendix 1: List of interviews 
 When?  Who? 
(Pseudonym) 
Position/Field Nationality  
1 June 2011 Hansen PhD candidate/Physical 
Oceanography 
Non-
Norwegian 
2 July 2011 Olsen PhD candidate/Electric Power 
Engineering 
Non-
Norwegian 
3 July 2011 Nilsen PhD candidate/Electric Power 
Engineering 
Non-
Norwegian 
4 July 2011 Heitmann & Hagen PhD candidates/Electric Power 
Engineering (2) 
Non-
Norwegian 
(2) 
5 August 2011 Berg Research Manager/Physicist Norwegian 
6 August 2011 Dahl Professor/ Mechanical and 
structural engineering and 
Materials Science 
Norwegian 
7 August 2011 Lund Professor/Mechanical and 
structural engineering and 
Materials Science 
Norwegian 
8 August 2011 Smith PhD candidate/Mechanical and 
structural engineering and 
Materials Science 
Norwegian 
9 August 2011 Amundsen PhD candidate/Mechanical and 
structural engineering and 
Materials Science 
Non-
Norwegian 
10 August 2011 Bakke Research Manager/Marine 
Biology 
Norwegian 
11 August 2011 Strand PhD candidate/Meteorology Norwegian 
12 August 2011 Paulsen PhD candidate/Meteorology Non-
Norwegian 
13 August 2011 Holm Research Scientist/Marine Norwegian 
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technology 
14 September 2011  Rønning Professor/Mechanical 
Engineering 
Norwegian 
15 September 2011 Langmo, Riise, 
Evensen, Lindgren 
& Sandvik 
Phd candidates (5)/ Electrical 
Engineering (2), Energy and 
Process Engineering (1), Marine 
technology (2) 
Norwegian 
(5) 
16 September 2011 Vik, Miller, Stone 
& Jonson 
PhD candidates (4)/Marine 
technology (1), Civil and 
Transport Engineering (2), 
Electrical Engineering (1) 
Non-
Norwegian 
(4) 
17 September 2011 Herman & Tangen PhD candidates (2)/ 
Engineering Design and Materials 
(1), Civil and Transport 
Engineering (1) 
Non-
Norwegian 
(2) 
18 September 2011 Helland Professor/Electric Power 
Engineering 
Norwegian 
19 September 2011 Tveit Senior researcher/Energy research Norwegian 
20 October 2011 Engen Research manager, physicist Norwegian 
21 October 2011 Arnesen Researcher/Physicist Norwegian 
22 October 2011 Nielsen Professor/Meteorology Non-
Norwegian 
23 October 2011 Antonsen Professor/Physical Oceanography Norwegian 
24 October 2011 Sunde Research Manager/Materials and 
Chemistry 
Non-
Norwegian 
25 October 2011 Foss (telephone 
interview) 
Research Manager/Energy 
research 
Norwegian 
26 2010 Monsen Research Manager/Electrical 
Engineering 
Norwegian 

190

Appendix 2: Interview guide Norwegian 
Personlig bakgrunn 
1. Bakgrunn. Utdanning/Arbeid.  
2. Hvilke OWE aspekter jobber du med?  
Perspektiver på teknologien 
3. Hvordan ser du på offshore vindkraftens fremtid? Tror du dere lykkes her i Norge? 
(Hvorfor/hvorfor ikke?) 
4. Hva er de største utfordringer med offshore vindkraft generelt? (teknologi, kostnader etc.)   
5. Hva tror du kan muligens forhindre at dere lykkes med teknologien her i Norge? Er det 
forskjellig fra andre land – hvordan?  
6. Hvilke aktører ser du som støttespillere? Hvem som motstandere? Hvordan ser du på 
regjeringens og politikernes rolle?  
7. Hva er argumentene for offshore vindkraft? Og mot offshore vindkraft? Hvordan vurderer 
du disse argumentene? 
Public & Media (innledning: artikkel om mediedekningen) 
8. Hvordan fremstilles offshore vindkraft i mediene? Hva synes du om den måten offshore 
vindkraft er omtalt i mediene på? 
9. Hva betyr det for ditt arbeid/din forskning når teknologien diskuteres i mediene? 
Diskuterer dere dette for eksempel blant kollegaer? Hvordan? Hva er deres synspunkter?  
10. Er du eller dine kollegaer engasjert i måten offshore vindkraft blir omtalt i mediene? 
Hvordan? Hvorfor/hvorfor ikke? Hva tror du er viktig å si om offshore vindkraft? Til 
hvem?  
11. Hva tror du folk flest tenker om offshore vindkraft? Offentlig opinion (positiv, negativ, 
ambivalent, uinteressert)? Hvorfor? 
12. Forventer du offentlige reaksjoner/engasjement når offshore vindkraft skal implementeres? 
Eller allerede i nå i teknologiutviklingsfasen? Hva slags reaksjon/engasjement (motstand, 
understøttelse)? Fra hvem? Med hvilke argumenter?  
13. Forbereder dere som forskere/institusjon dere på offentlige reaksjoner/engasjement? 
Hvordan? Har dette innflytelse på måten dere tenker teknologien / design av teknologien 
på?
14. Synes du folk vet nokk om OWE? Hva skulle de vite mer om? Hvorfor bør folk vite mer? 
Har dere som forskere/forskningsinstitusjon en rolle i dette?  
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Appendix 3: Interview guide English 
Personal background 
1. Background. Work/Education 
2. What aspects of OWE are you working with?  
Perspectives on the technology 
3. What are your views regarding the future of OWE? Will Norway succeed (why/why not)? 
4. What are the main challenges with OWE? (Getting it to work, costs…)? 
5. What are the main obstacles to success for OWE in Norway? Is this different in other 
countries – how? 
6. Who do you see as the main supporting actors of OWE? The main opponents? How do you 
perceive the role of the Norwegian government and politicians? 
7. What are the arguments in favor of OWE? Against OWE? What do you think about these 
arguments?  
Role of Media & Public (introduction: writing about media coverage) 
8. How is OWE portrayed in the news media in Norway?  What do you think about the way 
news media cover OWE? Is this fair? 
9. Does it mean anything for your work when OWE is debated in the media? Are you 
discussing this among colleagues? How? What are the main views? 
10. Are you or your colleagues engaged in the way the news media cover OWE? How? 
Why/why not? What do you think is important to say about OWE? Who do you see as your 
audience? 
11. How do you think the public opinion in Norway is towards OWE (positive, negative, 
ambivalent, indifferent)? Why?  
12. Do you expect public reactions/involvement when OWE is going to be implemented? Or 
already now in the technology development phase? What kind of involvement (support, 
resistance)? By whom? What kind of arguments do you foresee?  
13. Do you as scientists involved with OWE prepare for public involvement/reactions? How? 
If yes, does this has influence on the way you think about the technology/design of the 
technology? 
14. Do people know enough about OWE? What should they know more about? Why should 
people know more? Do you as scientists have a role in this? 
